The Easter truce and Ukraine’s political double game, by Lorenzo Maria Pacini

It’s hard to have even a temporary truce when one side doesn’t want the war to end. From Lorenzo Maria Pacini at strategic-culture.su:

Not even at Easter was it possible to have a little respite, because, ultimately, no one in the West really wants peace.

Strategy does not rhyme with hypocrisy

The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, had called for an “Easter truce” on the occasion of the liturgical solemnity, celebrated this year throughout the Christian world. This was a sign of strong attention to the human dimension of war, too often forgotten in favor of journalistic narratives and the utility of politicians who profit from the blood of young people dying at the front, but also further proof of Russia’s willingness to find sensible and rational solutions to the conflict. Solutions that, once again, have been manipulated and exploited by the enemy. There is no peace even at Easter.

In fact, Ukraine took advantage of the truce to turn the media narrative in its favor. The attack was twofold:

– In the media, Ukraine first accused Moscow of spreading falsehoods and, once the truce actually began (only on the Russian side), repeatedly accused Russia of continuing its attacks, repeatedly violating the truce.

– The affair served to cover up and make people forget as much as possible about the events in Sumy, or Bucha 2025.

– Strategically, Ukrainian soldiers tried to resupply some frontline positions and break through at some sensitive points, failing to do so but effectively firing on the enemy even though they knew it was a pause in the conflict.

In Jus in bello, the law of war, a truce is a temporary suspension of hostilities agreed upon by the parties. When declared unilaterally by one party, it is not usually considered legally binding, but may nevertheless have practical and legal implications.

The Hague Convention of 1907, in Article 36, defines a truce as “the suspension of hostilities between the belligerents for a period fixed by them, either directly or through mediators.” Therefore, when only one party calls for a truce, there is no international legal obligation, but there is nevertheless a strong moral and political value, which generally demonstrates a clear willingness to respect and protect the needs and safety of civilians, as well as to attempt negotiation. There is always an open military risk.

It is precisely the political nature of the affair that is strategically interesting. Kiev deliberately sabotaged the Easter truce because it is interested in continuing the military conflict. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported more than 50 attacks within the border areas with civilian casualties, including a 2-year-old girl in the Belgorod region. In addition to the bombing of Russian army positions, civilian areas in Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, and Lugansk were also attacked.

On the global political scene, the unelected permanent president Zelensky has shown great hypocrisy, trying to manipulate Putin’s goodwill, but without success. The result is a demonstration of war mongering and a lack of humanity

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One response to “The Easter truce and Ukraine’s political double game, by Lorenzo Maria Pacini

  1. Pingback: The Easter truce and Ukraine’s political double game, by Lorenzo Maria Pacini — Der Friedensstifter

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