Epstein was a mid-level operative in a transnational (U.S., Britain, Israel et al.) blackmail operation. Exposing the operation would expose a lot of intelligence skullduggery, but more importantly, it would render much of the blackmail material useless. So, it won’t be exposed. From Kayla Carman at strategic-culture.su:
Epstein wasn’t a Democrat scandal or a Republican scandal. He was an intelligence scandal.
The public loves a villain. It gives us somewhere to point the finger, someone to shake our fists at, a name to pin to the dartboard. In the case of Jeffrey Epstein, half the country threw darts at Bill Clinton’s face, the other half at Donald Trump’s. And in doing so, both sides managed the remarkable feat of being right and wrong at the same time.
Because Epstein wasn’t a Democrat scandal or a Republican scandal. He was an intelligence scandal. And if there’s one thing the intelligence community does better than spycraft, it’s convincing the public that their worst behaviour is an isolated incident.
The reality is that Epstein’s CV reads less like “rogue billionaire” and more like “contract HUMINT officer”. HUMINT—human intelligence—is the art of acquiring sensitive information by exploiting human beings, and it’s as old as espionage itself. In the old days, that meant cultivating an “asset” through ideology, bribery, ego, or, when necessary, a little creative embarrassment. Blackmail was not an aberration; it was the business model.
The 1st Bush administration’s seduction of a senior Saddam Hussein insider in the run-up to the Gulf War is a perfect example. This is still not public knowledge, but a source that previously worked with special clearance gleefully recalled the tale, pleased it was such a “successful op”. The chosen target? The general’s own niece, who enthusiastically agreed to seduce her own uncle in exchange for an Ivy League education and a U.S. passport. She didn’t consider herself a victim. They convinced her this was just a wise and fairly standard price to pay if you wish to become upwardly mobile. When your workplace normalises such trades, you stop seeing the moral lines at all. Plus, incest is rarely frowned upon in elite circles; the Rothschilds even brag about their inbreeding so as not to “pollute” the bloodline.
This dark manipulation is hardly unique to the Americans. The KGB’s “sparrow schools” in the Cold War trained operatives — male and female — in the art of seduction, teaching everything from body language to pillow talk as tradecraft. East Germany’s Stasi infiltrated West German politics with so many “Romeo spies” that entire ministries were quietly compromised over candlelit dinners. The British, not to be outdone, ran “Operation Mincemeat” in WWII — feeding the Germans fake invasion plans via the corpse of a man dressed as a Royal Marine, complete with love letters from an invented fiancée to make the ruse more believable. The detail wasn’t just for flair; HUMINT works because it feels real.
Sometimes, the tools were even cruder. In the 1980s, the CIA quietly ran “compromising photograph” operations in multiple foreign capitals, sending attractive case officers or recruited locals to seduce embassy officials, then arranging for conveniently timed “hotel room maintenance” or “accidental” walk-ins by an agent with a camera. The resulting images, often staged to look far more salacious than reality, could keep an official compliant for years — no need to prove the indiscretion, just to make it plausible enough to ruin a career. In the game of kompromat, perception is currency.
