Tag Archives: central bank policy

Who Is Left To Speak The Truth (Or Why Government Hates Gold), by Bill Bonner

From Bill Bonner at Bonner & Partners via theburningplatform.com:

Mr. Market Gets Even

Yes, prices are being discovered again… by free declaration of buyers and sellers.

Owners of Greek stocks are discovering that their equity stakes aren’t as valuable as they believed.

But for every seller there is a buyer…

Sellers are losing money. Buyers believe they are getting a bargain.

You can fool all of the people some of the time. Some of the people all of the time. And most of the people once in a while.

You can obstruct price discovery and you can disguise and distort the real value of things. But Mr. Market will get even someday. He always does.

Yesterday, we mentioned but did not explain, that Alan Greenspan betrayed Mr. Market…

In 1987, after President Reagan appointed him Paul Volker’s successor as chairman of the Federal Reserve, Greenspan went over to the zombies… or more precisely, to their allies, the cronies.

It must not have been easy for the former free market defender and member of Ayn Rand’s inner circle…

The Largest Paper Money Racket Ever

In the late 1980s and early 1990s – you could almost see Greenspan struggling with the contradictions.

He had been loyal to free markets. But his job carried with it the biggest central planning authority of all time. He knew that currency unbacked by gold was a scam, but his position as chief of the Fed put him in charge of the largest paper money racket ever.

Greenspan believed in letting Mr. Market set prices. But as gatekeeper of U.S. credit, he corrupted more prices than any human being ever had before him.

But what was he to do?

In 1993, at her husband’s inaugural address to Congress, Ms. Clinton – now the leading Democratic candidate for president – chose to stand next to him. It was one of those magic moments in history, when power and money came together to celebrate.

(When we were in Vancouver, we went to an Anglican church. A banner hung down from the ceiling proudly proclaiming the trinity: “King, Country, God.” The parishioners like to imagine that all their leaders are united… It spares them the trouble of choosing just one.)

Of all the bigwigs in Washington, it was Alan Greenspan who had the biggest wig of all. He was practically a god to the members of Congress, to whom the economy was as big a mystery as Heaven itself.

To continue reading: Who Is Left to Speak The Truth?

“Risk of Collapse” and “Panic” in the Air, China Cuts Rates, by Wolf Richter

In “Trading Places,” SLL maintained that over the long-term, Euro-Asian financial markets will outperform those of Europe and the US, but to expect volatility. Volatility has arrived in a big way in China, whose markets have doubled over the last 12 months, but have crashed the last two weeks. From Wolf Richter, at wolfstreet.com:

It didn’t take long: the frazzled People’s Bank of China tries to put a stop to the worst 2-week crash since 1996.

The whole world piled into what had been the hottest stock market in the universe. Chinese stocks had been endlessly hyped in the US and elsewhere. For the smart money, it was a game of chicken; ride it up and get out just before the crash.

Chinese stock markets had more than doubled in 12 months, propelled also by margin debt, cheap credit all around, and the irresistible desire to get rich quick. Everyone in China, from street vendors to housewives, suddenly opened margin accounts in Hong Kong and mainland China, and borrowed money to buy stocks. Outstanding margin debt ballooned to $348 billion, even while insiders were reportedly dumping stocks. A well-oiled wealth-transfer machine.

It was one heck of a party. By early June, it had created $6.5 trillion in “value” over a period of 12 months; 63% of China’s 2014 GDP!

The Chinese government continued to aid and abet that wealth transfer by touting stocks. Even in March, as stocks had already reached dizzying heights, a spokesman for the China Securities Regulatory Commission said that the soaring valuation for Shanghai-listed shares had its own “inevitability and rationality,” such as China’s “improving economic conditions.”

Then someone accidentally turned off the juice.

Over the last ten trading days, the Shanghai Composite Index has plunged 19%, including 7.4% on Friday – the steepest two-week plunge since December 1996. The Shenzhen Composite has given up 20%, and the startup-focused ChiNext Index has plummeted 27% over the last three weeks, including 8.9% on Friday. According to Bloomberg, by Thursday, margin debt has dropped four days in a row. Markets were running out of propellant.

