Tag Archives: Vietnam

Lessons of the Vietnam War, by Justin Raimondo

SLL has said more times than its readers probably care to hear that in Washington, nothing succeeds like failure. Nothing illustrates this maxim better than the last 60 years of foreign interventions. From Justin Raimondo at antiwar.com:

Forty years after the fall of Saigon, Washington is still pursuing the same policies that led to the worst defeat in American military history. We never acknowledged, let alone learned, the lessons of that misconceived campaign to “roll back Communism” in Southeast Asia, thus setting ourselves up for endless repeats – in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now, perhaps, Iran.

Just as today’s “war on terrorism” is portrayed as a “generational” struggle against “radical Islam,” so the Vietnam war was an episode in a cold war saga the end of which no one could see. The Soviet Union was presented as Satan with a sword, a mighty enemy sworn to our destruction, whose agents had subverted every country worth conquering and were homing in on the American homeland – unless we acted to stop them.

The reality, however, was quite different. Soviet socialism had struggled to survive ever since the Bolsheviks seized power in a 1917 coup, and only endured World War II due to massive Western aid and US intervention in the conflict. Even before the end of the war, which decimated Russia, the Kremlin had been forced by necessity to make its accommodation with the West, formally giving up the much-cited Communist goal of a world revolution against capitalism in favor of “socialism in one country.” Unable to feed its own people, let alone conquer the world, the ramshackle Soviet empire could hardly keep a hold on its eastern European satellites, facing rebellions in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia before the final implosion in 1989.

Such gains as the Soviets made were accomplished either with outright Western complicity – Eastern Europe was handed over to “Uncle Joe” at Yalta – or else due to the stubborn incompetence of the US and its allies. While what was then called the “Third World” was throwing off the chains of colonial rule, Washington sided with the colonialists – in Vietnam, this meant the French, who were aided (in limited fashion) by Eisenhower. President Kennedy had none of his predecessor’s caution, however, and he leaped into the fray, declaring we would “pay any price, bear any burden” in the struggle against the Communist Menace. His administration took the first step down that fateful road, supporting the unpopular and repressive South Vietnamese regime and sending in hundreds of US “advisors” – who were soon doing much more than advising.

Then, as today, the Enemy was depicted as a vast centrally-directed conspiracy: according to our “experts” and the pundits, the Vietnamese communists were mere puppets of the Kremlin, and the battle there was yet another chapter in the story of the reds’ relentless campaign for the West’s destruction. This cartoonish view overlooked developing splits within the international communist movement, and – crucially – the key role played by rising nationalism in communist successes in the developing world.

When it came to Vietnam, the Soviets were far from unconditionally supportive of the native communist movement. Having given up the goal of world revolution in favor of seeking détente with the West, the Kremlin continually acted as go-betweens pursuing a diplomatic settlement of the Vietnam conflict. As early as 1956, the Soviet party sought to rein in the Vietnamese Communists who were contemplating resumption of a military campaign to reunify the country. The US and its allies were ignoring the Geneva agreement to hold elections – which was denounced by then Sen. John F. Kennedy – and they aided South Vietnamese strongman Ngo Dinh Diem in his efforts to consolidate his hold on the South.

The brutality and outright stupidity of the American campaign in Vietnam was the communists’ main weapon: as the Americans destroyed villages in order to “save” them, the populace turned to the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies for protection. The Americans were seen as foreign occupiers, the heirs of the French who had lorded over the region in similar fashion: the corrupt and brutal “Republic of Vietnam” was widely hated by its own citizens. The Vietnamese were fighting on their own land against foreign troops and native collaborators: it was a war the Americans could never win, not if they had stayed there for a hundred years.

http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2015/04/30/lessons-of-the-vietnam-war/

To continue reading: Lesson of the Vietnam War

Trust Us, by Robert Gore

No belief has been more costly and deadly than a belief in governments’ veracity. Trusting their governments, people have marched off to die in useless and hopeless slaughter, sunk their savings into depreciating and worthless currencies, consigned their children to propaganda masquerading as education, funded wasteful and counterproductive spending, and looked to their leaders for security they couldn’t provide and expertise they didn’t have. To detail the duplicitous depredations of just our own government would require multiple volumes. However, since 9/11 official mendacity has broken out to the upside. It now poses a deadly threat as the government employs it not just to justify involvement in the Middle East, but to set the stage for confrontation with Russia.

