Sanctions designed to hurt Russia for the most part have helped them. The answer is obvious: more sanctions! From Joseph Solis-Mullen at mises.org:
Rather than working diplomatically to resolve the civil war in Ukraine that it played a principal role in precipitating (by backing the unconstitutional transfer of power in that country in 2014), the Biden administration spent the months leading up to the Russian invasion in February assiduously working to make sure “extreme” economic sanctions could be put in place.
The threat of such additional sanctions, for Washington already had imposed a series of sanctions in 2014, was purportedly meant to deter the invasion. That having failed, it was then claimed the sanctions would force Russia to the negotiating table.
That, too, has clearly failed.
Given the centrality of economic warfare to Washington’s foreign policy, it is worth exploring how the Kremlin has managed to keep the Russian economy afloat since invading Ukraine and the likely wider implications and possible future application vis-à-vis China.
First, the immediate collapse of the ruble was reversed by the actions of the Russian central bank and the treasury. While the former nearly doubled interest rates overnight, the latter began spending its accumulated reserves to offset the price inflation that began eating into Russian consumers’ purchasing power. Though locked out of nearly half of its foreign reserves by Washington and its vassal allies, the government in Moscow has used its record balance of payments surplus to make up for the temporary loss.