And on Saturday, the People’s Bank of China tried to put a stop to it. It cut its benchmark interest rates by 25 basis points, to 4.85% for the one-year lending rate and to 2% for the one-year bank deposit rate. The fourth cut since November. The last cut on May 10 had stemmed a much smaller rout and had re-ignited the propellants to drive stocks to greater highs. But the descent since has been brutal.

To continue reading: “Risk of Collapse” and “Panic” in the Air

http://wolfstreet.com/2015/06/27/risk-of-stock-market-collapse-panic-in-air-china-pboc-cuts-rates/

Pop goes the Bubble, by Dmitry Orlov

A clear-eyed look at the US economy, from Dmitry Orlov at cluborlov.blogspot.com:

Running a fundraiser (which, by the way, has been a great success—thank you all very much!) has prompted me to think about money more deeply than I normally do. I am no financial expert, and I certainly can’t give you investment advice, but when I figure something out for myself, it makes me want to share my insights. I know that many people see national finances as an impenetrable fog of numbers and acronyms, which they feel is best left up to financial specialists to interpret for them. But try to see national finances as a henhouse, yourself as a hen, and financial specialists as foxes. Perhaps you should pay a little bit of attention—perhaps a bit more than one would expect from a chicken?

By now many people, even the ones who don’t continuously watch the financial markets, have probably heard that the stock market in the US is in a bubble. Indeed, the price to earnings ratio of stocks is once again scaling the heights previously achieved just twice before: once right before the Black Tuesday event that augured in the Great Depression, and again right around Y2K, when the dot-com bubble burst. On Black Tuesday it was at 30; now it’s at 27.22. Just another 10% is all we need to bring on the next Great Depression! Come on, Americans, you can do it!

These nosebleed-worthy heights are being scaled with an extremely shaky economic environment as a backdrop. If you compensate for the distortions introduced by the US government’s dodgy methodology for measuring inflation, it turns out that the US economy hasn’t grown at all so far this century, but has been shrinking to the tune of 2% a year.

And if you ignore the laughable way the US government computes the unemployment rate, it turns out that the real unemployment rate has grown from 10% at the beginning of the century to around 23% today.

So how can an ever-shrinking economy with a continuously rising unemployment rate be producing ever-higher stock valuations?

Simple! The stock prices are being driven up by the actions of the Federal Reserve. Since the great financial crisis of 2007, when the entire financial system almost collapsed, the Federal Reserve, through its Quantitative Easing (QE), has been making funds available at minimal cost to a set of financial institutions deemed “too big to fail.” (What that means is that they cannot be allowed to fail, because that would almost bring down the entire financial system again, but must be artificially propped up no matter what.) This financial life support has dramatically driven up the Fed’s balance sheet, which now stands at $4.5 trillion (it was less than $1 trillion before the great financial crisis of 2007).

To continue reading: Pop goes the Bubble

http://cluborlov.blogspot.com/2015/06/pop-goes-bubble.html

See also, “Goodfellas and Goodgals,” SLL, 6/21/15

Goodfellas and Goodgals, by Robert Gore

You know, we always called each other good fellas. Like you said to, uh, somebody, :You’re gonna like this guy. He’s all right. He’s a good fella. He’s one of us.: You understand? We were good fellas. Wiseguys.

From the movie Goodfellas, 1990

Wiseguys have a term: connected, which refers to a guy who’s made his bones, who’s on the inside and protected by the mobster powers that be. It applies to the political context with the same connotations, and is nowhere more appropriate than the banker-government nexus. Thursday morning, before the stock market opened, the Zero Hedge website printed an article “Dollar Tumbles After Fed Whiffs Again; More Cracks Appear In Chinese Bubble,” that began:

All those saying the Fed will never be able to raise rate are looking particularly smug this morning, because if the market needed a green light that despite all the constant posturing, pomp and rhetoric, the US economy is simply (never) ready for a rate hike, it got it late last night when Goldman pushed back its forecast for the first Fed rate hike from September to December 2015 saying that “in large part this reflects the fact that seven FOMC participants are now projecting zero or one rate hike this year, a group that we believe includes Fed Chair Janet Yellen. We had viewed a clear signal for a September hike at the June meeting as close to a necessary condition for the FOMC to actually hike in September, but the committee did not lay that groundwork today.”

