The Biden administration is repackaging standard U.S. foreign policy. The box is different but the contents are the same. From Alastair Crooke at strategic-culture.org:
The world balance has changed qualitatively, and not just quantitatively, Alastair Crooke writes.
Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum two weeks ago, General Milley conceded that ‘America’s century’ is over – a long overdue acknowledgement, most might venture. Yet, belated or not, his saying it nonetheless seemed to signal an important strategic shift: “We’re entering into a tri-polar – world with the U.S., Russia and China being all great powers. [And] just by introducing three versus two you get increased complexity”, Milley said.
More recently, in a CNN interview Jake Sullivan, Biden’s Security Adviser, said that it had been a mistake to try to change China: “America is not seeking to ‘contain’ China: it’s not a new Cold War”. Mr. Sullivan’s remarks come a week after President Biden said the U.S. was not seeking “physical conflict” with China, despite rising tensions – “this is competition”, Biden said.
This indeed seemed to signal something important. But is it, though? This use of the word ‘competition’ is a tad curious as terminology, and requires a little unpacking.
CNN interviewer, Fareed Zakaria, asked Sullivan: So what is it, after all your ‘tough talk’, that you have been able to agree with China; what has been negotiated? One might imagine a response outlining how best Biden thinks to manage these competing interests in a complex tri-polar world. Well, that wasn’t Sullivan’s retort. “Wrong metric”, he said flatly: Don’t ask about bilateral agreements – ask about what else we have secured.
