Tag Archives: 2008 crisis

There Are No Markets, Only [IMF] Manipulation, by Mark Nestmann

Check out the figures on the notational value of derivatives at the end of this post. From Mark Nestmann, on a guest post at theburningplatform.com:

I can’t help but be reminded of the truism of this week’s article title, watching Chinese stock prices drop, day after day. In response, Chinese securities regulators have banned most short selling. They’ve pressured mutual funds to buy stocks and run advertisements that extol the virtues of buying stocks.

The Chinese central bank has even parceled out cash to brokers to make it easier for investors to buy on margin. As central banks do, it’s creating the cash out of thin air. The central bank also announced a surprise devaluation of the yuan, China’s currency.

So far, the intervention hasn’t worked. Chinese stocks continue to plummet. The latest interventions urge companies to buy back their shares and boost dividends. Perhaps the central bank will create more money to pay for it all.

That might stop the plunge. But then again, it might not.

China is hardly alone in overtly manipulating its markets. This blatant effort to manipulate stock prices is only the most recent desperate gamble by global governments to prop up markets. They’ll do just about anything to prevent a repeat of the 2007-2008 recession.

Their playbook comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which advises governments to engage in “financial repression” to buoy up global markets.

The IMF’s recipe to avoid what former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke calls “chaotic unwinding” includes bail-ins, higher inflation, negative interest rates, and capital controls. The IMF even proposes a “one-off capital levy” – outright confiscation of private savings – at a rate of 10% or higher.

But as world markets have demonstrated over the last few weeks, it doesn’t always work.

The cause of this chaotic unwinding is excessive debt combined with leveraged bets financed by more debt.

The world economy is floating on a gargantuan mountain of debt; collateralized, re-collateralized, hypothecated, and semi-hypothecated. Total world indebtedness now stands close to $200 trillion. That amounts to 286% of the global GDP of $70 trillion.

What’s more, according to the Bank for International Settlements, the total notional value of derivatives (i.e., bets on the value of something else, like a stock, bond, interest rate, etc.) traded over the counter was $630 trillion for the last six months of 2014. There’s another $600 trillion or so of exchange-traded derivatives, structured notes, and custom-designed derivatives. They include options, futures, and credit default swaps, along with securities backed by assets (many of dubious value, such as high-risk mortgages).

That amounts to about $1.2 quadrillion, or 1,868% of global GDP.

To continue reading: There Are No Markets, Only [IMF] Manipulation

More Bone-Smoking Garbage, by Karl Denninger

While the raiments of the empresses and emperors of central banking are still being fawned over by their courtiers in government and the press, there’s a growing number of observers, their eyes wide open, who are proclaiming the truth: the central bankers are naked! From Karl Denninger, on a guest post from theburningplatform.com:

I read this twice before realizing the last name of the author perfectly fit the so-called “fix” for 2008 — and the premise that “they could do that again.”

By the end of the week, stocks, currencies and commodity prices weren’t crashing any longer but financial markets were far from settled. Over the past 10 days, markets have plummeted, paused, recovered and fallen again. There’s little sign the anxiety is lifting.

Until recently investors had been preoccupied with the weakness of the post-2008 recovery. Now some are asking whether 2008 might come round again. It’s an especially disturbing possibility because, on the face of it, the policy options for responding to another slump are fewer than last time. Governments have run big budget deficits to support demand, so there’s less so-called fiscal space for a new round of stimulus, or so the thinking goes. Interest rates are still at zero, and even the advocates of quantitative easing recognize that it ran into diminishing returns. What’s left?

Clive goes on to raise the old flag once again; that the “effective remedies” could once again be trotted out.

There’s a problem with this premise: They didn’t work the last time.

My evidence? All of those measures are still in place!

If they were effective then they could have been withdrawn. They were not, any more than opiates are effective at resolving the source of pain. Oh sure, opiates mask pain (at the cost of making you stoned out of your mind!) but they don’t fix whatever is causing the pain itself.
What’s worse, of course is that in order to maintain their effectiveness you must continually increase the dose of these monetary instruments exactly as tolerance does the same thing with opiates. In the case of opiates you eventually reach a “coffin corner” as there is a depressant effect on the body that has a hard upper limit; when you reach it the user’s respiration and heart stop, and that’s the end of the show. As the effective dose ratchets upward you eventually reach the point where either the user accidentally takes too much and dies, or worse reaches the point that the effective and lethal doses cross and he dies that way.

In the case of so-called “monetary stimulus” the facts are in at this point — the 2008 nostrums did not work. Yes, the stock market went back up. But here’s the rub — they “worked” by increasing the debt in the system, and since GDP is computed in units of currency you must back out of the GDP equation the additional units that were added.