If you’re in on one of the biggest scams in history, that’s all you had to read to know that the stock market would gap up when it opened, which it did. There is no more connected institution than Goldman Sachs, supplying both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush with Secretaries of the Treasury (Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson) and regularly landing on Top 10 lists of campaign donors for candidates of both parties. The heads of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England are Goldman alumni. If Goldman says a rate hike won’t happen in September, it won’t happen.

For a while, it was believed that the rate hike would happen this month, but Snow White Yellen and her merry band of intellectual dwarves found excuses to delay it. Their explanations are couched in terms of the labor market, inflation expectations, and actual inflation, but the real reason is that nobody wants to bring to an end the ongoing theft known as the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). Economics has nothing to do with the Fed putting its thumb on the scale of interest rates; rather it is designed so the banks and Wall Street that have captured it will make money. That’s not the reckless rant of a conspiracy-theorizing populist. SLL is a staunch defender of capitalism and the self-interest that is its foundation, but banks stopped being capitalistic institutions over a century ago. What follows is a cold-blooded analysis of the deterioration of banking into larceny.

At the heart of fractional reserve banking is a lie: that a banks’ unsecured creditors—depositors—can withdraw their money on demand. They can’t, not all at once, and when, in the heat of a financial panic, they try, the bank faces a run, which can quickly become systemic. Ostensibly, the Federal Reserve was established to ameliorate this risk. The corrupting trade-off: from the moment of the enabling act’s passage, the banking industry became a ward of the state.

For a what-should-have-been-said-at-inception critique of the Federal Reserve, in a gripping historical novel no less, see The Golden Pinnacle, by Robert Gore. (The Golden Pinnacle was written by Gore in the belief that important ideas and a great read need not be mutually exclusive, and are in fact what readers are looking for. Prove him right and buy the book; it will be $22.46 (current price on Amazon) or $4.99 (Kindle and Nook) well spent.) The upshot of banker Daniel Durand’s fictional testimony before a House of Representatives committee: a central bank benefits the government, debtors, bankers, and the central bank at the expense of everyone else. Governments and other debtors benefit from lower interest rates and the hidden tax of a depreciating currency. The banks benefit from the establishment of a de facto banking cartel, mitigation of inherent banking risk, and access to cheap money with which to speculate. The central bank is one of the most powerful institutions in the government and its personnel benefit from the payola of regulatory capture and their positions as gatekeepers.

Further socialization of banking risk (but not banking rewards) came during the Great Depression with the establishment of deposit insurance. Too Big To Fail (TBTF) put the final nail in the coffin of any capitalistic tendencies still lurking within the banking system, and so inextricably intertwined the banks, the Federal Reserve, and the government that it was impossible to determine where one began and the others ended. TBTF set the stage for the Heist of the Century.

The TBTF banks in 2008 found themselves in the same position as a highly leveraged commodity speculator on the wrong side of a market move: tapped out. Fortunately for the banks, they had purchased plenty of insurance through the years—campaign contributions for politicians and revolving door jobs for politicians and bureaucrats alike. Nobody was going to let them to meet the fate that true capitalism demanded—bankruptcy— except for Lehman Brothers, which apparently did not grease enough, or the right, palms (and was also one of Goldman Sachs’ chief competitors). Other banks that would have gone bankrupt were sold to connected banks at fire sale prices.

The Heist wasn’t the bailouts per se; the government has got most of the taxpayer’s money back. The Heist is ZIRP, which began on December 16, 2008 and appears set to mark its seventh anniversary this December. Nobody, including bank executives or officials at the Fed and the Comptroller of the Currency, knew in 2008 how deep a hole the banks had dug themselves into. Many of their assets, which amounted to multiples of their shrinking capital, had no market or highly illiquid markets. The first step was to suspend mark-to-market accounting for those assets, so nobody on the outside could determine the banks’ true financial position. On April 9, 2009, the Financial Standards Accounting Board eased mark-to-market rules for hard to value and deeply underwater assets.

The economic and financial justifications for ZIRP were specious, the pitch to the marks as they were swindled. The Japanese economy had sputtered, enduring multiple recessions despite ultra-low interest rates for almost two decades—a clear demonstration of ZIRP’s inefficacy. In fact, mispriced interest rates reduce savings, promote debt, and lead to malinvestment that retards rather than promotes economic growth. That’s an intuitively obvious conclusion that Greenspan, Bernanke, Yellen, their flunkies, and cheerleaders in the media cannot allow themselves to speak, although it’s been part of the Austrian economic canon for a century.

