Tag Archives: Risk

Risk has been Abolished, According to Institutional Investors, by Wolf Richter

Just about all measures of investor complacency are flashing bright red. From Wolf Richter at wolfstreet.com:

Why? Wall Street sells “more financial products and generates more profits when investors are bullish.”

“Covenant-lite” loans – risky instruments issued by junk-rated borrowers, with few protections for creditors – set an all-time record at the end of the second quarter.

They’re part of the risky universe of “leveraged loans,” and they’re secured by some collateral, but they don’t come with the protections and restrictive maintenance requirements in their covenants that traditional leveraged loans offer creditors.

Even leveraged loans with more restrictive covenants are so risky that banks just arrange them and then try to off-load them to institutional investors, such as pension funds or loan funds. Or they slice and dice them and package them into Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) and sell them to institutional investors. Leveraged loans trade like securities. But the SEC, which regulates securities, considers them loans and doesn’t regulate them. No one regulates them.

The amounts are not trivial. Total outstanding leveraged loans in the US reached nearly $1 trillion ($943 billion) at the end of the second quarter, according to S&P Capital IQ LCD. And covenant lite loans made up 72.5% of them, the highest proportion ever.

That’s up from 69% at the end of the fourth quarter. This chart shows the surge in the proportion of covenant-lite loans to total leveraged loans over the past three years, from about 55% at the end of Q2 in 2014 to 72.5% at the end of Q2 2017:

So what’s the big deal? When there is no default, there is no difference. And since there is apparently no longer any risk of default, it’s, well, no big deal. That’s what investors are thinking.

To continue reading: Risk has been Abolished, According to Institutional Investors

Now That Everyone’s Been Pushed into Risky Assets… by Charles Hugh Smith

Risk can be disguised or hidden, but never eliminated. From Charles Hugh Smith at oftwominds.com:

A funny thing happened on the way to a low-risk environment: loans in default (non-performing loans) didn’t suddenly become performing loans.

If we had to summarize what’s happened in eight years of “recovery,” we could start with this: everyone’s been pushed into risky assets while being told risk has been transformed from something to avoid (by buying risk-off assets) to something you chase to score essentially guaranteed gains (by buying risk-on assets).

The successful strategy for eight years has been buy the dips because risk-on assets always recover and hit new highs: housing, stocks, bonds, bat guano futures–you name it.

Those who bought the dip in hot housing markets have seen spectacular gains since 2011. Those who bought every dip in the stock market have been richly rewarded, and those buying bonds expecting declining yields have until recently logged reliable gains.

The only asset class that’s lower than it was in 2011 is the classic risk-off asset: precious metals.

Investors who avoided risk-on assets–stocks, bonds, REITs (real estate investment trusts) and housing in hot markets–have been clubbed, while those who piled on the leverage to buy every dip have been richly rewarded.

Those who bet volatility–once a fairly reliable reflection of risk–would finally rise have been wiped out. By historical measures, risk has fallen to levels not seen since… well, just before the last Global Financial Meltdown.

Globally, financially assets have soared from a 2008 low around $222 trillion to over $300 trillion. Even in today’s financially jaded world, $80 trillion is an impressive number: over 4 times America’s GDP of $18 trillion annually, and roughly equal to global GDP.

To continue reading: Now That Everyone’s Been Pushed into Risky Assets…

He Said That? 11/14/16

From Hunter S. Thompson (1937–2005), American journalist and author, and the founder of the gonzo journalism movement:

So we shall let the reader answer this question for himself: who is the happier man, he who has braved the storm of life and lived or he who has stayed securely on shore and merely existed?

Overheard in the Land of the Free, by Simon Black

When did America become a land where people didn’t take chances because they might fail? From Simon Black at sovereignman. com:

When I was in Texas over the weekend taking a quick break from a whirlwind trip around the world, I went to one of the biggest shopping malls in Dallas to buy a birthday present for the CFO of our agriculture business.

The mall is called the Galleria, and it’s particularly interesting for shoppers because it has an ice-skating rink on the ground floor.

An ice rink might not sound like a big deal, but in a state like Texas that’s legendary for sweltering heat, it’s still quite a novelty.

Kids especially love the ice, and it’s common to hear them begging mom and dad for a 30 minute skate pass.

I was standing on a terrace overlooking the rink on Friday, busy firing off some emails to my staff, when I overheard one such conversation.

It didn’t even register until I heard the mother say, “Kaden- you can’t go ice skating… you might fall down!”

The words immediately passed through my mental filter as if someone had just shouted out my name across the food court.

