The Chinese play the long game, and they do it exceedingly well. From Lorenzo Maria Pacini at strategic-culture.su:
The so-called “strategic gradualism” allows China to advance its fundamental interests without taking a single, decisive action that could provoke direct conflict.
A strategic profile with a political heart
In the frenetic development of “warfare,” there are some countries that are rapidly moving toward a redefinition of all domains, at least as we have considered them to date. Among these, China occupies a prominent role because it represents the greatest economic and technological adversary for the collective West.
China has adopted a multi-level strategy in the so-called gray space, resorting to practices that include maritime aggression linked to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, cyber operations, forms of economic coercion, and online propaganda campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion. Specialized literature highlights how Beijing exploits ambiguity and employs unconventional tactics, thus complicating the responses of the United States and its allies. Let us therefore take a look at China’s objectives in the gray zone, its strategy and its tools, until we arrive at a logical model constructed to synthesize these elements.
To understand the People’s Republic’s goals in gray zone operations, we must first consider how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interprets this concept as a political and ideological structure that drives all action. While employing peacetime actions below the threshold of war as an integral part of national policy, Beijing does not define itself as a gray zone actor. Instead, the Chinese leadership recognizes this category as a practice historically used by the great powers—the United States, Russia, and the Soviet Union—including against China itself.
The CCP prefers to avoid Western terminology, speaking instead of “military operations other than war” (MOOTW). Although there is overlap with the American definition of gray zone activities, Beijing does not consider such actions to be hostile acts, but rather strategic tools that serve its political agenda. The different conceptions of peace and conflict between the West and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) explain this choice: in Chinese strategic thinking, “peace” does not equate to the absence of conflict or violence.
Sun Tzu chess masters versus 4-D checkers?
Duh, winning.