If you do this you’ll find that from the time of the crisis to today GDP has in fact expanded by less than 1% a year. Since the population expands by about 1% a year in the United States (and has been for the last 50 years or so) this means that on a per-capita basis GDP has actually been negative the entire time.

Read that last paragraph however many times you need to until it sinks in: There has been no economic growth in real terms on a per-person basis since the economic crisis. Zip. Zero. Nada.

To continue reading: More Bone-Smoking Garbage

Risk Turns Risky: Unpleasant Skew, Scale Dilation, and Broken Lines , by John Hussman

It is a good idea to read and understand this entire article, grasp the nuances, and study the graphs. From John P. Hussman at hussman.net:

Over the years, I’ve observed that overvalued, overbought, overbullish market conditions have historically been accompanied by what I call “unpleasant skew” – a succession of small but persistent marginal new highs, followed by a vertical collapse in which weeks or months of gains are wiped out in a handful of sessions. Provided that investors are in a risk-seeking mood (which we infer from the behavior of market internals), sufficiently aggressive monetary easing can delay this tendency, by starving investors of every source of safe return, and actively encouraging further yield-seeking speculation even when valuations are obscene. Once investors become risk-averse, as deteriorating market internals have suggested in recent months, vertical declines much more extreme than last week’s loss are quite ordinary.

The way to understand the bubbles and collapses of the past 15 years, and those throughout history, is to learn the right lesson. That lesson is not that overvaluation can be ignored indefinitely – we know different from the collapses that have regularly followed extreme valuations. The lesson is not that easy monetary policy reliably supports stock prices – persistent and aggressive easing did nothing to keep stocks from losing more than half their value in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009. Rather, the key lesson to draw from recent market cycles, and those across a century of history, is this:

Valuations are the main driver of long-term returns, but the main driver of market returns over shorter horizons is the attitude of investors toward risk, and the most reliable way to measure this is through the uniformity or divergence of market internals. When market internals are uniformly favorable, overvaluation has little effect, and monetary easing can encourage further risk-seeking speculation. Conversely, when deterioration in market internals signals a shift toward risk-aversion among investors, monetary easing has little effect, and overvaluation can suddenly matter with a vengeance.

To continue reading: Risk Turns Risky

He Said That? 8/22/15

Who can forget Jim Cramer’s timeless rant back in August 2007? He blew a gasket back then, demanding the financial authorities do something to save his underwater portfolio the financial system. He might have a heart attack or a stroke when this infant financial crisis reaches full maturity. For old time’s sake, here’s Jim Cramer:

Crisis Progress Report (10): Bust, by Robert Gore

Ideas and actions have consequences, fortunately. Debt booms bust. SLL is back in action after a week-long trip. Nothing that happened over that week, culminating in yesterday’s worst equity market drops in months, followed by today’s so-far hefty drop (never dismiss the possibility of an end-of-day “save” to make people feel a little better over the weekend) is surprising. SLL has been warning of exactly this outcome since last fall. Even the rally in oversold precious metals has been predictable (see “Buy Gold and Silver,” SLL, 7/20/15). The surprise has been how long the equity collapse was in coming. SLL was a little early, but a little early informed by competent analysis is better than a little late informed by complete cluelessness.

SLL has not been the only one making this call, but the competent camp has been far outnumbered by the clueless. Such was the case during the 2007-2009 crisis, too. That the lessons from that crisis went unlearned is inexcusable. It was a busting debt bubble, of which housing, mortgages, and mortgage securities and derivatives were at the leading edge.

The beliefs both within and outside the economics profession in the magic beans of expanding government spending and debt, transferring private debt to public balance sheets, debt monetization, and interest rate suppression betrays stupidity, cupidity, and statist proclivities. A bursting debt bubble cannot be stopped by encouraging and incurring more debt; Jack had a better chance with his beans.

How then have so many missed what was so obviously coming? In both government and on Wall Street, analysts and economists are paid not to look, to explain why common sense is fallacious and the plainly evident is not what is really happening. There is no constituency for the truth, which is why unvarnished utterances by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are propelling their candidacies. Outside the 1 percent, there is a constituency for reality, logic, and consequences. (If there is not, SLL will have to close up shop.) Inside the 1 percent, such considerations are ignored until they cannot be.

The two most subscribed-to economic fantasies—Keynesianism and monetarism—give the government primacy of place in economic affairs. According to Keynes, markets and the price mechanism are insufficient, only the government can bring aggregate supply and demand into alignment, by going into debt or raising taxes as necessary. According to the monetarists, the economy dances to a tune called by the central bank’s manipulations of bank reserves and interest rates.