Plunging deeper into financial fraud, they espoused the “wealth effect” doctrine. This pernicious and idiotic dream-masquerading-as-respectable-theory endorsed speculation and rising markets to create a wealth effect that would supposedly promote spending and economic expansion. This bizarre mutant of “trickle down” has even less empirical or analytic support than ZIRP. Rather, its true purpose was as an implicit directive and assurance for the connected. The directive: borrow at negligible rates and buy stocks, bonds, and related derivatives. The assurance: the Fed will give plenty of notice before rates are raised and will flood the system with additional liquidity if, despite its best efforts, markets should head south (the Greenspan, Bernanke, and Yellen “puts”). The Fed created a rigged game, open only to those who could access its ultra-cheap money—the banks and Wall Street. The revolving door between the Fed and its “clients” and substantial honoraria for former Fed officials reading ghost-written speeches are among the payoffs.

The victims of this swindle are the American public, who have sustained huge and mounting losses, summing to the trillions. By retarding economic growth, ZIRP, in concert with the refusal to allow the 2008 financial crisis to perform the function such crises usually perform—culling insolvent businesses, repricing assets, and purging unsound debt—has led to the weakest so-called recovery on record. Because of economic anemia, millions of Americans are unemployed or underemployed who would not be in a sound economy. Healthy businesses have not reaped the profits—the source of capital investment and jobs—that they should have because low interest rates have kept their sick competitors on life support. Malinvestment has created a deflationary overhang of excess production. ZIRP has discouraged savings, the fountainhead of economic growth, and encouraged debt, which must be repaid from future production. Debt has grown so large it threatens the solvency of the government and its people, and presents a future of unmitigated bleakness for America’s youth.

Many Americans are vaguely aware that they’ve been robbed, but there hasn’t been a reaction remotely proportional to the incalculably large losses. This has allowed to theft to continue, but the quietude will end when the artificially juiced stock market finally crashes and takes the economy with it. That the central bank has run the risk of public and political hostility and allowed the theft to go on as long as it has may well be an indication that the big banks are not as sound as advertised. Their financial statements have been indecipherable and opaque since before the suspension of mark-to-market, and they are still huge players in highly leveraged derivative markets. SLL recently posted an article about Deutsche Bank, the largest European TBTF bank, that raised the disturbing possibility that it faces financial difficulties (“Is Deutsche Bank The Next Lehman?” 6/13/15). With world debt over $200 trillion and the interlinkages in the global financial system, problems at one large bank, especially one that is a counterparty on trillions of dollars of derivatives contracts (like Deutsche Bank), can reverberate quickly and systemically.

Crime pays when it’s ostensibly legal, backed by the government, and its perpetrators convince gullible victims that it’s for their own good. The savvy know better, but also realize that not until, in Washington Irving’s words, “the whole superstructure built upon credit and reared by speculation crumbles to the ground, leaving scarce a wreck behind” will things change. It will be black humor at its finest when the crooks discover that most of what they’ve stolen is debt that will never be repaid. It would be justice at its finest if they spent decades in the graybar hotel.

“WHEN THE SLAVES REVOLT, THEY WILL SEEK THE BLOOD OF THEIR MASTERS,” THE GOLDEN PINNACLE

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The Great Abdication, by Danielle DiMartino Booth

Once in a great while an insider either tells the truth and quits or is fired, or, more commonly, quits and tells the truth. Danielle DiMartino Booth left the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank after 9 years and has engaged in one of those rare instances of truth-telling. From Ms. Booth, at The Liscio Report:

The business cycle is dead! Long live the business cycle!

Not too long ago, in a land not so far away, the business cycle was declared to be defeated. Policymakers at the Federal Reserve were credited with slaying the pesky beast that featured recessions as part of its nature. Such was the faith in the permanence of business cycle’s demise that the era was given its own label, The Great Moderation, a perfect world in which inflation ran not too hot or too cold and profit growth was accepted as the steady state.

As is so often the case, reality rudely disturbed nirvana’s prospects. The Great Moderation devolved into the Great Recession precipitated by one of the most devastating financial crises in U.S. history. The veneer of calm advertised over the prior years was stripped away. In its stead, economists had to concede that an era of benign monetary policy had encouraged malinvestment, the scourge that Austrian Ludwig von Mises warned of in the early 20th century. An overabundance of debt, if left unchecked, inevitably leads to the misallocation of resources. In the case of the first years of the 2000s, the target was, of course, the housing market.

