Tag Archives: Share buybacks

I read the news today, oh boy, by Raúl Ilargi Meijer

Raúl Ilargi Meijer provides a useful catalogue of today’s debt-driven financial bubbles. From Meijer at theautomaticearth.com:

Reading the news on America should scare everyone, and every day, but it doesn’t. We’re immune, largely. Take this morning. The US Republican party can’t get its healthcare plan through the Senate. And they apparently don’t want to be seen working with the Democrats on a plan either. Or is that the other way around? You’d think if these people realize they were elected to represent the interests of their voters, they could get together and hammer out a single payer plan that is cheaper than anything they’ve managed so far. But they’re all in the pockets of so many sponsors and lobbyists they can’t really move anymore, or risk growing a conscience. Or a pair.

What we’re witnessing is the demise of the American political system, in real time. We just don’t know it. Actually, we’re witnessing the downfall of the entire western system. And it turns out the media are an integral part of that system. The reason we’re seeing it happen now is that although the narratives and memes emanating from both politics and the press point to economic recovery and a future full of hope and technological solutions to all our problems, people are not buying the memes anymore. And the people are right.

Tyler Durden ran a Credit Suisse graph overnight that should give everyone a heart attack, or something in that order. It shows that nobody’s being stocks anymore, other than the companies who issue them. They use ultra-cheap leveraged loans to make it look like they’re doing fine. Instead of using the money/credit to invest in, well, anything, really. You can be a successful US/European company these days just by purchasing your own shares. How long for, you ask?

There Has Been Just One Buyer Of Stocks Since The Financial Crisis

As CS’ strategist Andrew Garthwaite writes, “one of the major features of the US equity market since the low in 2009 is that the US corporate sector has bought 18% of market cap, while institutions have sold 7% of market cap.” What this means is that since the financial crisis, there has been only one buyer of stock: the companies themselves, who have engaged in the greatest debt-funded buyback spree in history.

Why this rush by companies to buyback their own stock, and in the process artificially boost their Earning per Share? There is one very simple reason: as Reuters explained some time ago, “Stock buybacks enrich the bosses even when business sags.” And since bond investor are rushing over themselves to fund these buyback plans with “yielding” paper at a time when central banks have eliminated risk, who is to fault them.

To continue reading: I read the news today, oh boy

What Will Prick the “Leveraged Share Buyback” Craze? by Wolf Richter

There are times when a corporation buying its own shares is an appropriate corporate investment, buy going into to debt to fund such buybacks, especially after a six-year bull market, is not one of them. From Wolf Richter at wolfstreet.com:

There may be a day when we look back at the current craze of “leveraged share buybacks” – as Fitch Ratings calls these creatures of financial engineering – the way we now look back at the craze of leveraged buyouts (LBO) just before it all came apart during the Financial Crisis.

If a company with a torrent of free cash flow uses some of this cash to invest and expand, and then uses some of the remaining cash to pay dividends and repurchase its own shares, few people would quibble with it.

The problem for bondholders, and stockholders ultimately, arises when a company doesn’t generate enough cash to pay for its investments, dividends, and share buybacks, and ends up borrowing to fund share buybacks, thus increasing its debt burden while hollowing out its equity capital.

Instead of investing this borrowed money to expand and create more business whose cash flow would help service that debt in the future, companies blow this money on reducing the number of shares outstanding, or at least watering down the impact of executive stock compensation plans. Nothing good ever comes of these “leveraged share buybacks,” other than making per-share metrics look better.

And that’s exactly what has been happening, encouraged by the Fed-inspired ultra-low interest rate environment, which makes debt cheap and creditors desperate.

According to the report, share buybacks have exceeded free cash flow after dividends (FCF) since 2014 among Fitch-rated companies, “with most companies using debt to cover the shortfall, underscoring a more aggressive stance across the sector.”

To continue reading: What Will Prick the “Leveraged Share Buyback” Craze?

Share-Buyback Announcements Plunge, Stocks Risk Getting Clocked, by Wolf Richter

What happens when the biggest buyers in the stock market stop buying? The answer may be as obvious as it seems. From Wolf Richter at wolfstreet.com:

Who’s going to replace that “relentless bid?”