Pick your poison: both schools believe in magic beans because they fit their statist predilections. You would think that the global economy sliding into depression after six years of unprecedented application of Keynesian and monetarist nostrums would give their adherents pause, but it won’t. The mainstream branches of economics are religions, and at core their faith is a reflection of faith in government.

As SLL has said repeatedly, governments cannot control multiple variables, and the multiple variables they cannot control have been multiplying daily. China—where the government is trying to control the economy, margin debt, corporate debt, bad debt reserves, shadow banks, state-controlled banks, interest rates, equity prices, pollution, the price of pork, and whatever else it believes needs controlling—has become the poster child for the futility of such efforts. The futility, as predicted, is rippling out across the globe, where other governments are now frantically engaging in their own futile efforts to control multiple variables.

Now that debt expansion has become debt contraction, coming to intellectual grips with the future is straightforward. Regular readers of SLL should be intellectually prepared, hopefully they are prepared appropriately in other aspects of their lives as well. Debt contractions are inherently deflationary, especially in a global economy based on debt. Contraction and deflation are accompanied by depression, which will not be acknowledged for several years and from which innumerable “recoveries” will be hailed. Everything that governments and central banks do will make the situation worse, as they attempt to prevent or forestall the market (reality)-based consequences—repriced assets, reduced production and consumption, unemployment, insolvency, and bankruptcy—that will be the only road to recovery.

The next decade, and perhaps longer, will be incredibly stressful, even for the well-prepared. At this point, the best advice is relax: stay calm, focused, and rational. Remember, there will be some silver linings. Brutal and at times as indiscriminate as the crisis will be, there will be a measure of justice. Many fantasies, especially those of government as manna from heaven and central banks as guarantors of ever-rising markets, will be demolished. Rendezvous with reality are never bad things.

Sovereign debt and unfunded promises will be the locus of this crisis. Although governments will undoubtedly increase their repression and control as financial stress deepens, after multiple crashes they will be dead broke, unable to obtain credit at anything but ruinous interest rates. This means that they will be unable to do even a fraction of what they try to do now. Anarchy, chaos, civil disobedience, and revolution are far more likely than police state totalitarianism (which is quite expensive). You’ll have a better chance of being killed by criminals than police (although in many instances the two will be indistinguishable). However, from the disorder may emerge enclaves devoted to strictly limited government, the protection of individual rights and freedoms, and capitalism. Such enclaves will probably not correspond to existing political boundaries.

When markets make their final lows, there are going to be once-in-a-lifetime bargains in all sorts of financial and real assets. The daunting problem, of course, will be preserving liquidity in the interim, especially with rapacious governments on the prowl. Preparation will be a journey, not a destination; you’ll never be “done” and perfect solutions will be in short supply. However, just knowing what’s coming will put you ahead of most, and may very well be the difference between surviving for a better day or succumbing to the general panic and chaos.

A CLASSIC YOU’LL ACTUALLY ENJOY!

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Pop goes the Bubble, by Dmitry Orlov

A clear-eyed look at the US economy, from Dmitry Orlov at cluborlov.blogspot.com:

Running a fundraiser (which, by the way, has been a great success—thank you all very much!) has prompted me to think about money more deeply than I normally do. I am no financial expert, and I certainly can’t give you investment advice, but when I figure something out for myself, it makes me want to share my insights. I know that many people see national finances as an impenetrable fog of numbers and acronyms, which they feel is best left up to financial specialists to interpret for them. But try to see national finances as a henhouse, yourself as a hen, and financial specialists as foxes. Perhaps you should pay a little bit of attention—perhaps a bit more than one would expect from a chicken?

By now many people, even the ones who don’t continuously watch the financial markets, have probably heard that the stock market in the US is in a bubble. Indeed, the price to earnings ratio of stocks is once again scaling the heights previously achieved just twice before: once right before the Black Tuesday event that augured in the Great Depression, and again right around Y2K, when the dot-com bubble burst. On Black Tuesday it was at 30; now it’s at 27.22. Just another 10% is all we need to bring on the next Great Depression! Come on, Americans, you can do it!

These nosebleed-worthy heights are being scaled with an extremely shaky economic environment as a backdrop. If you compensate for the distortions introduced by the US government’s dodgy methodology for measuring inflation, it turns out that the US economy hasn’t grown at all so far this century, but has been shrinking to the tune of 2% a year.