The hope today is that the current era of easy monetary policy will have no deep economic ramifications. Such thinking, though, may prove to be naive. It goes without saying that the heat of the financial crisis merited a monumental response on policymakers’ part. That said, the most glaring outgrowth has been politicians’ exploiting low interest rates to their benefit. While it’s conceivable that well-intentioned central bankers want no part in encouraging Congressional malfeasance, the fact remains that the lack of action on politicians’ part would not have been possible absent the Fed’s allowing Congress to abdicate its responsibilities to the manna of easy money.

Of course, we all appear to have been spoiled over the last 25 years. A funny thing happened when the Fed placed a floor under stock prices with assurances that investors’ pain and suffering would be mitigated – recessions faded from the norm. Over the past 25 years, the economy has contracted one-fourth as often as it did in the 25 years that preceded this benign era. Hence the illusion of prosperity, one that has rendered investors complacent to the point of being comatose. That’s what happens when entire industries are able to run with more capacity than demand validates simply because the credit to remain in operation is there for the taking. To take but one example, capacity utilization is at 78.1 percent, shy of the 30-year average of 79.6 percent some six years into the current recovery. The downside is that the cathartic cleansing that takes place when recession is allowed to play out all the way to the bitter end of a bankruptcy cycle never occurs – winners and losers alike stay in business.

http://tlrii.typepad.com/theliscioreport/

To continue reading: The Great Abdication

The Warren Buffett Economy—Why Its Days Are Numbered (Part 5), by David Stockman

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

From David Stockman, at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

If Warren Buffett and his ilk weren’t so hideously rich, main street America would be far more prosperous. I must hasten to add, of course, that this proposition has nothing to do with the zero-sum anti-capitalism of left-wing ideologues like Professors Piketty and Krugman.

Far from it. Real capitalism cannot thrive unless inventive and enterprenurial genius is rewarded with outsized fortunes.

But as I have demonstrated in Parts 1-4, Warren Buffett’s $73 billion net worth, and numerous like and similar financial gambling fortunes that have arisen since 1987, are not due to genius; they are owing to adept surfing on the $50 trillion bubble that has been generated by the central bank Keynesianism of Alan Greenspan and his successors.

The resulting massive redistribution of wealth to the tiny slice of households which own most of the financial assets is not merely collateral damage. That is, it is not the unfortunate byproduct of continuous and extraordinary central bank “stimulus” policies that were otherwise necessary to keep the US economy off the shoals and the GDP and jobs on a steadily upward course.

Just the opposite. The entire regime of monetary central planning is a regrettable historical detour; it did not need to happen because massive central bank intervention is not necessary for capitalism to thrive. Contrary to the prevailing statist presumption, the free market does not have a death wish; it is not perennially slumping toward underperformance and depressionary collapse absent the deft ministrations of the fiscal and monetary authorities.

In fact, today’s style of heavy-handed monetary central planning destroys capitalist prosperity. It does so in a manner that is hidden at first—– because credit inflation and higher leverage temporarily gooses the reported GDP. But eventually it visibly and relentlessly devours the vital ingredients of growth in an orgy of debt and speculation.

To appreciate this we need to turn back the clock by 100 years—-to the early days of the Fed and ask a crucial question. Namely, what would have happened if its charter had not been changed by the exigencies of Woodrow Wilson’s foolish crusade to make the world safe for democracy?

http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/the-warren-buffett-economy-why-its-days-are-numbered-part-5/

To continue reading: The Warren Buffet Economy, Part 5

The Warren Buffett Economy—-Why Its Days Are Numbered (Part 3), by David Stockman

For Part 1

For Part 2

From David Stockman, at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

During the last 27 years the financial system has ballooned dramatically while the US economy has slowed to a crawl—–a divergent trend that has intensified with the passage of time. For instance, since Q4 2000, nominal GDP has expanded by just 70% compared to a 140% gain in market finance (i.e. the value of non-financial corporate equity plus credit market debt per the Fed’s Flow Of Funds report).

