Tag Archives: Monetary Policy

Central Banking Refuted In One Blog—–Thanks Ben! by David Stockman

Blogger Ben Bernanke discovers the blogosphere can be a rough neighborhood as David Stockman rips him a new asshole. From Stockman at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

Blogger Ben’s work is already done. In his very first substantive post as a civilian he gave away all the secrets of the monetary temple. The Bernank actually refuted the case for modern central banking in one blog.

In fact, he did it in one paragraph. This one.

A similarly confused criticism often heard is that the Fed is somehow distorting financial markets and investment decisions by keeping interest rates “artificially low.” Contrary to what sometimes seems to be alleged, the Fed cannot somehow withdraw and leave interest rates to be determined by “the markets.” The Fed’s actions determine the money supply and thus short-term interest rates; it has no choice but to set the short-term interest rate somewhere.

Not true, Ben. Why not ask the author of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act and legendary financial statesman of the first third of the 20th century—–Carter Glass.

The then Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee did not refer to the new reserve system as a “banker’s bank” because he was old-fashioned or unschooled in finance. The term evoked the essence of the Fed’s original mission. Namely, to passively rediscount good commercial collateral (receivables and inventory loans) brought to its window by member banks—priced at a penalty spread floating above the market rate of interest.

Notwithstanding Bernanke’s spurious claim that the Fed has to “set the short-term rate somewhere”, tIhe reserve system designed by Congressman Glass was authorized to do no such thing.It had no target for the Federal funds rate; no remit to engage in open market buying and selling of securities; and, indeed, no authority to own or discount government bonds and bills at all.

Instead, its job was to passively respond to the ebb and flow of trade and industry on main street as mediated through the commercial banking system. If business conditions were robust, interest rates would rise on the free market in order to balance the demand for working capital loans and long-term debt financing with the available supply of private savings.

http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/central-banking-refuted-in-one-blog-thanks-ben/

To continue reading: Central Banking Refuted In One Blog

Finally The “Very Serious People” Get It: QE Will “Permanently Impair Living Standards For Generations To Come”, from Zero Hedge

QE doesn’t work, and is in fact counterproductive. That’s evidently news to The Financial Times, but not to Zero Hedge or SLL, who predicted its failure six years ago. How, we have repeatedly asked, can a central buying exchanging its fiat money for a government’s indebtedness, promote anything—notably economic growth—other than paper swapping? From zerohedge.com:

When “very serious people” (even if it is those who once ran now defunct Bear Stearns) announce it, with a 6 year delay, they make the Financial Times.

On the other hand, when Zero Hedge said precisely this 6 years ago, it was cast as a tin-foil clad group of conspirators who see the worst in every situation.

What is “it”? This:

The long-term consequences of global QE are likely to permanently impair living standards for generations to come while creating a false illusion of reviving prosperity.
In this case, it was said this week by Guggenheim’s Chairman of Investments and Global Chief Investment Officer, Scott Minerd. We are happy that increasingly more “serious people” come to the same conclusion which we posited first a 6 years ago.

* * *

Here is the full note:

The Monetary Illusion

As economic growth returns again to Europe and Japan, the prospect of a synchronous global expansion is taking hold. Or, then again, maybe not. In a recent research piece published by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, global economic growth, as measured in nominal U.S. dollars, is projected to decline in 2015 for the first time since 2009, the height of the financial crisis.

In fact, the prospect of improvement in economic growth is largely a monetary illusion. No one needs to explain how policymakers have made painfully little progress on the structural reforms necessary to increase global productive capacity and stimulate employment and demand. Lacking the political will necessary to address the issues, central bankers have been left to paper over the global malaise with reams of fiat currency.

With politicians lacking the willingness or ability to implement labor and tax reforms, monetary policy has perversely morphed into a new orthodoxy where even central bankers admittedly view it as their job to use their balance sheets as a tool to implement fiscal policy.