And if you ignore the laughable way the US government computes the unemployment rate, it turns out that the real unemployment rate has grown from 10% at the beginning of the century to around 23% today.

So how can an ever-shrinking economy with a continuously rising unemployment rate be producing ever-higher stock valuations?

Simple! The stock prices are being driven up by the actions of the Federal Reserve. Since the great financial crisis of 2007, when the entire financial system almost collapsed, the Federal Reserve, through its Quantitative Easing (QE), has been making funds available at minimal cost to a set of financial institutions deemed “too big to fail.” (What that means is that they cannot be allowed to fail, because that would almost bring down the entire financial system again, but must be artificially propped up no matter what.) This financial life support has dramatically driven up the Fed’s balance sheet, which now stands at $4.5 trillion (it was less than $1 trillion before the great financial crisis of 2007).

To continue reading: Pop goes the Bubble

http://cluborlov.blogspot.com/2015/06/pop-goes-bubble.html

See also, “Goodfellas and Goodgals,” SLL, 6/21/15

Goodfellas and Goodgals, by Robert Gore

You know, we always called each other good fellas. Like you said to, uh, somebody, :You’re gonna like this guy. He’s all right. He’s a good fella. He’s one of us.: You understand? We were good fellas. Wiseguys.

From the movie Goodfellas, 1990

Wiseguys have a term: connected, which refers to a guy who’s made his bones, who’s on the inside and protected by the mobster powers that be. It applies to the political context with the same connotations, and is nowhere more appropriate than the banker-government nexus. Thursday morning, before the stock market opened, the Zero Hedge website printed an article “Dollar Tumbles After Fed Whiffs Again; More Cracks Appear In Chinese Bubble,” that began:

All those saying the Fed will never be able to raise rate are looking particularly smug this morning, because if the market needed a green light that despite all the constant posturing, pomp and rhetoric, the US economy is simply (never) ready for a rate hike, it got it late last night when Goldman pushed back its forecast for the first Fed rate hike from September to December 2015 saying that “in large part this reflects the fact that seven FOMC participants are now projecting zero or one rate hike this year, a group that we believe includes Fed Chair Janet Yellen. We had viewed a clear signal for a September hike at the June meeting as close to a necessary condition for the FOMC to actually hike in September, but the committee did not lay that groundwork today.”

If you’re in on one of the biggest scams in history, that’s all you had to read to know that the stock market would gap up when it opened, which it did. There is no more connected institution than Goldman Sachs, supplying both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush with Secretaries of the Treasury (Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson) and regularly landing on Top 10 lists of campaign donors for candidates of both parties. The heads of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England are Goldman alumni. If Goldman says a rate hike won’t happen in September, it won’t happen.

For a while, it was believed that the rate hike would happen this month, but Snow White Yellen and her merry band of intellectual dwarves found excuses to delay it. Their explanations are couched in terms of the labor market, inflation expectations, and actual inflation, but the real reason is that nobody wants to bring to an end the ongoing theft known as the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). Economics has nothing to do with the Fed putting its thumb on the scale of interest rates; rather it is designed so the banks and Wall Street that have captured it will make money. That’s not the reckless rant of a conspiracy-theorizing populist. SLL is a staunch defender of capitalism and the self-interest that is its foundation, but banks stopped being capitalistic institutions over a century ago. What follows is a cold-blooded analysis of the deterioration of banking into larceny.

At the heart of fractional reserve banking is a lie: that a banks’ unsecured creditors—depositors—can withdraw their money on demand. They can’t, not all at once, and when, in the heat of a financial panic, they try, the bank faces a run, which can quickly become systemic. Ostensibly, the Federal Reserve was established to ameliorate this risk. The corrupting trade-off: from the moment of the enabling act’s passage, the banking industry became a ward of the state.

For a what-should-have-been-said-at-inception critique of the Federal Reserve, in a gripping historical novel no less, see The Golden Pinnacle, by Robert Gore. (The Golden Pinnacle was written by Gore in the belief that important ideas and a great read need not be mutually exclusive, and are in fact what readers are looking for. Prove him right and buy the book; it will be $22.46 (current price on Amazon) or $4.99 (Kindle and Nook) well spent.) The upshot of banker Daniel Durand’s fictional testimony before a House of Representatives committee: a central bank benefits the government, debtors, bankers, and the central bank at the expense of everyone else. Governments and other debtors benefit from lower interest rates and the hidden tax of a depreciating currency. The banks benefit from the establishment of a de facto banking cartel, mitigation of inherent banking risk, and access to cheap money with which to speculate. The central bank is one of the most powerful institutions in the government and its personnel benefit from the payola of regulatory capture and their positions as gatekeepers.

