Tag Archives: central bank policy

Crisis Progress Report (13): Time for the Crash, by Robert Gore

From the last Crisis Progress Report, dated October 1: “Assume a rally like the one in 2008 is in the offing. If the 2008 rally’s timing is any guide, this one will start between now and New Year’s, but there are no assurances; it may begin next year.” SLL did not know then that the rally was already underway, the market having made its recent closing low on September 28. Now that the market has rallied, in the perverse way that markets work, Friday’s employment report, the best in some time, may well kick off the next down leg. October has had its share of market crashes, so with fear high at the beginning of the month, the market rallied and October was its best month in years. November and December are often strong, marked by end-of-the-year “Santa Claus” rallies. Again, in their perverse way, markets this year may leave a lump of high-sulfur-content, CO2-releasing, soon-to-be-outlawed coal in investors’ stockings.

This latest employment report will be revised multiple times; it is subject to a variety of abstruse statistical criticisms; it is seasonally and birth-death-model adjusted; it shows that almost all the jobs in October were taken by older workers, and finally, employment is, as any economist will tell you, a lagging indicator. Whatever the ambiguities in the employment report, there is no gainsaying that debt contraction is rolling through, and roiling, the global economy in textbook fashion. Global debt, central bank and government-force fed, approaches $225 trillion and has grown faster than global GDP for decades. It is the most massive in history, measured in either absolute terms or in relative terms against global GDP.

Debt is close to or at a high point that may not be exceeded for decades, but the underlying forces of contraction are in full flower. They first appeared in the most leveraged sector relative to its ability to repay: natural resources. China blew a debt-fueled bubble, and its economic “miracle” stoked investment in natural resources around the world. That investment binge was aided mightily by artificially low, central-bank suppressed interest rates. Once China’s bubble started to deflate, as all such bubbles must, investment that looked “opportunistic” on the way up has became malinvestment, with gluts in oil, iron ore, coal, aluminum, nickel, fertilizer, and a host of other raw materials.

Earlier this year, it was possible, if one was completely ignorant of debt dynamics, or “debtonomics” as SLL has christened them (see Debtonomics Archive), to argue that the raw materials situation would be contained. The same assurances were given in 2007 about the pending collapse of the housing and mortgage finance markets, and the present assurances will prove as spot off as those were. Natural resources are a far larger part of the global economy than the what proved to be earth-shaking US housing and mortgage finance market was in 2007. There are too many debt contraction ripples rippling out; the only way the contained argument can be made now is through willful ignorance. (SLL has been glutting its blog postings with stories on those ripples. Rather than clutter up this article with a multitude of links, readers who have missed those stories and are interested should scan through the blog over the last month.)

The glut of raw materials has led to a glut in raw materials transport. Tankers, bulk shipping vessels, and container ships are in oversupply and shipping rates have collapsed, in some cases to all time lows. China’s exports and imports are shrinking, as is overall global trade. The ripples are reaching US shores, where railroads are reporting shrinking volumes of not just natural resources, but chemicals, containers, and industrial products. The trucking industry is following suit; the US load-to-truck ratio just hit a 33-month low. Neither US railroads nor trucks are directly tied into China, but they are nevertheless being affected by reduced demand from China that is anything but “contained.”

Notice that the contraction has moved beyond raw materials. Cheap money and China’s supposedly perpetually expanding demand prompted fervid increases in Chinese and global industrial capacity, now overcapacity. Exhibit A is the steel industry, burdened with massive oversupply. Its raw material, iron ore, has gone from $154 per dry metric ton in February of 2013 to its current price below $50 per dry metric ton. It’s the same story with cement, finished aluminum and copper products, industrial machinery, tractors, and engines, to name a few. The segment of the global economy that makes things, especially the segment that makes things for other industrial users, is looking at gluts as devastating as those faced by producers of raw materials. Last month, Daniel Florness, the CEO of Fastenal, a US company that makes nuts, bolts, and other fasteners said, “The industrial environment is in a recession—I don’t care what anybody says, because nobody knows that market better than we do. You know, we touch 250,000 active customers a month.” (“‘Our Data Is Not Good’ – US Companies Warn That A Recession Is Coming,” by Tyler Durden, SLL, 10/26/15).

The fashionable refrain is that none of this will put the US in a recession because the US economy is based on services, not mining, manufacturing, and exports. The stock market has recovered most of its August and September losses, the housing market is holding up, and service sector statistics still show growth. This optimism is misplaced. The things-you-can-touch economy buys legal and financial services, communications, technology, insurance, consulting, office space, real estate, and advertising. The idea that significant cutbacks by America’s mining, manufacturing, transport, and distribution companies will have minimal impact on its service companies ignores the extensive commercial relationships between the two groups.