One argument is that if central banks were not created to execute fiscal policy, then why require them to maintain any capital at all? Capital is that which is held in reserve to absorb losses. If losses are to be anticipated, then a reasonable inference is that a certain expectation of risk must exist. Therefore, central banks must be expected to take on some risk for policy purposes, which implies a function beyond the creation of a monetary base to maintain price stability.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-03-28/finally-very-serious-people-get-it-qe-will-permanently-impair-living-standards-gener

To continue reading: Finally The “Very Serious People” Get It

They Said That? 3/18/15

From the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, press release, 3/18/15:

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, with labor market indicators continuing to move toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee continues to see the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as nearly balanced. Inflation is anticipated to remain near its recent low level in the near term, but the Committee expects inflation to rise gradually toward 2 percent over the medium term as the labor market improves further and the transitory effects of energy price declines and other factors dissipate. The Committee continues to monitor inflation developments closely.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain this target range, the Committee will assess progress–both realized and expected–toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. Consistent with its previous statement, the Committee judges that an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate remains unlikely at the April FOMC meeting. The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the medium term. This change in the forward guidance does not indicate that the Committee has decided on the timing of the initial increase in the target range.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20150318a.htm

This is not the full text of the press release. These two paragraphs were chosen to demonstrate a masterful use of 313 words to say nothing.  The economy is not getting better, but it’s not getting worse, but if it is getting worse it will get better. The federal funds rate target is just right now, but how long it will stay just right is dependent on five broadly defined variables. It will probably stay just right through the April Federal Open Market Committee meeting. If inflation moves back to 2 percent and the Department of Labor keeps spitting out good unemployment statistics, the target range will be raised, but no word on when that might be.

This, then, is the culmination of the move over the last few years to make the Fed more transparent and open. There is nothing transparent about this release, because it says nothing. The stock market went wild because the release infinitesimally appeared to lower the chances the federal funds rate target will be raised all of 25 basis points, a quarter of a percent, in June. On such slender threads do financial markets hang. SLL has said it before and will say it again: when the only thing the stock market has going for it is cheap financing from the central bank, that’s a market to shun.

Crisis Progress Report (5): The Black Hole, by Robert Gore

The world is at the event horizon of the black hole of debt, the point of no return in which the gravitational pull of imploding debt makes escape impossible. Debt has allowed the world’s command and controllers to pretend they could control many important variables, but debt reaches a point where debt service costs outweigh putative benefits. It is then only a matter of time before it collapses, and it doesn’t matter where that collapse begins. The world has $200 trillion of debt, almost three times world GDP, and most financial assets are in fact someone’s debt, or, further down the priority ladder, equity—unsecured ownership claims on corporations. In a world as indebted as ours, an impairment of even a small percentage of debt reverberates globally, as the impairment entails asset mark downs, impairing the debt service capabilities of those asset owners, which means mark downs by their creditors, jeopardizing their debt payments, and so on. Once the black hole forms and exerts its pull, its event horizon expands, sucking in financial instruments, entire companies, and governments.

Back in the days when the Federal Reserve was engaged in Quantitative Easing (QE), depreciating the dollar, countries who wanted to maintain their exports had to depreciate in tandem to maintain their currency’s foreign exchange rate against the dollar. The US was exporting QE, which had all the attendant consequences we’ve come to know and love for the importers: artificially lower interest rates, artificial economic “stimulus,” debt promotion and expansion, and a currency that either kept pace with the dollar’s depreciation or out-depreciated it. QE presented a rare bonanza for the financially connected: borrow US dollars at near zero interest rates, speculate with the proceeds on anything that potentially presented a positive return, and pay back the loan in depreciated dollars. It was a trade that drove equity markets higher, bond yields lower, funded fracking and other low-quality debt, and was the foundation of unknown trillions in all manner of derivative speculation.

Using borrowed dollars meant these trades were short dollars. The end of QE and the dollar’s rally are inflicting massive pain and prompting the unwind of many of them. A 5 percent loss hurts when the speculator has put up the full price, at 10 times leverage it becomes a 50 percent loss, at 20 times the speculator’s equity is wiped out. Putting up full price in modern financial markets is quaintly anachronistic. Almost everyone is leveraged, and 20 times or more is not anomalous. The unwinds contract the debt used to fund the underlying trades, shrinking total debt. In other words, much of the world’s speculative activity is running smack into the event horizon.

What is happening to those countries, many of them emerging market nations, who imported the Fed’s QE? They no longer have to manufacturer their local currencies to buy dollars to depreciate their currencies; the market is taking care of that for them. This serves as an implicit monetary tightening, with the reverse consequences of imported QE. Money becomes less plentiful; interest rates rise and the currency appreciates, which slows or stops export growth and consequently economic expansion. Importantly, it also prompts debt contraction, or more debt at the event horizon.