In 2015, S&P 500 companies bought back $569 billion of their own shares, down just a smidgen from $572 billion in 2014, according to FactSet. That’s a combined $1.14 trillion in stock repurchases. With the S&P 500 market capitalization at $18.8 trillion currently, corporate buybacks over the past two years have mopped up about 6% of the total float in dollar terms. And this has been happening year after year with increasing vehemence since 2010.

While some sectors already cut back in 2015, buybacks soared 44% in the Industrial sector and 26% in the Consumer Discretionary sector. Companies buying back their own shares act purposefully as the relentless bid, with the sole goal of driving up share prices. They want to buy high! And it works.

These shares don’t sit in an account waiting to be dumped on the market. Companies cannot sell the shares that they previously repurchased. Selling shares is considered “raising capital,” which requires companies to jump through all kinds of regulatory hoops, often followed by a sell-off. Corporate share repurchases won’t ever reverse and turn into selling pressure. These shares just just evaporate.

So share repurchases add enormous buying pressure. IBM, which most recently reported its 16th year-over-year revenue decline in a row, ending up with its worst quarterly revenues in 14 years, is a master at this. That’s why its stock price magically keeps creeping back up after the post-earnings announcement beat-down.

Share buybacks have been a key part of the well-oiled Wall-Street machinery of financial engineering. They hide the dilutive effects of stock compensation programs and stock-based mergers and acquisitions. And they inflate earnings per share by lowering the number of shares outstanding. In return, they strip the company of equity capital. So IBM’s “tangible” net equity (equity minus “goodwill” and “intangible assets”) have reached negative $23.8 billion, and its liabilities have ballooned to $103.9 billion — its balance sheet has turned into a financial sinkhole.

Hounding reluctant companies into buying back their own shares is also one of the favorite tools by which “activist investors” – corporate raiders, as they used to be called – hope to make a quick buck. Carl Icahn and Apple are a prime example. But the tactic is developing a nasty habit of backfiring: Apple is down 28% from a year ago, and Icahn has bailed out.

Buyback announcements – not actual share buybacks – totaled $2 trillion since 2013. Many of those announced buyback programs stretch over several years, and some of those announced buybacks haven’t been executed yet. But buyback announcements are suddenly plunging. Christine Hughes, Chief Investment Strategist at OtterWood Capital:

According to JP Morgan Quant Marko Kolanovic, announced buybacks have dropped 40% ($250 billion) on a 12-month trailing basis. Share buybacks take approximately 6 quarters to execute so the recent drop will translate into roughly $40 billion less equity demand per quarter.

This chart (via OtterWood Capital) shows the relationship between buyback announcements and the S&P 500 since before the Financial Crisis.

Note how the crazy boom in the S&P 500 (green line) that kicked off in 2009 stalled out in December 2014 and began vacillating wildly – after buyback announcements had stalled over a year earlier, in terms of dollars (red line) and in terms of the number of companies announcing buybacks (blue line). Both of them have begun plunging:

To continue reading: Share-Buyback Announcements Plunge, Stocks Risk Getting Clocked

Why Stock Buybacks Won’t Save The Market This Time, by Shah Gilani

From Shah Gilani at Money Morning, via davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

There’s a reason investors have blindly trusted Wall Street’s “buy the dips” mantra since 2009.

In fact… there are 2.3 trillion reasons.

That’s because since 2009 U.S. companies spent more than $2.3 trillion buying back their own shares, according to a report by Aranca Investment Research Services.

All that buying acted as a floor for stocks and launched the major indices to new heights.

But now, after watching stocks fall off the “Wall of Worry” this year, instead of climbing it, investors who simply bought the dip without any strategy are praying new buyback programs will start lifting stocks.

Too bad for them (and too bad for the companies that wasted billions of dollars watching their shares fall back to Earth), all the upcoming share buyback announcements combined can’t put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

That’s because sentiment about global growth, about the market, and about the long-term value of buybacks has changed.

