The fragility of nuclear deterrence, by Lorenzo Maria Pacini

Nuclear deterrence is much more fragile than it was during the Cold War, when there were at least some fairly distinct diplomatic guidelines. From Lorenzo Maria Pacini at strategic-culture.su:

History will not be kind to those who play with the future of humanity for the sake of their own political vanity.

The danger of nuclear escalation is real. The international balance has hitherto been based on deterrence as an instrument of ‘guarantee’. But if this changes or fails, what will happen?

The foundations of deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is a fundamental strategy in strategic and military science, which is based on using the threat of a devastating nuclear response to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or to deter strategic attacks by one or more adversaries. In its own right, it fits into the broader context of nuclear strategy, which concerns the use of nuclear weapons to protect national interests, defend security and influence the behaviour of adversary states. Nuclear deterrence assumed a central role during the Cold War and continues to be a crucial element of the defense policy of the many nuclear powers across the globe.

The concept is based on a psychology of international relations that aims to make the consequences of hostile action unacceptable to the adversary. Simple but very, very effective. In nuclear terms, it is a matter of making the enemy perceive that the costs of an attack, or of a conflict leading to the use of nuclear weapons, far outweigh the benefits they might gain from such an attack.

Nuclear deterrence can be divided into two main forms:

Direct Deterrence: it concerns the threat of using nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear or conventional attack by an adversary. The basic idea is that, if an adversary believes that attacking a deterring country entails the likelihood of devastating nuclear retaliation, it will choose not to attack.

Indirect deterrence: this refers to the use of the nuclear threat to influence an enemy’s behaviour in contexts not directly related to the use of nuclear weapons, such as conventional wars or strategic confrontations. In this case, the threat of nuclear escalation serves as a tool to influence an enemy’s decisions in conflict or crisis situations.

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