Layoffs have begun in mining, oil, and gas and will spread. The newly unemployed cut back on store trips, restaurants, entertainment, and other discretionary spending in the service economy. They may, heaven forbid, even cut back on their smart phone usage. Then we’ll know that things are really, really bad. About the only sector that may appear immune, at least for a while, is the government, but the relative health of this nonproductive—or more accurately, counterproductive—sector, will come, as it always does, at the expense of the rest of the economy.

One of the US’s world-beating service industries—the production, packaging, and distribution of debt—is already showing the strain. Fracking and mining companies are seeing their credit lines curtailed or eliminated, and bond financing unavailable or prohibitively priced. What started in the oil and gas corner of the bond market—widening credit spreads—has spread out to a general increase. The ultra-cheap interest rates that allowed companies to finance shareholder friendly dividends and buybacks are ratcheting up. Banks are cutting their commitments to both the investment grade and high-yield corporate bond markets. Constriction in credit markets often precedes significant stock market declines, but hey, things are different this time. Flinty creditors spend all their time looking at boring old balance sheets, revenues, expenses, and cash flows. Equity markets have hope and faith and central bank pixie dust!

They can ignore the writing on the wall, but not the wall. That would be the one into which the global economy is smashing. Pixie dust has probably taken US equity markets about as far as they’re going to go. A crash that begins before Christmas will surprise only those who still believe in Santa Claus.

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The Fed Desperately Tries to Maintain the Status Quo, by Ronald-Peter Stöferle

From Ronald-Peter Stöferle at mises.org:

During the press conferences of recent FOMC meetings, millions of well-educated investment professionals have been sitting in front of their screens, chewing their fingernails, listening as if spellbound to what Janet Yellen has to tell them. Will she finally raise the federal funds rate that has been zero bound for over six years?

Obviously, each decision is accompanied by nervousness on the markets. Investors are fixated by a fidgety curiosity ahead of each Fed decision and never fail to meticulously observe Janet Yellen and the FOMC, and engage in monetary ornithology on doves (growth- and employment-oriented FOMC members) and hawks (inflation-oriented FOMC members).

Fed watchers also hope for some enlightening information from Ben Bernanke. According to Reuters, some market participants paid some $250,000 just to join one of several dinners, where the ex-chairman spilled the beans. Apparently, he does not expect the federal funds rate to return to its long-term average of about 4 percent during his lifetime.

In a conversation with Jim Rickards, Bernanke stated that a rate hike would only be possible in an environment in which “the U.S. economy is growing strongly enough to bear the costs of higher rates.” Moreover, a rate increase would have to be clearly communicated and anticipated by the markets — not to protect individual investors from losses, Bernanke assures us, but rather to prevent jeopardizing the stability of the “system as a whole.”

It is axiomatic that zero-interest-rate-policy (ZIRP) cannot be a permanent fixture. Indeed, Janet Yellen has been going on about increasing rates for almost two years now. But, how much more lead time will it require to “prepare” the markets? In both September and October the FOMC chickened out, even though we are not talking about hiking the rate back to “monetary normalcy” in one blow. The decision on the table is whether or not to increase the rate by a trifling quarter point!

The Fed’s quandary can be understood a little better by examining what “monetary normalcy,” or a “normal interest rate,” is supposed to be. Or, even more fundamentally: what is an interest rate?

We “Austrians” understand an interest rate as an expression of market participants’ time preference. The underlying assumption is that people are inclined to consume a certain product sooner rather than later. Hence, if savers restrict their current consumption and provide the resources for investment instead, they do so only on condition that they will be compensated by increased opportunities for consumption in the future. In free markets, the interest rate can be regarded as a measure of the compensation payment, where people are willing to trade present goods for future goods. Such an interest rate is commonly referred to as the “natural interest rate.” Consequently, the FOMC bureaucrats would ideally set as a goal a “normal interest rate” that equals the “natural” one.

This, however, remains unlikely.

To continue reading: The Fed Desperately Tries to Maintain the Status Quo

QE’s Creeping Communism, by Peter Schiff

Want to know how endless quantative easing turns out? You need look no farther than Japan. From Peter Schiff at europac.com:

Most economists and investors readily acknowledge that the current period of central bank activism, characterized by extended bouts of quantitative easing and zero percent interest rates, is a newly-blazed trail in economic history. And while these policies strike some as counterintuitive, open-ended, and unimaginably expensive, most express comfort that our extremely educated, data-dependent, central bankers have a pretty good idea as to where the trail is going and how to keep the wagons together during the journey.