Further socialization of banking risk (but not banking rewards) came during the Great Depression with the establishment of deposit insurance. Too Big To Fail (TBTF) put the final nail in the coffin of any capitalistic tendencies still lurking within the banking system, and so inextricably intertwined the banks, the Federal Reserve, and the government that it was impossible to determine where one began and the others ended. TBTF set the stage for the Heist of the Century.

The TBTF banks in 2008 found themselves in the same position as a highly leveraged commodity speculator on the wrong side of a market move: tapped out. Fortunately for the banks, they had purchased plenty of insurance through the years—campaign contributions for politicians and revolving door jobs for politicians and bureaucrats alike. Nobody was going to let them to meet the fate that true capitalism demanded—bankruptcy— except for Lehman Brothers, which apparently did not grease enough, or the right, palms (and was also one of Goldman Sachs’ chief competitors). Other banks that would have gone bankrupt were sold to connected banks at fire sale prices.

The Heist wasn’t the bailouts per se; the government has got most of the taxpayer’s money back. The Heist is ZIRP, which began on December 16, 2008 and appears set to mark its seventh anniversary this December. Nobody, including bank executives or officials at the Fed and the Comptroller of the Currency, knew in 2008 how deep a hole the banks had dug themselves into. Many of their assets, which amounted to multiples of their shrinking capital, had no market or highly illiquid markets. The first step was to suspend mark-to-market accounting for those assets, so nobody on the outside could determine the banks’ true financial position. On April 9, 2009, the Financial Standards Accounting Board eased mark-to-market rules for hard to value and deeply underwater assets.

The economic and financial justifications for ZIRP were specious, the pitch to the marks as they were swindled. The Japanese economy had sputtered, enduring multiple recessions despite ultra-low interest rates for almost two decades—a clear demonstration of ZIRP’s inefficacy. In fact, mispriced interest rates reduce savings, promote debt, and lead to malinvestment that retards rather than promotes economic growth. That’s an intuitively obvious conclusion that Greenspan, Bernanke, Yellen, their flunkies, and cheerleaders in the media cannot allow themselves to speak, although it’s been part of the Austrian economic canon for a century.

Plunging deeper into financial fraud, they espoused the “wealth effect” doctrine. This pernicious and idiotic dream-masquerading-as-respectable-theory endorsed speculation and rising markets to create a wealth effect that would supposedly promote spending and economic expansion. This bizarre mutant of “trickle down” has even less empirical or analytic support than ZIRP. Rather, its true purpose was as an implicit directive and assurance for the connected. The directive: borrow at negligible rates and buy stocks, bonds, and related derivatives. The assurance: the Fed will give plenty of notice before rates are raised and will flood the system with additional liquidity if, despite its best efforts, markets should head south (the Greenspan, Bernanke, and Yellen “puts”). The Fed created a rigged game, open only to those who could access its ultra-cheap money—the banks and Wall Street. The revolving door between the Fed and its “clients” and substantial honoraria for former Fed officials reading ghost-written speeches are among the payoffs.

The victims of this swindle are the American public, who have sustained huge and mounting losses, summing to the trillions. By retarding economic growth, ZIRP, in concert with the refusal to allow the 2008 financial crisis to perform the function such crises usually perform—culling insolvent businesses, repricing assets, and purging unsound debt—has led to the weakest so-called recovery on record. Because of economic anemia, millions of Americans are unemployed or underemployed who would not be in a sound economy. Healthy businesses have not reaped the profits—the source of capital investment and jobs—that they should have because low interest rates have kept their sick competitors on life support. Malinvestment has created a deflationary overhang of excess production. ZIRP has discouraged savings, the fountainhead of economic growth, and encouraged debt, which must be repaid from future production. Debt has grown so large it threatens the solvency of the government and its people, and presents a future of unmitigated bleakness for America’s youth.

Many Americans are vaguely aware that they’ve been robbed, but there hasn’t been a reaction remotely proportional to the incalculably large losses. This has allowed to theft to continue, but the quietude will end when the artificially juiced stock market finally crashes and takes the economy with it. That the central bank has run the risk of public and political hostility and allowed the theft to go on as long as it has may well be an indication that the big banks are not as sound as advertised. Their financial statements have been indecipherable and opaque since before the suspension of mark-to-market, and they are still huge players in highly leveraged derivative markets. SLL recently posted an article about Deutsche Bank, the largest European TBTF bank, that raised the disturbing possibility that it faces financial difficulties (“Is Deutsche Bank The Next Lehman?” 6/13/15). With world debt over $200 trillion and the interlinkages in the global financial system, problems at one large bank, especially one that is a counterparty on trillions of dollars of derivatives contracts (like Deutsche Bank), can reverberate quickly and systemically.