China is in a league of its own. Its currency, the yuan, has a “soft” peg to the dollar, consequently the yuan has roughly moved with the dollar. When the dollar was weak, China weakened its currency to keep up, accumulating almost $4 trillion as it bought dollars and sold yuan. Selling yuan increases the Chinese money supply—Chinese QE. Exports dominate the economy, promoting a rising standard of living and acquiescent quietude to Communist domination among the Chinese masses. When China’s export markets contracted during the financial crisis, China went on a debt binge, funding unnecessary domestic infrastructure and redundant housing developments. Since 2008, total Chinese credit has quadrupled, reaching 282 percent of GDP.

To maintain the yuan-dollar peg now that the dollar is rising, the Chinese must sell dollar reserves to buy yuan, tightening the domestic money supply. This handicaps Chinese exports, shrinks China’s foreign exchange reserves, and retards economic growth and debt expansion. The yuan is slipping against the dollar, but because the dollar is rising and the world is hell-bent on competitive currency devaluation, the yuan is rising against most other currencies. If the Chinese abandon the peg and let the yuan fall against the dollar and other currencies, they will see an acceleration of already serious capital flight. If they don’t: slowing exports, economic contraction, and potential social unrest. The Chinese leadership has responded as most command and controllers respond when confronted with hard problems that have no easy solutions: it has grown increasingly repressive (see “The Endgame Of Communist Rule In China Has Begun,” by David Shambaugh, The Wall Street Journal, 3/7-8/15, SLL, 3/9/15). Whether or not the peg is abandoned, the Chinese economy is slowing and has a rendezvous with unsustainable debt. Maintaining the peg will only hasten the day.

Debt began collapsing in on itself with last year’s commodity bust. In the fracking “miracle” oil patch, the collapse is well advanced (see “‘Default Monday’: Oil & Gas Companies Face Their Creditors,” by Wolf Richter, SLL, 3/5/15), and will eventually draw non-oil debt into the no-escape vortex. The financial world is holding its breath, waiting to see who the dollar short carries out on a stretcher; who draws the short stick on Greek, Ukrainian, and Austrian debt, (see “Ukraine unofficially has 275 percent inflation!” from The Burning Platform, SLL, 3/10/15, and “Austria is fast becoming Europe’s latest debt nightmare,” by Jeremy Warner, SLL, 3/8/15), and how China will maintain a strong and weak currency at the same time. Now that the event horizon has been breached, the black hole of debt is expanding, exerting its increasingly powerful gravitational pull.

ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS NO CENTRAL BANK!

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AMAZON

KINDLE

NOOK

He Said That? 1/30/15

It is rare when a president of a Federal Reserve bank and SLL are in agreement. From Charles Plosser, president of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve:

It may work out just fine, but there’s a risk to that strategy, and the risk is that we wait until the point where markets force us to raise rates and then we have to react quickly and aggressively. I believe that if we wait too long, then we run the risk of falling very far behind the curve or disrupting the economy by rapid rate increases….

…The history is that monetary policy is not ultimately a very effective tool at solving real economic structural problems. It can try for a while but the problem then is that it’s only temporarily effective, and when you can’t do it anymore you get the explosion yesterday in the Swiss market.

One of the things I’ve tried to argue is look, if we believe that monetary policy is doing what we say it’s doing and depressing real interest rates and goosing the economy and we’re in some sense distorting what might be the normal market outcomes at some point, we’re going to have to stop doing it. At some point the pressure is going to be too great. The market forces are going to overwhelm us. We’re not going to be able to hold the line anymore. And then you get that rapid snapback in premiums as the market realizes that central banks can’t do this forever. And that’s going to cause volatility and disruption….

…I think the jury is still out on the costs. Because the cost I was worried about was the longer-term cost of unraveling all of this. So maybe I was right, maybe I was wrong. That remains to be seen.

I do worry about the longer-term implications for the institution. Part of my criticism has been that we have pushed the boundaries into fiscal rather than monetary policy. That has brought us praise and opprobrium. Perhaps justifiably on both counts. I do wonder as I look down the road five or 10 years, how will that shape the institution? What happens to our independence? What happens to our ability to do things effectively? Given all that we’ve done — maybe it was all for the best, but even if it was — are there going to be longer-term ramifications that we may end up regretting later?

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-01-30/what-happens-when-markets-realize

Did Mr. Plosser read yesterday’s SLL post, “Crisis Progress Report?” He seems to be acknowledging the Command and Control Futility Principle: Governments and central banks can control one or more, but not all variables in a multi-variable system. How can Mr. Plosser get away with publicly voicing doubts about the policies of his institution? He’s committed two sins that could cost him a plum position at a Wall Street investment bank: honesty, and questioning the idea that buying debt with made up money promotes prosperity. He must be near retirement.