You might fall down? Duh. It’s a ten-year old boy on ice skates. Of course he’s going to fall down.

I’m really not sure when this happened. I’m nearly 38, so I grew up in the 80s and early 90s.

When I was a kid, my friends and I used to ride our bikes all over town by ourselves until it was dark.

Today that would be enough for our parents to be arrested… or at least paid a visit by Child Protective Services.

My friends and I chased each other around and played that occasionally got rough.

Now even ‘Tag’ has been outlawed in countless school districts who consider the game physically and emotionally distressing to children.

I only remember having to have a few inoculations as a child.

The CDC website doesn’t go back to the 1980s, but it does show that in 1995, the government only endorsed shots against five diseases for children.

Today it’s 14, and the actual number of shots has soared.

Again, I don’t know precisely when any of this changed. But it’s painfully obvious how different things are now for kids.

Major cultural changes like this always start in the home with what parents teach their children… as in, “Kaden, you might fall down.”

What is the big lesson that this child is learning? Because, “Kaden, you might fall down,” could just as easily be, “Kaden, you aren’t allowed to take any risks or try anything that’s new and challenging.”

Risk taking is supposed to be part of the American DNA. The US is supposed to be the country that rises to major challenges.

And there’s certainly no shortage of challenges now.

The national debt now stands at $19.8 trillion. Social Security and Medicare are woefully unfunded, and many other government trust funds are flat broke.

The Federal Reserve has printed itself into near insolvency and created massive financial bubbles around the world.

Hundreds of thousands of pages of regulations now exist, debilitating small businesses and creating extraordinary disincentives to produce.

Socialist dogma is growing stronger. The top 25% of income earners in the US already pay more than 80% of the taxes. And yet the bottom 50% wants you to pay even more of your ‘fair share’.

It’s madness.

Being comfortable with major challenges and risk taking is more important than ever. And they’re a big part of any individual’s success in life.

To continue reading: Overheard in the Land of the Free

 

Sorry, Central Banks: Risk and Volatility Cannot be Extinguished, by Charles Hugh Smith

Central banks can’t turn financial markets into padded cells. From Charles Hugh Smith at oftwominds.com:

Central bank market intervention doesn’t extinguish risk–it simply transfers it to the system itself.

The unspoken claim of central bank policy is that risk can be extinguished by intervention/manipulation: once the Fed has your back, i.e. is supporting the market, risk disappears, and the easy profits flow to those who buy the dips with supreme confidence in the Fed’s ability to magically turn risk-assets into risk-free assets.

Unfortunately for the credulous investors who believe this, risk cannot be extinguished, it can only be transferred to others or to the system itself.

This confidence in central banks raises a pernicious systemic risk: assuming the “100-year flood” can’t happen every 6 years or so. I have from time to time highly recommended The Misbehavior of Markets. The author, fractal pioneer Benoit Mandelbrot, explains in simple mathematical ways how Modern Portfolio Theory, i.e. the management of risk, is based on a faulty conception of risk and statistical chance.
I

n a nutshell: while modern portfolio management is statistically based (all those “standard deviations” you always see referenced in quantitative analyses), the markets behave fractally. Fractals are known as the geometry of chaos, for they describe how seemingly stable systems can quickly, and unpredictably, degrade into chaos.

But as Mandelbrot explains, “100-year floods” actually occur with startling regularity in all markets. Put another way: you cannot disappear all risk with fancy statistical models and credit default swaps, etc., that offload the risk onto others, i.e. counterparties.

In other words, all you’re really doing is masking the risk–you’re not eliminating it. And in hiding the real risk, you are lulling the market participants into a pernicious choice architecture in which their willingness to take riskier and riskier actions is rewarded and encouraged, while caution is punished.

This is the Paradox of Risk: by masking risk behind assurances that the Fed has your back, the Federal Reserve is encouraging unwary investors to increase their exposure to risk without even being aware of the dangers.

I covered the perverse consequences of believing risk can be “managed away to near-zero” in my book An Unconventional Guide to Investing in Troubled Times.

This is how you get a total systemic collapse of the entire choice architecture.And by this I mean not just the financial markets, but the backstop provided by central banks.

In a system that is now highly correlated to central bank policies, the idea that some counterparty will cover your losses is illusory. This is magical thinking: that when the system implodes, the counterparties will magically escape the highly correlated collapse. And if they don’t, well, the central banks will make good the losses. What’s $47 trillion in notational derivatives exposure between friends?

This is a second Paradox of Risk: central bank intervention provides the illusion that systemic risk has been extinguished, but in pushing all asset classes into correlation, they’ve eliminated cross-asset hedging.

