Tag Archives: car loans

Perfect Storm Arrives: “Massive Wave” Of Car Repossessions And Loan Defaults To Trigger Auto Market Disaster, Cripple US Economy, by Tyler Durden

Maybe it’s not such a good idea to give long-term car loans to people of questionable ability to repay those loans on collateral that quickly loses its value and puts the borrower in negative equity. From Tyler Durden at theburningplatform.com:

For almost a year now, we have been dutifully tracking several key datasets within the auto sector to find the critical inflection point in this perhaps most leading of economic indicators which will presage not only a crushing auto loan crisis, but also signal the arrival of a full-blown recession, one which even the NBER won’t be able to ignore, as the US consumers are once again tapped out. We believe that moment has now arrived.

But first, for those readers who are unfamiliar with the space, we urge you to read some of our recent articles on the topic of car prices – which alongside housing, has been the biggest driver of inflation in the past 18 months – and more specifically how these are funded my the US middle class, i.e., car loans, and last but not least, the interest rate paid for said loans. Here are a few places to start:

So while the big picture is clear – Americans are using ever more debt to fund record new car prices – fast-forwarding to today, we have observed two ominous new developments: the latest consumer credit report from the Fed revealed a dramatic spike in the amount of new car loans, which increased by more than $2,000 in one quarter, from just over $38,000 (a record), to $40,155 (a new record).

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The Domino Effect, by Eric Peters

From Eric Peters, on a guest post at theburningplatform.com:

When most people can’t afford to buy things outright, the cost of money – interest – becomes even more important than the cost of the things themselves.

For the past eight years, interest rates have been held down to 3 or 4 percent (or even less, in some cases) such that it costs almost nothing to borrow money. The private banking cartel that controls interest rates – the (ahem) “Federal” Reserve – did this to “stimulate” the economy – which is built on debt and people’s ability and willingness to assume it – after the cratering of Wall Street (and with it, everything else) back in ’08.

In particular, two areas of the economy: real estate and the car business. Both have “recovered” – somewhat – as a result of this. But it’s a shaky recovery, not based on underlying strength – which would be characterized by people’s increased ability to afford the things they’re buying. Instead, this is a “recovery” based on the fiction of affordability made possible via the Fed’s policy of effectively “free” loans.

In the case of the car business, longer loans have been the key to maintaining the facade of this Potemkin village on wheels.

By spreading out the payment over six or seven years as opposed to four or five (which was the usual not so very long ago) the cost of buying a new car has been made to seem more manageable. You pay less each month – even though you pay for more months.

But this dodge only works when the cost of the loan – interest – is low.

If it’s high, then the payment is going to be, too.

And with cars – unlike houses – there is a built-in limit to how far out the loan can be stretched as way to tamp down the month-to-month costs down. Eight or nine years is probably the absolute maximum, because cars – unlike houses – always decrease in value over time and because unlike houses, cars are fundamentally throw-aways. Probably 95 percent of all cars made during the 1980s are in junkyards now.

Axiom: The longer you own a car, the less it is worth. The mileage goes up – the value goes down. A car’s value lies chiefly in its newness, which inevitably wanes no matter how little it’s driven or how well cared-for it may be (there are some exceptions, such as exotic and collectible cars; but these are just that – exceptions.)

To continue reading: The Domino Effect