Crime pays when it’s ostensibly legal, backed by the government, and its perpetrators convince gullible victims that it’s for their own good. The savvy know better, but also realize that not until, in Washington Irving’s words, “the whole superstructure built upon credit and reared by speculation crumbles to the ground, leaving scarce a wreck behind” will things change. It will be black humor at its finest when the crooks discover that most of what they’ve stolen is debt that will never be repaid. It would be justice at its finest if they spent decades in the graybar hotel.

“WHEN THE SLAVES REVOLT, THEY WILL SEEK THE BLOOD OF THEIR MASTERS,” THE GOLDEN PINNACLE

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The Great Abdication, by Danielle DiMartino Booth

Once in a great while an insider either tells the truth and quits or is fired, or, more commonly, quits and tells the truth. Danielle DiMartino Booth left the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank after 9 years and has engaged in one of those rare instances of truth-telling. From Ms. Booth, at The Liscio Report:

The business cycle is dead! Long live the business cycle!

Not too long ago, in a land not so far away, the business cycle was declared to be defeated. Policymakers at the Federal Reserve were credited with slaying the pesky beast that featured recessions as part of its nature. Such was the faith in the permanence of business cycle’s demise that the era was given its own label, The Great Moderation, a perfect world in which inflation ran not too hot or too cold and profit growth was accepted as the steady state.

As is so often the case, reality rudely disturbed nirvana’s prospects. The Great Moderation devolved into the Great Recession precipitated by one of the most devastating financial crises in U.S. history. The veneer of calm advertised over the prior years was stripped away. In its stead, economists had to concede that an era of benign monetary policy had encouraged malinvestment, the scourge that Austrian Ludwig von Mises warned of in the early 20th century. An overabundance of debt, if left unchecked, inevitably leads to the misallocation of resources. In the case of the first years of the 2000s, the target was, of course, the housing market.

The hope today is that the current era of easy monetary policy will have no deep economic ramifications. Such thinking, though, may prove to be naive. It goes without saying that the heat of the financial crisis merited a monumental response on policymakers’ part. That said, the most glaring outgrowth has been politicians’ exploiting low interest rates to their benefit. While it’s conceivable that well-intentioned central bankers want no part in encouraging Congressional malfeasance, the fact remains that the lack of action on politicians’ part would not have been possible absent the Fed’s allowing Congress to abdicate its responsibilities to the manna of easy money.

Of course, we all appear to have been spoiled over the last 25 years. A funny thing happened when the Fed placed a floor under stock prices with assurances that investors’ pain and suffering would be mitigated – recessions faded from the norm. Over the past 25 years, the economy has contracted one-fourth as often as it did in the 25 years that preceded this benign era. Hence the illusion of prosperity, one that has rendered investors complacent to the point of being comatose. That’s what happens when entire industries are able to run with more capacity than demand validates simply because the credit to remain in operation is there for the taking. To take but one example, capacity utilization is at 78.1 percent, shy of the 30-year average of 79.6 percent some six years into the current recovery. The downside is that the cathartic cleansing that takes place when recession is allowed to play out all the way to the bitter end of a bankruptcy cycle never occurs – winners and losers alike stay in business.

http://tlrii.typepad.com/theliscioreport/

To continue reading: The Great Abdication

In Dramatic Decision Judge Finds Fed Bailout Of AIG Was “Illegal”, Government “Violated Federal Reserve Act”, by Tyler Durden

It shouldn’t take a multimillionaire hiring one of the best and most expensive lawyers in the country, pursuing a multi-billion dollar payout to force a judicial determination that the Federal Reserve administered rescue of AIG Insurance in 2008 was illegal, outside the scope of the Federal Reserve Act. The drafters of that legislation were rolling in their graves.

Here’s a little background. AIG wrote credit default swaps on repackaged mortgage securities, which means it was essentially offering insurance on the continuing credit worthiness of those securities. Unfortunately for AIG, with the housing bust, the market went south, way south, on many of those swaps, with many of them becoming worth far more than AIG had realized in premiums. Unfortunately for AIG, it had not reserved for any of its contingent liabilities on those swaps, so attempting to pay up would have rendered it bankrupt. So the Federal Reserve and the government stitched together a rescue, one which gave them most of the equity in AIG. One little noted feature of the rescue was that AIG’s counterparties on those credit default swaps were paid off at 100 cents on the dollar; as if AIG had made good on the swaps. The counterparties bore no haircut. If you smell a rat, you’ve got a keen nose. Guess who the biggest counterparty was? Goldman Sachs! Guess who was running the Treasury at the time? Henry Paulsen, former CEO of Goldman Sachs!