Foreign policy has always been relatively ignored by most Americans, compared to the attention paid to domestic issues. Straight Line Logic articles on foreign policy invariably garner fewer hits than domestic pieces and this one probably will, too. However, ignoring the topic, the American people have ceded foreign policy to an elite with a common mindset and goals. If stated explicitly to them, most Americans would reject both the mindset and the goals, which is where the lies come in. Furthermore, foreign policy has been and will continue to be far more consequential than many of the issues that command Americans’ attention.

The end of World War II found the US in a historically unique position. It had been the head of victorious alliance and its military had suffered far fewer losses than its allies or enemies. It had invented and used the atomic bomb. Of the world’s major nations, it was the only one whose industrial infrastructure was intact. The Bretton Woods’ monetary order had made the dollar the reserve currency. The US was the world’s unchallengeable sole superpower. That changed when the USSR detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, but within its Cold War bloc, the US was the dominant force. US leaders quite naturally came to believe that it was best for both the US and the world that the nations within the US bloc comply with US dictates, and that the bloc itself should continuously confront and challenge the Soviet bloc.

The belief in American superiority was fueled not just by US strength, but by “The Best and the Brightest” hubris of the American elite, analyzed by David Halberstam in his book of that name. The greatest nation on earth was being managed by its smartest, most accomplished people, titans from government, industry, Wall Street, and academia, primarily the Ivy League. The rest of America on the whole accepted both the elite’s characterization of itself and its control of US foreign, military, and intelligence policy. They didn’t have much choice. Most of the available information about foreign affairs—and much propaganda—came from the government, and all the major media organs parroted the party line. There was little difference between the two major political parties on foreign policy.

Vietnam was a watershed. Because it became an unpopular war and a US defeat, it has been shoved down the American memory hole, which is a mistake. One learns more from one’s failures than one’s successes. Vietnam demands far greater scrutiny and analysis than it has been given, and the US has paid a steep price for this analytical neglect. The government wove a web of lies to cover shifts in the landscape that might have, if generally recognized, led to a critical and fruitful reexamination of the US’s role in the world.

At first the US presence in Vietnam fit the Hollywood template: the US was helping beleaguered South Vietnam fight off communist North Vietnam so the South Vietnamese could enjoy the fruits of democracy and liberty. In its hubris, the US government refused to recognize or acknowledge a key reality: like the North Vietnamese government, many in South Vietnam regarded the US not as liberators, but as the latest in a long line of imperial occupiers of the country, strolling to the plate from the on-deck circle after the French had struck out. The North Vietnamese never would have achieved its widespread infiltration of South Vietnam if a large number of inhabitants had not shared its animus towards a foreign power. Hostility increased as the US supported, then assassinated, South Vietnam’s president Ngo Dinh Diem. It peaked when the US military and the CIA essentially took over running South Vietnam and the ever-escalating war destroyed villages and towns, sizable areas of the countryside, including farmland, and much of the infrastructure there.

Also unacknowledged or denied was the difficulty of fighting a guerrilla war on the guerrillas’ home turf. The story from the military and Washington was that victory was just around the corner, always only a few brigades and a little more funding away. By all conventional metrics North Vietnam suffered horrendous losses. However, it waged an unconventional and ultimately successful war both militarily and politically, gaining, with carrots and sticks, South Vietnamese support, banking on eventual American exhaustion. As US support for the war waned, the rhetoric about winning continued, but the actual strategy became a military and diplomatic effort to find a face-saving way out. By that time, enough of the mainstream media had gone off the reservation on Vietnam that the government’s ability to lie about it had been severely compromised. Alternative “facts,” analyses, and interpretations were widely available and fed the increasing skepticism.

The government also misled on the financial dimension of the war. Enamored of America’s wealth and power, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations believed the US could have it all: Vietnam and a dramatic expansion of the welfare state. However, raising taxes would have increased public opposition to one or the other or both. Deficit financing maintained the have-it-all fiction. As with Vietnam, it was left for Richard Nixon to deal with the consequences.

