Notwithstanding the rather odd use of the word “Fail” in the title, this is a very good article about America’s military shortcomings, which do not in any way stem from a failure to spend money. From Federico Pieraccini at strategic-culture.org:
An analysis of US generals’ growing dissatisfaction with the political leadership in Washington sheds new light on the direction in which the American military machine is heading. In particular, it is interesting to observe the military planning for the future of the sea, air, space, cyberspace, and land forces.
At the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces found themselves without any real peer, causing them to gradually alter their strategy and investments in war and conflicts. They transitioned from being a large numerical force geared toward fighting opponents of a similar caliber (the USSR) in accordance with a specific military strategy, to a force focused on hybrid adversaries (regular or militia forces) or foes that were not their equal (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Libya). The US military accordingly proceeded to change its planning and tactics to satisfy the demands of the new tenants in the White House, the notorious Neoconservatives. What resulted was a military doctrine centered on the concept of a unipolar world and aimed at global domination.
Since the early 90s, policy-makers in Washington have had as their objective the utopian goal of global hegemony, and in order to accomplish this the US armed forces had to expand and create new control centers (USAFRICOM, USNORTHCOM), in addition to those already in existence (USEUCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM), in every corner of the planet.
This is a typical example of imperial overreach, which has historically been the impetus for the collapse of several kingdoms and empires over the centuries.
The operational capabilities of the US military machine from the 90s to the mid-2000s remained more or less unchanged in every major conflict in which it was involved: Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. These were conflicts in which the defense forces of these nations could not hope to match the attacker’s power. Weak air defences were a common denominator for all these nations – a vulnerability that has always been the prerequisite for wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the US ability to attain air superiority and thus subsequently enjoy unchallenged air space.
Carpet bombing, coupled with the use of staggering numbers of cruise missiles, destroyed the anti-aircraft defenses of both countries, paving the way for massive ground or airborne invasions. One example still fresh in everyone’s mind was the intensity of the US strike in the early days of the Iraq war in 2003, which brought unprecedented levels of death and destruction.
Yet despite this advantageous position, the number of dead American and allied soldiers during the years of occupation was enough to shock the American public, perhaps forever changing the perception of the military conflict. The consequences were predictable, with popular pressure forcing a withdrawal of troops from Iraq and a significant reduction of the contingent stationed in Afghanistan.
After a 70-year history of warfare, the old strategy of bombing, invading, and occupying a conquered territory had outlived its usefulness.
To continue reading: Why American Military Doctrine Is Doomed for Fail