Tyler Durden, from zerohedge.com, tells the rest of the story:

Earlier today, former AIG head Hank Greenberg’s long-running legal battle of the US government came to a dramatic end when in a 75-page ruling, U.S. Court of Claims Judge Thomas Wheeler found that Greenberg was indeed correct in claiming the government overstepped its legal boundaries in its “unduly harsh treatment of AIG in comparison to other institutions” which was “misguided and had no legitimate purpose.”

But because “the question is not whether this treatment was inequitable or unfair, but whether the government’s actions created a legal right of recovery for AIG’s shareholders” Wheeler found that Greenberg was not owed any money as AIG would have gone bankrupt without the government’s forced intervention. Greenberg was seeking at least $25 billion in damages for shareholders.

The reason for the case is that years after the initial $85 billion bailout which eventually ballooned to $182 billion, AIG – with the government’s explicit backstop and thus zero credit risk – managed to repay the government bailout funds and the government with a $22.7 billion profit. Greenberg argued that the pre-bailout equity holders deserved a piece of the pie, very much the same way that Fannie and Freddie stakeholders are also arguing they too deserve a piece of the post-government bailout pie.

However, “in the end, the Achilles’ heel of Starr’s case is that, if not for the Government’s intervention, AIG would have filed for bankruptcy. In a bankruptcy proceeding, AIG’s shareholders would most likely have lost 100 percent of their stock value” the judge found, and admitted that the pre-government bailout equity value of financial companies – since all of them were facing bankruptcy without a bailout – was zero. Whether this opens up the door to a class action lawsuit by all those who were short financials into the bailout and were then squeezed by the Fed’s bailout which the court has found to be an “illegal exaction” remains to be seen.

Here are the key sections from the court ruling:

The weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Government treated AIG much more harshly than other institutions in need of financial assistance. In September 2008, AIG’s international insurance subsidiaries were thriving and profitable, but its Financial Products Division experienced a severe liquidity shortage due to the collapse of the housing market. Other major institutions, such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America, encountered similar liquidity shortages. Thus, while the Government publicly singled out AIG as the poster child for causing the September 2008 economic crisis (Paulson, Tr. 1254-55), the evidence supports a conclusion that AIG actually was less responsible for the crisis than other major institutions.

Well, there was Lehman too, whose stock most certainly went to zero and which never got a government bailout but that was to be expected: after all Goldman needed to eliminate its biggest fixed income competitor at the time, and what better way than to wipe it out completely.

Wheeler continues:

The notorious credit default swap transactions were very low risk in a thriving housing market, but they quickly became very high risk when the bottom fell out of this market. Many entities engaged in these transactions, not just AIG. The Government’s justification for taking control of AIG’s ownership and running its business operations appears to have been entirely misplaced. The Government did not demand shareholder equity, high interest rates, or voting control of any entity except AIG. Indeed, with the exception of AIG, the Government has never demanded equity ownership from a borrower in the 75-year history of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Paulson, Tr. 1235-36; Bernanke, Tr. 1989-90.

In other words, there has never been a Fed-mediated nationalization of a private corporation prior to 2008. Which is accurate. It is also illegal according to the court, a ruling that may have dramatic repercussions for all future government/Fed bailouts of banks that Goldman deems relevant.

Starr alleges in its own right and on behalf of other AIG shareholders that the Government’s actions in acquiring control of AIG constituted a taking without just compensation and an illegal exaction, both in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution…. Having considered the entire record, the Court finds in Starr’s favor on the illegal exaction claim.

It is not quite clear why the Fed is equivalent to the Government in this case but we’ll just let that slide.

Here are the details:

With the approval of the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had the authority to serve as a lender of last resort under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act in a time of “unusual and exigent circumstances,” 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006), and to establish an interest rate “fixed with a view of accommodating commerce and business,” 12 U.S.C. § 357. However, Section 13(3) did not authorize the Federal Reserve Bank to acquire a borrower’s equity as consideration for the loan. Although the Bank may exercise “all powers specifically granted by the provisions of this chapter and such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking within the limitations prescribed by this chapter,” 12 U.S.C. § 341, this language does not authorize the taking of equity.