But as it turns out, there really isn’t much need for guesswork. As the United States enters its eighth year of zero percent interest rates, we should all be looking at a conveniently available tour guide along the path of perpetual easing. Japan has been doing what we are doing now for at least 15 years longer. Unfortunately, no one seems to care, or be surprised, that they are just as incapable as we have been in finding a workable exit. When Virgil guided Dante through Hell, he at least knew how to get out. Japan doesn’t have a clue.

Despite its much longer experience with monetary stimulus, Japan’s economy remains listless and has continuously flirted with recession. In spite of this failure, Japanese leaders, especially Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (and his ally at the Bank of Japan (BoJ), Haruhiko Kuroda), have recently doubled down on all prior bets. This has meant that the Japanese stimulus is now taking on some ominous dimensions that have yet to be seen here in the U.S. In particular, the Bank of Japan is considering using its Quantitative Easing budget to buy large quantities of shares of publicly traded Japanese corporations.

So for those who remain in doubt, Japan is telling us where this giant monetary experiment leads to: Debt, stagnation and nationalization of industry. This is not a destination that any of us, with the possible exception of Bernie Sanders, should be happy about.

The gospel that unites central bankers around the world is that the cure for economic contraction is the creation of demand. Traditionally, they believed that this could be accomplished by simply lowering interest rates, which would then spur borrowing, spending and investment. But when that proved insufficient to pull Japan out of its recession in the early 1990s, the concept of Quantitative Easing (QE) was born. By actively entering the bond market through purchases of longer-dated securities, QE was able to lower interest rates across the entire duration spectrum, an outcome that conventional monetary policy could not do.

But since that time, the QE in Japan has been virtually permanent. Unfortunately, Japan’s economy has been unable to recover anything resembling its former economic health. The experiment has been going on so long that the BoJ already owns more than 30% of outstanding government debt securities. It has also increased its monthly QE expenditures to the point where it now exceeds the Japanese government’s new issuance of debt. (Like most artificial stimulants, QE programs need to get continually larger in order to produce any desirable effects). This has left the BoJ in dire need of something else to buy. Inevitably, it cast its eyes on the Japanese stock market.

To continue reading: QE’s Creeping Communism

The Essence Of Modern Economics: Garbage In, Garbage Out, by MN Gordon

MN Gordon shares SLL’s opinion of modern economics as SLL (Herd Extinct, 9/24/15 and Profits From Stupidity, 10/30/15). From Gordon at davidstockmanscontraclub.com:

“On two occasions I have been asked, “Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine the wrong figures, will the right answers come out? …I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.” – Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher.

Crunching Data to Fix Prices

The fundamental problem facing today’s economy is the flagrant contempt by governments the world over for the free exchange of goods and services and private stewardship of property. Perhaps it is power and control governments are after. Maybe they believe they are improving the economy and making the world a better place for all.

No one really knows for sure. But what is lucidly clear is the muddled disorder modern day economic policies have wrought upon us. You can hardly enter into a transaction without a cluster of intervention mucking with the price of payment.

Taxes, tariffs, wage laws, and subsidies. These all impact prices. But the main culprit affecting prices and trade are central bank interventions into money and credit markets. Relentless actions to control the economy by manipulating money and credit stand the price of everything else on end.

Certainly, government intervention into the U.S. economy is much looser than a Soviet style command and control system. But it does share a common refrain. Price fixing is central to its operation.

The Soviets, armed with their Five-Year Plans and the Theory of Productive Forces, deliberately directed how much wheat should be planted and how much a potato should cost. Conversely, the U.S. approach is mostly hidden from the short sighted view of the average lay person. The Federal Reserve allows the government to bypass the nuisance of tinkering with individual prices…though they still do it through subsidies and appropriations.

In short, the Federal Reserve, an unelected board of appointments, crunches economic data each month and draws a conclusion as to what price to fix the economy’s most important commodity – its money. By doing so all other prices in the economy must change – and distort – to adjust to the Fed’s market intervention.