As a consequence, and as we previously demonstrated, the ratio of finance to economic output has soared to nearly 540% of national income compared to a historic norm of about 200%. Had even the stabilized ratio of 240% that the Volcker sound money policy had put in place by 1986, for example, remained at the level, total credit market debt and equity finance would be $50 trillion lower than today’s gargantuan $93 trillion total.

Even when you purge the cumulative price inflation out of the above picture, the story does not remotely add-up. That is, while real median household income has not gained at all since the late 1980s, and thus currently stands at just 1.03X of its 1987 value, the GDP deflator-adjusted value of corporate equities and credit market debt outstanding stands at 8.0X and Warren Buffett’s real net worth at 19.0X.

Needless to say, that’s not capitalism at work; its central bank driven bubble finance. So the question remains why did the Fed expand its balance sheet by 22X over the past 27 years (from $200 billion to $4.5 trillion)? After all, the empirical result was a sharp slowing of main street growth, a massive financialization of the US economy and monumental windfalls to financial speculators who surfed on the $50 trillion bubble.

And let’s first sharpen the financial surfer point. Warren Buffett is not a genius and did not invent anything, even a unique method of investing and allocating capital. He may have read Graham and Dodd as a youthful investor, but his nominal net worth did not grow from $3.4 billion in 1987 to $73 billion at present by following the old fashioned precepts of value investing.

Instead, he bought the obvious consumer names of the baby boom demographic wave like Coke and Gillette; had a keen ear for buying what he believed slower footed investors would also be buying later; appreciated the value of banks and other companies that suckled on the public teat; and mainly rode the 27-year wave that caused finance to soar from $12 trillion to $93 trillion after Greenspan took the helm at the Fed.

Stated differently, under a regime of honest money and free market finance no mere insurance company portfolio manger could make 19X in real terms in 27 years. Yes, perhaps a real inventor of something fundamentally new and economically transformative could—-such as Thomas Edison, Henry Ford or Bill Gates.

http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/the-warren-buffett-economy-why-its-days-are-numbered-part-3/

To continue reading: The Warren Buffet Economy, Part 3

Cat Food Dinners, by Robert Gore

In the last days of the tech bubble at the turn of the century, companies announced stock splits and the price of their stocks jumped. Services would alert day traders of splits so they could pounce on the stocks before the uninformed masses. Why would a split have any effect on the price of a stock other than a directly proportional adjustment? (e.g., A two-for-one split should reduce the price of the stock by 50 percent.) Supposedly a split represented management’s confidence in the company’s prospects, or some such rah rah. And a pizza cut into eight slices represents more pizza than one cut into six slices. It was the craziness of the time. Ultimately, all those splits did was make stocks more affordable for day-trading greater fools.

It is the craziness of our time that stocks elevate when companies take actions—advertised as “shareholder friendly”—that harm the company and its shareholders: increasing dividends and buying back shares. A company pays the corporate tax on its profits. When it pays dividends, shareholders, unless they are tax exempt, are taxed on the distribution. If the company retained the money, it could be used for productive investment. Shareholders have bought ownership in the company because they believe the company’s management will generate a return. Investors buy Berkshire Hathaway stock because they believe Warren Buffet can achieve a higher return on their money than they can.

Warren Buffet believes the same thing. Berkshire Hathaway does not pay a dividend; Buffet keeps the money and makes more investments. The many fold increase in Berkshire’s share price over the years is testament to his success. Why invest in a company if the company is going to give your money back, and you pay taxes on the distribution? Some companies even borrow to fund such distributions. The company is depriving itself of capital that could be used for profitable investment, incurring a debt that will have to be repaid from future profits, and handing many of its shareholders a tax liability.

With share buybacks, the company pays out to shareholders who are either reducing their holdings or selling out completely. The company cannot figure out anything to do with its capital, so it speculates in the stock market. Berkshire Hathaway occasionally buys back its own stock, but Buffet says it does so only when he judges that the stock price is below its intrinsic value and his record is good. The herd of corporate managers, like the herd of investors generally, buy high. After five years of a bull market, stock buybacks set a record in 2014 and may do so again in 2015. By many time-tested measures, stock valuations are stretched, definitely not the stuff of glowing returns. The criticism about funding dividends with debt applies equally to funding buybacks with debt. Bondholders get the short end of the shareholder friendliness stick, as it reduces the company’s cash and creditworthiness.