Nixon’s closing of the gold window in August of 1971 should have initiated a long overdue reexamination of the assumption of American omnipotence. The US would no longer exchange gold for its reserve currency. How could it insist that the world dance to its tune after it had broken this most fundamental of promises? The fall of South Vietnam four years later knocked away the US’s other prop, its military. How was it going to guarantee US bloc nations’ security when it couldn’t defeat North Vietnam?

Neither event shook the elite’s belief in American omnipotence, and the right of the US government to order the world as it saw fit. The fall of the USSR in 1991 increased its hubris but presented a problem: no more enemy against which to rally the US bloc. Ordinary Americans asked why Cold War swollen defense and intelligence budgets couldn’t be slashed, and why it was necessary for the US to maintain military bases and commitments around the world. Perhaps the money saved could be used to pay down debt or reduce taxes. The last balanced budget was achieved during the Clinton administration, in part due to a peace dividend that soon vanished.

For the elite, 9/11 was a godsend. However, to justify the subsequent renewal of US global interventionism and a dramatic curtailment of civil liberties, the American people would have to be fed the whopper of all whoppers: that Islamic extremism presented an existential threat on par and maybe even more dangerous than the Communist threat. Of all the world’s Islamic nations, only one, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons, and that is only a handful. The most terrifying weapons non-governmental Islamic extremists have are YouTube beheadings and their ability to brainwash some adherents into blowing themselves up. The religion is riven by a schism between its Sunni and Shiite sects and centuries of intrigue, rivalry, and conflict. If fundamentalists had their way, Islamic governments would return their peoples to economic and social practices putting them more than a millennium behind the developed world. The freedom responsible for mankind’s progress is anathema to them (as was again demonstrated in Paris). Yet, somehow, these retrograde nuts are a threat to conquer the planet.

So on dubious pretexts the elite jumped into the Middle Eastern hornets nest, and not surprisingly the US has been stung, repeatedly, at a cost of trillions of dollars and thousands of civilian and military deaths and severe injuries. Nobody has yet demonstrated what vital US interest was furthered by its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, because there was none. The neoconservative vision of remaking the Middle East, a pipe dream from the beginning, is now nothing more than a hollow joke.

Some opponents of the invasions have said they were all about oil, but the Middle East is full of oil and nations would have kept selling it to us had we never set foot in the area. Like the South Vietnamese earlier, there are many in the Middle East who are not overjoyed with the foreign presence. Having gone to school on the North Vietnamese, they have proven adept at waging defensive guerrilla war, and at outlasting domestic US support for its government’s involvements.

As the embarrassing Syrian “red line” contretemps demonstrated, the majority of Americans have grown wary of further Middle Eastern forays. Their suspicions are fueled by the internet, where bloggers, alternative media, and videos often reveal “truth” inconsistent with the government-mainstream media approved version. Not even the YouTube beheadings were enough to garner support for sending the military to fight ISIS. Obama had to promise that US troops would not take a combat role, a promise that is surreptitiously being broken.

Nothing, certainly not repeated failure or lack of public support, stops a determined US interventionist from trying again, or even doubling down. It is one thing to wage wars, unsuccessful ones at that, in backward countries in the Middle East. It is another matter altogether to tee one up against Russia. Give the interventionists their best case. Assume that Russia has been actively aiding and abetting rebels in eastern Ukraine, who wantonly shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 with Russian assistance. Assume that Russia annexed the Crimea against the will of a majority of the Crimean people, who wished to remain a part of Ukraine, to which it rightfully belongs. Stretch things even farther and assume that Russia is trying to resurrect the old USSR empire, and is conducting or will conduct campaigns of subversion and overt military action in old Warsaw pact nations and the Baltic states. All of these assumptions are open to serious question, but even if taken as correct, cautionary portents abound.