To continue reading: Garbage In, Garbage Out

End The Fed’s Money Monopoly–The Only Escape From Monetary Central Planning & The Wall Street Casino, by Sean Fieler

Sean Fieler with a valuable look back on the well-founded fears of central banking that attended the launch of the Federal Reserve in 1913. See also The Golden Pinnacle, by Robert Gore. Although it is a historical novel, it makes the 1913 case against the Fed in Chapter 27, “Fools Gold.” From Fieler, at The Wall Street Journal, via davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

History suggests that the only way to rein in the sprawling Federal Reserve is to end its money monopoly and restore the American people’s ability to use gold as a competing currency.

The legislative compromise that created the Fed in 1913 recognized that the power to print money, left unchecked, could corrupt both the government and the economy. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Act created the Federal Reserve System without a centralized balance sheet, a central monetary-policy committee or even a central office.

The Fed’s regional banks were prohibited from buying government debt and required to maintain a 40% gold reserve against dollars in circulation. Moreover, each of the reserve banks was obligated to redeem dollars for gold at a fixed price in unlimited amounts.

Over the past century, every one of these constraints has been removed. Today the Fed has a centrally managed balance sheet of $4 trillion, and is the largest participant in the market for U.S. government bonds. The dollar is no longer fixed to gold, and the IRS assesses a 28% marginal tax on realized gains when gold is used as currency.

The largest increases in the Fed’s power have occurred at moments of financial stress. Federal Reserve banks first financed the purchase of government bonds during World War I. The gold-reserve requirement was dramatically reduced and a central monetary policy-committee was created during the Great Depression. President Richard Nixon broke the last link to gold to stave off a run on the dollar in 1971.

This same combination of crisis and expediency played out in 2008 as the Fed bailed out a series of nonbank financial institutions and initiated a massive balance-sheet expansion labeled “quantitative easing.” To end this cycle, Americans need an alternative to the Fed’s money monopoly.

To continue reading: End The Fed’s Money Monopoly

Mario Draghi Admits Global QE Has Failed: “The Slowdown Is Probably Not Temporary,” by Tyler Durden

The wonder is not that QE failed; the wonder is that anybody thought it would work. The world’s QEing central banks should have t-shirts made: Stock Markets Made New Highs and All the Rest of Us Got Were The Bills. Those bills, incidentally, are now coming due, and they’re dragging down the world economy. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

Undoubtedly, the most amusing this about the prospect of more easing from the ECB (as telegraphed by Mario Draghi last week) and the BoJ (where Haruhiko Kuroda just jeopardized his status as monetary madman par excellence by failing to expand stimulus) is that both Europe and Japan both recently slid back into deflation despite trillions in central bank asset purchases.

In other words, the market expects both Draghi and Kuroda to double- and triple- down on policies that clearly aren’t working when it comes to altering inflation expectations and/or boosting aggregate demand. Indeed, both Goldman and BofAML said as much last week. For those who missed it, here’s Goldman’s take

The subdued and increasingly persistent inflation dynamics that have prevailed in recent years may have eroded central banks’ best line of defence in the face of adverse disinflationary shocks. The energy-price-driven decline in Euro area inflation from 2012 to 2015 has thrown this possibility into even sharper relief.

By embarking on unprecedented balance sheet operations and forward guidance, central banks in Europe have sought to ring-fence domestic inflation expectations and signal their intention to maintain monetary conditions easy for a protracted period of time. Mario Draghi himself described the ECB’s asset purchase programme as a way of ensuring that very low (and, at times, negative) inflation does not lead wage- and price-setters to adjust their behaviour to a perceived lower steady-state rate of inflation. However, judging from market-based implied measures of longer-term inflation expectations, the effectiveness of the ECB’s announcements has proved limited so far.

To continue reading: Mario Draghi Admits Global QE Has Failed

The Latest (and Dumbest) Central Bank Fraud, by Bill Bonner

From Bill Bonner of Bonner and Partners via davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

WATERFORD, Ireland – You go for a nice picnic on the slopes of Vesuvius… You spread out your tablecloth. You open your picnic hamper. You prepare for a relaxing afternoon in the warm October sun.

And then someone comes running down the mountain, warning that the volcano is going to blow up. You pack up your sausages and put a cork in the wine bottle… and rush to the car and drive away. Better to be safe than sorry. And then? Nothing happens.

Most of the time, you can safely ignore the nervous nellies and prophetic Cassandras. (According to legend, Apollo gave Cassandra the gift of prophecy. When she refused him, he spat into her mouth so she would never be believed.) But sometimes the worrywarts are right…

For the last 16 years, we’ve been writing a daily e-letter – first the Daily Reckoning and now the Diary. We saw the collapse of the dot-com bubble coming and warned readers. Most didn’t want to hear it; they were making good money in the stock market. It was a “new era.” And they didn’t want it to end.

