Tag Archives: Nonperforming loans

China Proposes Unprecedented Nationalization Of Insolvent Companies: Banks Will Equitize Non-Performing Loans, by Tyler Durden

From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

In what may be the biggest news of the day, and certainly with far greater implications than whatever Mario Draghi will announce in a few hours when we will again witness the ECB doing not “whatever it takes” but “whatever it can do”, moments ago Reuters reported that China is preparing for an unprecedented overhaul in how it treats it trillions in non-performing loans.

Recall that as we first wrote last summer, and as subsequently Kyle Bass made it the centerpiece of his “short Yuan” investment thesis, the “neutron bomb” in the heart of China’s impaired financial system is the trillions – officially at $614 billion but realistically anywhere between 8% and 20% of China’s total $35 trillion in bank assets – in non-performing loans. It is the unknown treatment of these NPLs that has been the greatest threat to China’s just as vast deposit base amounting to well over $20 trillion, which has been the fundamental catalyst behind China’s record capital flight as depositors have been eager to move their savings as far from China’s domestic banks as possible.

As a result, conventional thinking such as that proposed by Bass, Ray Dalio, KKR and many others, speculated that China will have to devalue its currency in order to inflate away what is fundamentally an excess debt problem as the alternative is unleashing a massive debt default tsunami and “admitting” to the world just how insolvent China’s state-owned banks truly are, not to mention leading to the layoffs of tens of millions of workers by these zombie companies.

However, China now appears to be taking a surprisingly different track, and according to a Reuters report China’s central bank is preparing regulations that would allow commercial banks to swap non-performing loans of companies for stakes in those firms. Reuters sources said the release of a new document explaining the regulatory change was imminent.

According to Reuters, the move would represent, “on paper, a way for indebted corporates to reduce their leverage, reducing the cost of servicing debt and making them more worthy of fresh credit.”

It gets better.

It would also reduce NPL ratios at commercial banks, reducing the cash they would need to set aside to cover losses incurred by bad loans. These funds could then be freed up for fresh lending for investment in the new wave of infrastructure products and factory upgrades the government hopes will rejuvenate the Chinese economy.

It is certainly possible that this is merely a trial balloon, one which as was the case repeatedly during Europe’s crisis uses Reuters as a sounding board to gauge the market’s reaction, however the reality is that China may truly be desperate enough to pursue this option.

Because what is lacking in the Reuters explanation is that this proposal entails nothing short of a nationalization on a grand scale, one which gives China’s impaired commercial banks – all of which are implicitly state controlled – the “equity keys” to the companies to which they have given secured loans, loans which are no longer performing because the underlying assets are clearly impaired, and where the cash flow generated can’t even cover the interest payments.

To continue reading: China Proposes Unprecedented Nationalization Of Insolvent Companies: Banks Will Equitize Non-Performing Loans

Who Gets to Pay for the Italian Banking Crisis? by Don Quijones

From Don Quijones at wolfstreet.com:

Six years after Europe’s sovereign debt crisis began, the Eurozone’s third largest economy, Italy, has finally decided to do what just about every other country has done when facing a full-blown, almost out-of-control banking crisis: to set up a bad bank to hide its worst debt.

It was only a matter of time: in the last six years, Europe’s economies have been drowning in an ever-expanding vitrine of bad debt — and none more so than Italy, where non-performing loans have soared to more than 350 billion euros, a fourfold increase since the end of 2008. At 18%, Italy’s ratio of nonperforming loans is more than four times the European average (and Europe’s banks are in worse shape than America’s). It’s the equivalent of 21% of GDP in a country that boasts Europe’s second highest public debt-to-GDP ratio (130%), just behind Greece, and where the banks hold over 70% of the country’s debt.

To make matters even worse, if Brussels gets its way, Italy’s government will not be able to dip into future taxpayer funds to stop its debt-laden banks from dropping like flies. European law no longer allows that sort of thing. Well, not really. Now, in the wake of new regulations that came into effect at the beginning of this year, collapsing banks in Europe will be “resolved” with the funds of stockholders, bondholders and other investors, including account holders with deposits of more than €100,000 euros — instead of classic bailouts that would raid directly or indirectly the taxpayers of other countries.

It might even make bank creditors realize that investing in a bank is not a risk-free venture.

That’s not to say that the bail-in approach doesn’t have its share of problems – chief among them the “super-priority” status covertly granted to derivative claims in recent international banking regulation. In other words, as the former hedge fund manager Shah Gilani warns in a Money Morning:

If your too-big-to-fail (TBTF) bank is failing because they can’t pay off derivative bets they made, and the government refuses to bail them out, under a mandate titled “Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in Resolution,” approved on Nov. 16, 2014, by the G20’s Financial Stability Board, they can take your deposited money and turn it into shares of equity capital to try and keep your TBTF bank from failing.

There’s also the niggling little fact that Europe’s banks have not yet built up the capital buffers needed to comply with the EU’s new bail-in rules.

To continue reading: Who Gets to Pay for the Italian Banking Crisis?