The current US campaign against Russia uses economic sanctions. If the situation deteriorates into a military confrontation, a US victory is problematic. The results could be catastrophic, including the use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s massive size would give it a massive home field advantage, as Napoleon and Hitler discovered. They would probably ally with neighbor China. Both countries are increasingly resisting the American elite’s vision of global domination. The last year the news has been filled with stories of new cooperative ventures—political, economic, and military—between the two nations. Both are attempting to strengthen ties with their less powerful neighbors, offering various carrots in exchange for closer cooperation. The goal is the formation of a Euro-Asian axis strong enough to rival the US-European axis. The ultimate countermove to US domination has been strategies to develop trade, particularly trade in oil, denominated in rubles and yuan rather than dollars.

Cursory examinations of a globe and the world almanac support the conclusion that the envisioned Euro-Asian axis is no pipe dream. Russia and China, and the nations contiguous to them, contain a significant percentage, in many cases a majority, of the world’s population, resources, and land mass. This Soviet-Chinese bloc also borders the Middle East, giving it a huge advantage in any future conflict in the area, if it choses to get involved. (Which it probably won’t unless absolutely forced to do so. The Russians and Chinese have stayed out of overt military involvement in the Middle East, wisely choosing to let the US waste its time, money, soldiers’ lives, credibility, and military might in the region.)

The precipitous decline in the price of oil may just be the unhindered workings of the price mechanism in a market with a glut of supply, dwindling demand, and many producers who must keep producing even though in the long-term it is uneconomic after all costs are accounted for. This remains the most plausible explanation, but there are also a plethora of theories that “explain” the decline in terms of non-market forces. The most credible so far is that the US and Saudi Arabia are teaming up to put Russia out of business and drive Putin from power. That theory was propounded by Mike Whitney in a piece, “Is Putin Creating a New World Order? Oil Price Blowback,” which first appeared on counterpunch.org and was featured on SLL (and has been denied by Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal).

Putin has been the spearhead of Euro-Asia, including the moves against the dollar. He is a formidable challenger to an US-centered world order, especially since he’s teamed up with China. He has outplayed the US government at every turn and has embarrassed an obviously overmatched Obama. It is not too much of a stretch to suggest that Obama would sacrifice US fracking industry, which he doesn’t like, and that the Saudis would bear a temporary financial hit, to get rid of Putin, who is allied with Saudi enemies Iran and Syria.

Whether or not that is the case, official US antipathy towards Putin, and a desire to see him driven from power, are unmistakable. Which means the government’s pounding drums on Ukraine, faithfully amplified by the mainstream media, are, in all likelihood, pretexts. In other words, the elite are again lying to sell the public on yet another foreign intervention, this one far more fraught with danger than previous failures.

Let’s drop the earlier, favorable-to-the-interventionists assumptions. The US’s fingerprints are all over the coup that ousted democratically elected president Victor Yanuyovch, after he veered from joining the US-EU orbit and instead accepted an offer of various commercial and financial benefits from Russia. There are ample indications of significant neo-Nazi elements within the movement that took control of the Ukraine government. That government is now nothing more than a US puppet, beholden to the US and other western governments for financial life support for its withering economy. The proof offered that Ukrainian separatists shot down Flight 17 is not conclusive, and the Russians have counterclaimed that the Ukrainian government shot it down, though that claim also requires a dose of salt. Satellites can read and photograph license plates from thousands of feet above the earth, but the photographic proof for the US claim that Russia has moved troops and military equipment into eastern Ukraine has been scant.

So the justifications for what could become the most consequential war the US has ever fought are among the flimsiest ever offered. The policy-making elite has envisioned a US-dominated world since the US assumed the pinnacle of power after WWII, and probably even before then. The post-WWII preeminence upon which that vision rested was never going to last. It was called into question with the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and completely discredited decades ago when Nixon closed the gold window and the US withdrew from Vietnam. There is no reason the American bloc and the emerging Russo-Sino bloc could not come to a modus vivendi, perhaps even to their mutual benefit (idealism never completely dies). However, that would require abandonment of the elite’s untenable vision, and that won’t happen until after at least one more disastrous US intervention, if not in Russia, then somewhere else.

ONCE UPON A TIME AMERICA MINDED ITS OWN BUSINESS

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Deal Us In! by Robert Gore

He’s every poker player’s dream: boisterous, talkative, inattentive, ingratiating, a drinker, thinks he’s smart, sure he’s the best player at the table, and best of all, loaded with cash. By the end of the night he’s tapped out, like the week before and the week before that, but the safest bet of the evening is that he’ll show up the following week. At global poker, the US has been the chump for almost a century and that’s not going to change; it’s as close as you can get to a sure thing.