So if they Fed is not authorized to “take equity”, does that mean that the NY Fed trading desk at Liberty 33 or its backup desk in Chicago, also known as the “Plunge Protection Team” will have to do a firesale of all its stock, E-mini, and ETF holdings obtained as a result of levitating the market ever higher for the past 7 years? Inquiring minds demand to know.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-15/dramatic-decision-judge-finds-fed-bailout-aig-was-illegal-government-violated-federa

To continue reading: Fed Bailout of AIG was “Illegal”

Is Deutsche Bank The Next Lehman? by NotQuant.com

The title raises a disturbing possibility, and as the article states, “we will not know until events are moving at an uncotrollable and accelerating speed.” Click through to the story and check out the graph of Deutsche Bank’s derivatives exposure versus insignificant magnitudes like German and Eurozone GDPs. From NotQuant.com, via theburningplatform.com:

Looking back at the Lehman Brothers collapse of 2008, it’s amazing how quickly it all happened. In hindsight there were a few early-warning signs, but the true scale of the disaster publicly unfolded only in the final moments before it became apparent that Lehman was doomed.

First, for purposes of drawing a parallel, let’s re-cap the events of 2007-2008:

There were few early indicators of Lehman’s plight. Insiders however, were well aware: In late 2007, Goldman Sachs placed a massive proprietary bet against Lehman which would be known internally as the “Big Short”. (It’s a bet that would later profit from during the crisis).

In the summer 2007 subprime loans were beginning to perform poorly in the marketplace. By August of 2007, the commercial paper market saw liquidity evaporating quickly and funding for all types of asset-backed security was drying up.

But still — even in late 2007, there was little public indication that Lehman was circling the drain.

Probably the first public indication that things were heading downhill for Lehman wasn’t until June 9th, 2008, when Fitch Ratings cut Lehman’s rating to AA-minus, outlook negative. (ironically, 7 years to the day before S&P would cut DB)

The “negative outlook” indicates that another further downgrade is likely. In this particular case, it was the understatement of all time.

A mere 3 months later, in the course of just one week, Lehman would announce a major loss and file for bankruptcy.

And the rest is history.

Could this happen to Deutsche Bank?
First, we must state the obvious: If Deutsche Bank is the next Lehman, we will not know until events are moving at an uncontrollable and accelerating speed. The nature of all fractional-reserve banks — who are by definition bankrupt at all times – is to project an aura of stability until that illusion has already begun to implode.

By the time we are aware of a crisis – if one is in the offing — it will already be a roaring blaze by the time it is known publicly. It is by now well-established that truth is the first casualty of all banking crises. There will be little in the way of early warnings. To that end, we begin connecting the dots:

Here’s a re-cap of what’s happened at Deutsche Bank over the past 15 months:

In April of 2014, Deutsche Bank was forced to raise an additional 1.5 Billion of Tier 1 capital to support it’s capital structure. Why?
1 month later in May of 2014, the scramble for liquidity continued as DB announced the selling of 8 billion euros worth of stock – at up to a 30% discount. Why again? It was a move which raised eyebrows across the financial media. The calm outward image of Deutsche Bank did not seem to reflect their rushed efforts to raise liquidity. Something was decidedly rotten behind the curtain.
Fast forwarding to March of this year: Deutsche Bank fails the banking industry’s “stress tests” and is given a stern warning to shore up it’s capital structure.
In April, Deutsche Bank confirms it’s agreement to a joint settlement with the US and UK regarding the manipulation of LIBOR. The bank is saddled with a massive $2.1 billion payment to the DOJ. (Still, a small fraction of their winnings from the crime).
In May, one of Deutsche Bank’s CEOs, Anshu Jain is given an enormous amount of new authority by the board of directors. We guess that this is a “crisis move”. In times of crisis the power of the executive is often increased.
June 5: Greece misses it’s payment to the IMF. The risk of default across all of it’s debt is now considered acute. This has massive implications for Deutsche Bank.
June 6/7: (A Saturday/Sunday, and immediately following Greece’s missed payment to the IMF) Deutsche Bank’s two CEO’s announce their surprise departure from the company. (Just one month after Jain is given his new expanded powers). Anshu Jain will step down first at the end of June. Jürgen Fitschen will step down next May.
June 9: S&P lowers the rating of Deutsche Bank to BBB+ Just three notches above “junk”. (Incidentally, BBB+ is even lower than Lehman’s downgrade – which preceded it’s collapse by just 3 months)

And that’s where we are now. How bad is it? We don’t know because we won’t be permitted to know. But these are not the moves of a healthy company.

http://www.theburningplatform.com/2015/06/13/is-deutsche-bank-the-next-lehman/

To continue reading: Is Deutsche Bank The Next Lehman?