Buybacks can also create a capital gains tax liability for selling shareholders. With both dividends and buybacks, not only may shareholders have to pay taxes, they must also figure out what to do with the proceeds. Spend the money? Stick it in CDs paying near zero interest? Buy stock in another shareholder friendly company that will end up returning their money?

Notwithstanding the costs to both shareholders and their companies, dividends and buybacks have supported stocks. Short term paydays outweigh longer-term considerations. The biggest fans of shareholder friendliness are corporate executives, whose compensation is often tied to the share price. Robert Prechter has noted that many practices deemed acceptable in bull markets become unacceptable in bear markets, with punishment meted out retroactively for the newly instated sins. Spending the company’s money and incurring debt to support the share prices and the value of stock options may, when the music stops, look questionable, venal, or outright criminal, depending on the severity of the next bear market.

If executives are put in the dock, they can claim the Federal Reserve made them do it. Its debt monetization and interest rate suppression have provided so much liquidity and driven returns so low that the honchos can argue they couldn’t do anything else with corporate cash but distribute it to shareholders or speculate on their own stock. For companies sitting on mountains of cash, that defense has exculpatory merit. Why leave an asset that earns next to nothing on the balance sheet? Furthermore, the stated aim of central banks has been to drive money into riskier investments; from corporations to seniors who cannot fund their retirements from “safe” fixed-income investments offering minuscule yields. Corporate executives, their high-priced lawyers will argue, were merely getting with the program, with their own enrichment an incidental consequence. Seniors have no high-priced legal talent to argue their case, but for many, if they don’t buy stocks and junk bonds and pick up some hours at Walmart, they’re looking at cat food dinners. Unfortunately, when this force-fed equity golden goose meets its inevitable end, pâté won’t be gracing their plates or those of millions of other Americans—they’ll be savoring Scrumptious Shredded Salmon or Choice Chicken Chunks.

TIRED OF THE SAME OLD THING? A FAMILY SAGA

ABOUT A FAMILY YOU’LL CARE ABOUT

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Former Fed Governor Predicts “Wrenching” Market Adjustment, by Wolf Richter

When the fantasy known as the US equity market finally collides with reality, it’s going to be a helluva pileup. From Wolf Richter, at wolf street.com:

Lawrence Lindsey, a Governor of the Federal Reserve from 1991 to 1997, was right before. And got fired for it. Reality was too inconvenient.

In December 2002, as George W. Bush’s economic adviser and Director of the National Economic Council at the White House, he fretted out loud that the invasion of Iraq would be a lot more expensive than supporters of it were claiming. Clearly he’d failed to drink the Kool-Aid. Instead of peanuts, it would cost as much as $200 billion, he said. It shook the White House at its foundations, the fact that he had the temerity to say this.

The Atlantic explains:

Bush instead stood by such advisers as Paul Wolfowitz, who said that the invasion would be largely “self-financing” via Iraq’s oil, and Andrew Natsios, who told an incredulous Ted Koppel that the war’s total cost to the American taxpayer would be no more than $1.7 billion.

As it turns out, Lawrence Lindsey’s estimate was indeed off — by a factor of 10 or more, on the low side.

So maybe people should listen to him. And maybe, if his record repeats itself, the disaster he warns about is going to be a lot more costly in the end than the worst-case scenario he is now predicting.

Lindsey was speaking during a panel discussion on Fed policy at an event sponsored by the Peterson Foundation, MarketWatch reported. And once again, he dared to say what everyone already knew, but what the financial establishment on Wall Street fights tooth and nail: The Fed has dragged out the normalization of interest rates “way beyond what is prudent.”

He explained that in graduate school, if you suggested that the federal funds rate should be kept at zero while the unemployment rate is 5.4%, which is exactly what the Fed has been doing, “you would have been laughed out of the classroom.”

http://wolfstreet.com/2015/05/20/lawrence-lindsey-fed-has-no-credibility-about-ability-to-stay-on-top-of-ticking-monetary-bomb/

To continue reading: Former Fed Governor Predicts “Wrenching” Market Adjustment

Financial Blowback, by Robert Gore

Blowback is a government action that leads to a result directly opposite the government’s intent, a manifestation of the Command and Control Futility Principle (see “Crisis Progress Report,” SLL, 1/29/15). Designed to reduce terrorism and terrorist infiltration, the US’s war on terrorism has created blowback: more terrorism and chaos throughout the Middle East, and a flood of refugees into Europe, some of whom are undoubtedly Islamic extremists.