But the Nasdaq collapsed in 2000… and didn’t recover until 15 years later. We believed at the time that the U.S. economy would follow Japan into a long, slow slump. With Addison Wiggin, we wrote a book about it, Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the 21st Century.

The Nasdaq’s bubble round-trip between the late 1990s and early 2000ds. No-one wanted to hear any warnings at the top (we still remember people buying profit-less wonder stocks for 100ds of dollars that don’t even exist anymore today) .

“Don’t fight the Fed,” is one of the old-timers’ rules on Wall Street. We understand the principle. You don’t fight the Fed because the Fed has more ammunition than you have. But when we were writing Financial Reckoning Day, we never imagined that the Fed could create an entire fantasy economy based on completely unnatural signals and grotesque manipulations.

That is the economy of the 21st century. It is an economy in which the old rules of supply and demand… value and price… up and down… have to be viewed through the distorted light of central bank intervention. When the price of new money – as set by the Fed to its best customers – is almost zero, who knows what other things are worth?

To continue reading: The Latest (and Dumbest) Central Bank Fraud

The Wrong War for Central Banking, by Stephen S. Roach

From Stephen S. Roach, former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and the firm’s chief economist, senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs, and a senior lecturer at Yale’s School of Management. Notwithstanding the mainstream credentials, Roach has often swum against the tide on his economic calls, and he’s been right more often than wrong. His only mistake here is not mentioning debt as the overriding factor in deflation, but the rest of the article is pretty good. From Roach, at project-syndicate.org:

BEIJING – Fixated on inflation targeting in a world without inflation, central banks have lost their way. With benchmark interest rates stuck at the dreaded zero bound, monetary policy has been transformed from an agent of price stability into an engine of financial instability. A new approach is desperately needed.

The US Federal Reserve exemplifies this policy dilemma. After the Federal Open Market Committee decided in September to defer yet again the start of its long-awaited normalization of monetary policy, its inflation doves are openly campaigning for another delay.
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For the inflation-targeting purists, the argument seems impeccable. The headline consumer-price index (CPI) is near zero, and “core” or underlying inflation – the Fed’s favorite indicator – remains significantly below the seemingly sacrosanct 2% target. With a long-anemic recovery looking shaky again, the doves contend that there is no reason to rush ahead with interest-rate hikes.

Of course, there is more to it than that. Because monetary policy operates with lags, central banks must avoid fixating on the here and now, and instead use imperfect forecasts to anticipate the future effects of their decisions. In the Fed’s case, the presumption that the US will soon approach full employment has caused the so-called dual mandate to collapse into one target: getting inflation back to 2%.

Here, the Fed is making a fatal mistake, as it relies heavily on a timeworn inflation-forecasting methodology that filters out the “special factors” driving the often volatile prices of goods like food and energy. The logic is that the price fluctuations will eventually subside, and headline price indicators will converge on the core rate of inflation.

This approach failed spectacularly when it was adopted in the 1970s, causing the Fed to underestimate virulent inflation. And it is failing today, leading the Fed consistently to overestimate underlying inflation. Indeed, with oil prices having plunged by 50% over the past year, the Fed stubbornly maintains that faster price growth – and the precious inflation rate of 2% – is just around the corner.

Missing from this logic is an appreciation of the new and powerful global forces that are bearing down on inflation. According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest outlook, the price deflator for all advanced economies should increase by just 1.5% annually, on average, from now to 2020 – not much higher than the crisis-depressed 1.1% pace of the last six years. Moreover, most wholesale prices around the world remain in outright deflation.

But, rather than recognize the likely drivers of these developments – namely, a seemingly chronic shortfall of global aggregate demand amid a supply glut and a deflationary profusion of technological innovations and new supply chains – the Fed continues to minimize the deflationary impact of global forces. It would rather attribute low inflation to successful inflation targeting, and the Great Moderation that it presumably spawned.

To continue reading: The Wrong War for Central Banking

Why China’s interest rate cut may be bad news for the world economy, by Larry Elliott

From Larry Elliott at the guardian.com:

The People’s Bank of China was preparing to spring a surprise while President Xi Jinping was taking a selfie with Manchester City star Sergio Aguero. On Friday, the central bank in the world’s second-biggest economy cut the cost of borrowing for the sixth time in a year.