Theodore Roosevelt, his visage now inexplicably carved on Mt. Rushmore, envied the British empire and wanted one for the US. It wasn’t enough that the Industrial Revolution had made the US the world’s richest country. There was no glory in business and prosperity; what mattered was war, conquest, and battlefield heroics. With the charge up San Juan Hill in the splendid little war he had pressed President McKinley so hard to fight, Roosevelt got what he craved: heroics and the beginnings of empire. Spain relinquished Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the US.

Roosevelt was the second noteworthy big government Republican president (Lincoln was the first), which is why so many of today’s big government Republicans think he belongs up on Mt. Rushmore with Honest Abe. After he became president, he took a page from Great Britain’s book, built up the navy, and sent the Great White Fleet, 16 brand new destroyers, around the world, announcing that the US had pulled up a seat for global poker. However, it’s an expensive game. Roosevelt realized the puny federal government couldn’t even afford the ante, and championed an income tax and central bank. (Would someone please explain, in the comments section below, why he is on Mt. Rushmore?) Those “innovations” didn’t come until two presidencies later.

World War I for the US was what gamblers call a “heart,” not a “head” bet. The few atrocities and provocations that got the public stirred up never amounted to a threat, but the British and French got our military and industrial might, which was significant and perhaps decisive. For our troubles we got more troubles. During the war he had promised to keep us out of, President Wilson jacked up the top rate on the brand new income tax to 77 percent, instituted a draft (the men who would actually do the fighting weren’t quite as enthused as the rest of the populace), and threw opponents in jail. Our allies had assured Wilson they shared his desire to make the world safe for democracy, but after the war they cut up the Middle East and parts of Africa for their own benefit. The Peace Treaty of Versailles was so harshly punitive that Marshal Foch, the French commander-in-chief of the allied armies, presciently noted: “This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years.” The US had made its bets, but the British and French split the pot.

Foch was wrong by only 65 days, but dead right that World War II would be a continuation of World War I. Again, with the possible exception of the fear that Germany might develop an atomic bomb (a long shot, as we knew, since most of its top scientists had emigrated to the US), our opponents posed an existential threat to our allies, but not to us. (If the Germans couldn’t defeat the British across the British Channel, they surely couldn’t have crossed the Atlantic and defeated the US. And the Japanese crossing the Pacific to defeat what their own Admiral Yamamoto called “a sleeping giant”? Forget it.) Again, for our troubles we got more troubles. The USSR ended up with most of Eastern Europe. Our ally stole our atomic secrets, detonating its own bomb four years after war’s end. We underwrote the economic recovery of both friends and foes, and picked up most of the tab for defending those European countries the USSR had not annexed or “invited” into the Warsaw Pact. Freed from defense spending, our protectees funded lavish cradle-to-grave welfare states, their youth later protesting US militarism.

After the war, the US had the biggest stake and strongest hand, which we overplayed. Savvy players realized the US would throw money and armaments their way if they professed anticommunism, even if their regimes were just as tyrannical as the communist ones they claimed to oppose. The South Vietnamese government played this game. The US bet big after the French folded, and lost. Fighting guerrillas on their home turf had become a long-odds wager. Costs were shifting in favor of the defense; relatively inexpensive artillery could take out multimillion dollar aircraft. The Vietcong knew the territory and had the support of a significant number of South Vietnamese, who regarded the US as the latest in a line of imperial occupiers. The North Vietnamese were in it to win it, and were willing to take staggering losses until US public opinion turned against the war, which it did.

Winning poker requires recognizing other players’ weak hands. The US had ginned up its military-industrial complex during the Vietnam war and doubled down during the Reagan years, although we were not then at war. Because of its inherent contradictions and flaws, communism couldn’t beat a pair of twos (a fact Reagan and Margaret Thatcher—but not most of the intelligentsia—recognized). The Soviet Union’s repression and command economy put it deep in the hole, and it begged, borrowed, and stole to keep itself in the game until, tapped out, it collapsed in 1991.