There is another type of blowback, lurking within the global financial system, that may prove just as dangerous. Since the financial crisis, government debt and debt monetization have been embraced to promote economic growth. New regulations have been implemented to address financial risks.

The realization grows that governments borrowing money, and central banks buying it and other debt, have produced little in the way of economic growth (see “The Song Remains the Same“, from the Economic Cycle Research Institute, SLL 3/25/15). What is not generally recognized is the blowback potential: that the supposed remedies will ultimately make the disease worse. Artificially low rates lead to overproduction and leveraged speculation. Expanding debt increases the debt service burden.

The burgeoning oil patch disaster is a sample of blowback. The fracking boom was powered by debt, which may have made economic sense when oil was over $100 per barrel, but is a millstone now that it is below $50 per barrel. Wells are being shut down, investment slashed, and employees fired—economic contraction, the opposite of economic growth. Similar production cutbacks are happening in a number of other natural resources: iron, coal, and precious metals. Declining volumes of world trade and all-time lows in the Baltic Dry Index point to continuing shrinkage in production and further contraction.

That contraction impairs the ability of debtors to service their debt, and the margin of error for the most heavily indebted global economy in history is nil. Debt restructurings and bankruptcies in oil and other natural resources have already begun. Creditors are pulling in their horns. Shrinking credit and production will be a mutually reinforcing vicious cycle that spreads to other sectors, a ticking time bomb. Governments and central banks are encumbered with much more debt than they had in 2008, and will have little or no leeway to forestall the workings of this cycle through debt expansion and monetization.

Debt being the epicenter of the coming crisis, it’s no surprise that time bombs lurk in credit markets. Bond math is such that a one percent move up in yield produces a larger loss, in percentage terms, on bonds when yields are low than when they are high. Thus, when central bank interest rate suppression ends, either due to central bank policy change or market spasms, those owning government bonds will suffer substantial losses. Ironically, the largest owners of government bonds are central banks—they have set themselves up for their own blowback.

By sucking up much of the available float in government bonds, they have already inflicted damage on the workings of those markets. Those bonds are used as collateral against short-term loans in “repo” transactions (short for repurchase—the borrower sells the bonds and agrees to repurchase them; the difference in prices is the implicit interest) that allow the market to function. Without them, the markets seize up as collateral-starved lenders actually pay interest, rather than receive it with the government bond collateral they received for their cash. Many of those seeking collateral are short bonds, so removing bonds from the market reduces the number of shorts.

By “hogging” the bond market, central banks have crowded out the shorts that would provide bids and liquidity if the market were to drop. Diminished liquidity is exacerbated by new regulations that treat less favorably, in terms of capital ratios, bonds banks hold in trading portfolios versus bonds they hold to maturity, as investments. Banks were the primary market makers for bonds. At a time when interest rates are so low they have nowhere to go but up (and bond prices down), the pool of bond bidders has shrunk. The new banking regulations were intended to make banks safer, but the blowback effect will be to make the bond market considerably less so.

Shallow liquidity is a natural consequence of a high degree of leverage, in any market. Zero interest rate policies promote leverage. If a trade is crowded with speculators who have put up a tiny percentage of their trades and borrowed the rest at microscopic rates, at the first hint of trouble they look for a bid, which disappears. Leverage, as the old trading adage goes, is a two-edged sword. Cheap debt that has fueled the steady ascent of markets since the financial crises will be responsible for terrifying plunges as markets choke on government and central bank blowback and fire sale bids are the only ones available. Witness January’s Swiss franc debacle, recent vertiginous drops in oil and other commodities‘ prices, and the stock market’s “flash crash” back in May of 2010.

Another trading adage: sell when you can, not when you have to. Countless traders who thought they could get out in time when markets went against them have been carried out on stretchers. Liquidity can be as evanescent as a mirage oasis in the desert. Everything that central banks and governments have done since the last financial crisis guarantees a mouth full of sand when the next crisis hits. The financial blowback will be fearsome, a crushing reaction to what proceeded it, and the only way to avoid becoming collateral damage will be to get out of the line of fire before it begins.

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