This move has implications, none of them especially cheery despite the knee-jerk increase in share prices that followed. Those investors who thought the announcement in Beijing was a big buy signal should ask themselves whether this was a sign of strength or a sign of weakness.

It is worth noting that the interest rate move came just days after China released official figures showing that the economy’s annual growth rate had slowed down in the third quarter, but only to a still healthy looking 6.9%. After all the stock market turmoil in August, that was a strong performance and it had the desired effect of reassuring markets that the authorities were in control of the planned rebalancing of the economy towards more modest but better quality growth.

But as all commentators know, China’s official figures are not worth the paper they are written on. The fact that interest rates were cut four days after the latest growth data was released underlines the point. Danny Gabay at Fathom thinks China’s real growth rate is 3%, and the rate cut late on Friday night suggests he is right.

The good news for the PBoC is it has plenty of scope to cut rates further from their current level of 4.35% should the economy not respond to the stimulus provided. Unlike other central banks, it has not already cut the official cost of borrowing to zero (and in some cases below zero). The bad news is that it might need all the leeway it has available. That’s certainly the view of Gerard Lyons, a China expert at Standard Chartered before he became economic adviser to Boris Johnson. Lyons thinks that sooner or later China will join the rest of the central bank pack.

But it is not just in China that things are looking a bit dicey. On the day before the PBoC cut rates, the European Central Bank dropped the broadest of hints that in December it will announce new growth-boosting measures for the eurozone. Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president, has options. He could cut the ECB’s deposit rate, already -0.2%, still further and thus penalise banks that want to park money with the central bank. More likely, though, the ECB will turn to its version of quantitative easing and increase its bond-buying programme from the current €60bn (£43bn) a month.

Japan is also poised to provide more stimulus later this week when official figures are likely to show the economy back in recession. As with the ECB, a central aim of the policy is to secure a competitive advantage by bearing down on the exchange rate. But if the yen and the euro are weakening, something else has to be strengthening, and the upshot will be that the US dollar will rise.

With the US economy showing signs of slowing, the Federal Reserve, America’s central bank, will put on ice any plans to raise interest rates, for fear that this will drive the dollar even higher.

So what’s the problem? China, Japan and the eurozone are all easing policy. The US is going to delay tightening policy. More stimulus equals stronger growth and fends off the threat of deflation. That’s got to be good, hasn’t it?

To continue reading: Why China’s interest rate cut may be bad news

Hobson’s Choice, by Doug Nolan

From Doug Nolan at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

More than two months have passed since the August “flash crash.” Fragilities illuminated during that bout of market turmoil still reverberate. Sure, global markets have rallied back strongly. Bullish news, analysis and sentiment have followed suit, as they do. The poor bears have again been bullied into submission, as the punchy bulls have somehow become further emboldened. The optimists are even more deeply convinced of U.S., Chinese and global resilience (the 2008 crisis “100-year flood” thesis). Fears of China, EM and global tumult were way overblown, they now contend. As anticipated, global officials remain in full control. All is rosy again, except for the fact that global central bankers behave as if they’re utterly terrified of something.

The way I see it, underlying system fragility has become so acute that central bankers are convinced that they must now forcefully (“shock and awe,” “beat expectations,” etc.) react to any fledgling market “risk off” dynamic. Risk aversion and de-leveraging must not gather momentum. If fragilities are not thwarted early, they could easily unfold into something difficult to control. Such an outcome would risk a break in market confidence that central banks have everything well under control – faith that is now fully embedded in the pricing and structure for tens of Trillions of securities and hundreds of Trillions of associated derivatives – everywhere. With options at this point limited, the so-called “risk management” approach dictates that central banks err on the side of using their limited armaments forcibly and preemptively.

With today’s extraordinary global backdrop in mind, I’m this week noting a few definitions of “Hobson’s Choice”:

“An apparently free choice that actually offers no alternative.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms)

“A situation in which it seems that you can choose between different things or actions, but there is really only one thing that you can take or do.” (Cambridge Idioms Dictionary)

“No choice at all, take it or leave it.” (Endangered Phrases by Steven D. Price)

There are subtleties in these definitions, just as there are subtleties in financial Bubbles. Importantly, over time Bubbles embody a degree of risk where they stealthily begin to dictate ongoing monetary accommodation. These days, global market Bubbles have reached the point where their message to global central bankers is direct and unmistakable: “No choice at all, take it or leave it.” “Keep expanding monetary stimulus or it all comes crashing down – and that’s you Yellen, Draghi, Kuroda, PBOC – all of you…”

To continue reading: Hobson’s Choice