Can the U.S. drive a wedge between Russia and China? Probably not. From Mauricio Metri at strategic-culture.su:
The liberal globalist world order will collapse if everyone becomes mercantilist again due to geopolitics.
In October 2024, Donald Trump gave an interview to talk show host Tucker Carlson, in which he made clear his administration’s most crucial challenge in the international arena: to keep Russia away from China, as he identified China as the main threat to the United States in the 21st century. It means redesigning the central core of the great powers, made up of just these three countries.
That may be why he chose the strange figure of television host Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense. Author of the book American Crusade: Our Fight to Stay Free, published in 2020, the new secretary suggests, in histrionic tones, a Judeo-Christian crusade in defense of the West against China above all. Nothing much different for the State Department. Trump picked Marco Rubio out, a neoconservative who also identifies China as the most critical geopolitical challenge facing the United States this century. Like his boss in Washington, Secretary Rubio has spoken openly about the need for rapprochement with Moscow to isolate and weaken Beijing’s position in the world (For details, see journalist Ben Norton’s excellent article).
It is immediately apparent that there has been a significant shift in the tradition of U.S. foreign policy about Russia. Since 1947, with the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine, the United States has aligned itself more directly with the guidelines of British geopolitical thinking, whose structuring axis lies in defining Russia as the main threat to its global interests and national security. Something that is still alive today in British palaces. This vision was born in 1814, when Russia defeated Bonaparte, and remained present in London’s power spaces throughout the 19th century, for example, in the Great Game of Asia. Its formalization gained more precise contours in 1904, with the publication of the famous article “The Geographical Pivot of History” by British geographer Halford Mackinder, the primary reference for later Anglo-Saxon geopolitical thinking.
If, on the one hand, the policy (of containment of the USSR) inaugurated by President Harry Truman in 1947, marking the beginning of the Cold War, was structured based on the Russian, by then Bolshevik, challenge, on the other hand, it implied the expansion, to the borders of Eurasia, of the interventionist and violent tradition of the United States, practiced with iron and fire in the Western Hemisphere since the beginning of the 19th century. In this sense, to deal with the European challenges of the post-war period, Washington created NATO in 1949, whose basic principle, summarized by its first secretary, British General Lionel Ismay, was to keep the Americans in Europe, Russians out, and Germans down.