This posed some awkward dilemmas for America’s elite. Notwithstanding, occasional rhetoric to the contrary, the elite fervently believe in collectivism and statism. Their welfare-regulatory state has been less harsh than the Soviet totalitarian state, but like the Soviet version it insidiously undermines economic performance and is fiscally unsound. The elite had folded on the winning hand—free market capitalism—long ago, and it was discomfiting to see the Soviets go down the tubes. A harbinger, perhaps, of the fate of other, albeit “less harsh,” collectivist-statist systems? And what to do with that military-industrial complex?

Fortunately, there’s always a game going somewhere. Unfortunately, the game the US bought into—the Middle East—is the roughest one in town, filled with cutthroats (literally!), card sharps, and thieves. The savvier players stay on the periphery or stay away entirely. Some—Great Britain, France, and Russia—because they’ve already played and lost. And some—China—because they’ve learned from others and know they can’t win.

The US, on the other hand, goes all in. Good players rub their hands in predatory delight when a rube shoves his ante into the pot and asks, “How do you play?” The US government blustered into the Middle East without recognizing that to the average denizen, clan, tribe, and religion are far more important than country, which is nothing more than lines drawn on a map by Europeans almost a century ago. It has been almost willfully blind to the centrality of the Sunni-Shiite schism that has waxed and waned (now waxing) for over a thousand years. We keep looking for players that have our best interests at heart, and are surprised when the ones we line up with take our chips.

The strongest players at the table—Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran—want to take each other to the cleaners. For their own reasons, they are both happy the US joined the game. In the hand being played, the Saudi’s have joined our half-hearted effort against Sunni Islamic State. It has made noises about invading Saudi Arabia, so the Saudis play the old trick: get the US to fight your war. There’s another angle. If the US makes a heavier commitment, perhaps while they’re in the area they can be induced to take out not just the Islamic State, but it, and Saudi Arabia’s enemy, Syria’s Shiite leader, Bashar Assad. Another one of our good buddies—Sunni Turkey—has a similar motivation. There’s no telling what kind of stupid bets bad players will make. So the Saudis and Turks press for not just a heavier US commitment, but for a war against Assad before the one against the Islamic State. Meanwhile, our friends the Saudis are driving our oil producers out of business; good players are ruthless.

At least we recognize that Iran does not have our best interests at heart. It split the pot with Russia and China after Afghanistan and Iraq, the last two hands in the Middle East. All three won big—by not playing—as the US squandered soldiers’ lives, armaments, and over a trillion dollars in Afghanistan. Iran was the big winner in Iraq. There was the Afghanistan-sized waste of lives and resources, plus the US drove Saddam Hussein out of power and installed an Iran-friendly Shiite government. Iraq is well on its way to becoming an Iranian satellite. The final démarche will come when the US leaves for good.

Iran does not want a Sunni state in the middle of Iraq and Syria, which is Iran’s Shiite ally. Iran is not as reticent as Turkey and Saudi Arabia about getting its hands dirty. Its air force has bombed Islamic State positions, it has trained and armed Shiite Iraqi militias, and sent its own troops to fight. Those Iraqi militias, fighting for their religion, have been far more effective than US-trained Iraqi army units, fighting for their country. However, the US worries that the militias may be violating someone’s human rights, proving that after numerous losing hands it still doesn’t know how the game is played. It’s an understatement to say the Islamic State does not protect human rights. The US is wary of Iran, although it welcomes their current involvement—as long as they don’t violate anyone’s human rights and don’t fight for sectarian reasons, which they most assuredly are. Further Iranian involvement would make obvious to all the absurdity of the US position: we are fighting two bitter enemies’ wars for them, placing ourselves on both sides of the long-running Sunni-Shiite sectarian war.

Eventually we’ll lose another big pot in the Middle East. We have to watch out—we’re no longer flush and we’ve had to tap our credit lines. Middle Eastern sharpies are licking their chops at the 2016 US election. Regardless of who wins—Hillary or the Republican nominee—on present rhetoric they are assured the US won’t walk away from the table. As they stack their chips and the cards are shuffled for the next hand, they know the US will reach for its wallet. They’ll hear what’s music to their ears, the ever-optimistic chirp of the perpetual loser: “Deal me in!”

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