And let me tell you, when sentiment changes, everything changes…

To continue reading: Why Stock Buybacks Won’t Save The Market This Time

Cat Food Dinners, by Robert Gore

In the last days of the tech bubble at the turn of the century, companies announced stock splits and the price of their stocks jumped. Services would alert day traders of splits so they could pounce on the stocks before the uninformed masses. Why would a split have any effect on the price of a stock other than a directly proportional adjustment? (e.g., A two-for-one split should reduce the price of the stock by 50 percent.) Supposedly a split represented management’s confidence in the company’s prospects, or some such rah rah. And a pizza cut into eight slices represents more pizza than one cut into six slices. It was the craziness of the time. Ultimately, all those splits did was make stocks more affordable for day-trading greater fools.

It is the craziness of our time that stocks elevate when companies take actions—advertised as “shareholder friendly”—that harm the company and its shareholders: increasing dividends and buying back shares. A company pays the corporate tax on its profits. When it pays dividends, shareholders, unless they are tax exempt, are taxed on the distribution. If the company retained the money, it could be used for productive investment. Shareholders have bought ownership in the company because they believe the company’s management will generate a return. Investors buy Berkshire Hathaway stock because they believe Warren Buffet can achieve a higher return on their money than they can.

Warren Buffet believes the same thing. Berkshire Hathaway does not pay a dividend; Buffet keeps the money and makes more investments. The many fold increase in Berkshire’s share price over the years is testament to his success. Why invest in a company if the company is going to give your money back, and you pay taxes on the distribution? Some companies even borrow to fund such distributions. The company is depriving itself of capital that could be used for profitable investment, incurring a debt that will have to be repaid from future profits, and handing many of its shareholders a tax liability.

With share buybacks, the company pays out to shareholders who are either reducing their holdings or selling out completely. The company cannot figure out anything to do with its capital, so it speculates in the stock market. Berkshire Hathaway occasionally buys back its own stock, but Buffet says it does so only when he judges that the stock price is below its intrinsic value and his record is good. The herd of corporate managers, like the herd of investors generally, buy high. After five years of a bull market, stock buybacks set a record in 2014 and may do so again in 2015. By many time-tested measures, stock valuations are stretched, definitely not the stuff of glowing returns. The criticism about funding dividends with debt applies equally to funding buybacks with debt. Bondholders get the short end of the shareholder friendliness stick, as it reduces the company’s cash and creditworthiness.

Buybacks can also create a capital gains tax liability for selling shareholders. With both dividends and buybacks, not only may shareholders have to pay taxes, they must also figure out what to do with the proceeds. Spend the money? Stick it in CDs paying near zero interest? Buy stock in another shareholder friendly company that will end up returning their money?

Notwithstanding the costs to both shareholders and their companies, dividends and buybacks have supported stocks. Short term paydays outweigh longer-term considerations. The biggest fans of shareholder friendliness are corporate executives, whose compensation is often tied to the share price. Robert Prechter has noted that many practices deemed acceptable in bull markets become unacceptable in bear markets, with punishment meted out retroactively for the newly instated sins. Spending the company’s money and incurring debt to support the share prices and the value of stock options may, when the music stops, look questionable, venal, or outright criminal, depending on the severity of the next bear market.

If executives are put in the dock, they can claim the Federal Reserve made them do it. Its debt monetization and interest rate suppression have provided so much liquidity and driven returns so low that the honchos can argue they couldn’t do anything else with corporate cash but distribute it to shareholders or speculate on their own stock. For companies sitting on mountains of cash, that defense has exculpatory merit. Why leave an asset that earns next to nothing on the balance sheet? Furthermore, the stated aim of central banks has been to drive money into riskier investments; from corporations to seniors who cannot fund their retirements from “safe” fixed-income investments offering minuscule yields. Corporate executives, their high-priced lawyers will argue, were merely getting with the program, with their own enrichment an incidental consequence. Seniors have no high-priced legal talent to argue their case, but for many, if they don’t buy stocks and junk bonds and pick up some hours at Walmart, they’re looking at cat food dinners. Unfortunately, when this force-fed equity golden goose meets its inevitable end, pâté won’t be gracing their plates or those of millions of other Americans—they’ll be savoring Scrumptious Shredded Salmon or Choice Chicken Chunks.

TIRED OF THE SAME OLD THING? A FAMILY SAGA

ABOUT A FAMILY YOU’LL CARE ABOUT

TGP_photo 2 FB

AMAZON

KINDLE

NOOK