Keynesian economics says you can’t have inflation and recession (or depression) simultaneously. The real world says different. Alasdair Macleod explains. From Macleod at goldmoney.com:
There is a growing realisation that the world faces a combination of persistent inflation of prices and a recession at the same time. The factors driving both are visibly intensifying. Those of us versed in the cycle of bank credit are aware that it is the contraction of bank balance sheets which is driving the recession, while it is continuing currency debasement driving inflation.
Neo-Keynesians in the establishment think the current position is contradictory, that current rates of price inflation will decline back to their 2% target in a recession, and interest rates can then be reduced to stimulate economic activity.
The key to understanding why prices can continue to rise in a recession requires a fuller understanding of the role of credit in an economy and what it represents. Its role is far greater than commonly thought, with considerably more than several quadrillions of dollar equivalents outstanding. All economic activity and wealth are credit. This article sketches out the various types of credit, and how credit equates to our collective wealth.
It also requires us to differentiate between a currency which is anchored to gold specie and one without a specie anchor. The former imposes a discipline on the state of non-intervention, while the latter encourages intervention. It is that intervention which leads to fiat currencies and all credit based upon it finally collapsing.
The importance of credit
That the monetary authorities do not understand credit might seem unbelievable. But evidenced by their actions, it is the only explanation for their mistakes. Clearly, as well as credit they don’t understand the importance of money, having banished gold from its role of anchoring the purchasing power of credit. The vested interest of replacing gold with currency, to obtain for governments the benefit of unfettered debasement, is ignored or forgotten by today’s state-educated economists and commentators. Disregarding what drove the dollar off the Bretton Woods standard in the first place, the establishment in the broadest sense can no longer distinguish between credit and legal money.