Central banks have declared war on volatility as a means of managing perception of risk. Since volatility reflects risk perception, the Fed keeps pummeling volatility (VIX) in the hopes that by killing VIX, it will instill confidence in market players that risk has been sedated and dumped in the East River.

To continue reading: Sorry, Central Banks: Risk and Volatility Cannot be Extinguished

China’s $1 Trillion Bond Leverage Unwinds as Pimco Senses Panic, by Bloomberg News

Bond leverage in China is unravelling at both ends: the interest rates on funds used for carry-trade speculation are going up, the prices of the bonds subject to such speculation are going down. From bloomberg.news:

Investors get squeezed as bond prices fall, repo rates rise

“It looks like everybody is cutting their leverage”

After years of racking up profits by borrowing cheaply and plowing the proceeds into higher-yielding debt, investors are now rushing to unwind those wagers amid the deepest selloff in 13 months. The bets are getting squeezed from both sides as bond prices sink and borrowing costs rise to one-year highs in the 8 trillion yuan ($1.2 trillion) market for repurchase agreements, used by traders to amplify their buying power.

https://assets.bwbx.io/images/i_PY952kCef4/v2/-1x-1.png

While a reduction in leveraged wagers is arguably good for China’s long-term financial stability, it risks fueling a downward spiral in a market that Pacific Investment Management Co. says already shows signs of panic amid mounting default concerns. The pullback challenges government efforts to revive economic growth with cheap credit and could hardly come at a worse time for Chinese companies on the hook for a record 547 billion yuan of maturing onshore notes in May.

It looks like everybody is cutting their leverage, passively or pro-actively, as pessimistic sentiment continues to brew,” said Wang Ming, chief operating officer at Shanghai Yaozhi Asset Management LLP, which oversees 15 billion yuan of fixed-income securities. “Carry trades have become riskier.

Overnight Rates

Outstanding positions in the repo market — where investors can pledge existing bond holdings for cash to invest in more debt — have dropped by 18 percent this year through March, reversing a three-year climb to all-time highs in December. While it’s unclear how many of those transactions were used to buy more bonds, analysts at Haitong Securities Co. and Minsheng Securities Co. both say repos are the best available proxy for leverage in China’s debt market.

It’s getting more expensive for investors to lever up as market volatility makes lenders more cautious and forecasters push back estimates for another central bank interest-rate cut to at least the fourth quarter. The cost of overnight repos has averaged 1.99 percent this month, up from 1.14 percent in June.

There is still plenty of room for rates to go higher,” Zhou Hao, an economist at Commerzbank AG, wrote in a report on Wednesday.

It’s Absurd – Do Not Fool Yourself, from Artemis Capital Management

Excerpts from an Artemis Capital Management letter to investors, via theburningplatform.com:

Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be shifted through time and redistributed in form.

Vibrant life and rebirth comes from the acceptance of change and death in many complex systems:

The forest service has long understood that controlled burns are a more effective tool for fighting forest fires than total suppression. The act of subduing forest fires results in a dangerous build up in dry foliage that counterintuitively causes larger and larger fires. Mother Nature will initiate controlled burns naturally via lightning strikes and this is essential to the rebirth of the forest. The trees of the great sequoia forests will not release seeds without first sensing heat from a wildfire.

The art of avalanche prevention in backcountry snow terrain is based on a similar philosophy. Rangers use controlled blasts to reduce snow pressure rather than risk massive uncontrollable slides.

Marriage therapists observe that couples that do not fight are at the greatest risk of a divorce. The couples that fight actively bring core issues to the forefront instead of suppressing their problems. Apathy is worse than anger.

Treatment of cancer requires extensive chemotherapy to kill the cancerous agents from the body and allow healthy cells to multiply.

Treatment of addiction requires brutal recognition of the reality of the problem, personal responsibility, and immediate withdrawal from the source despite painful short-term effects.

The act of pruning a garden requires forcefully removing sick leaves to promote the vibrancy of the healthy plants.

In management science the ability to address problematic or below average employees is an essential value in the culture of many successful organizations.

The classic trading axiom of “cutting your losers and letting your winners ride” is an alternative form of the same idea.

All of the aforementioned natural and social phenomena have great positive exposure to change but at the expense of a short-term loss. In other words, they are long convexity.

The mainstream view that central banks have suppressed tail risk is absurd and runs counter to common sense.

Policy makers have done the opposite.

Central banks have taken asset returns from the future and brought them to the present…

they have taken tail risk from the present and shifted it into the future…

that have turned private risk into public risk.

The risk is not gone… do not fool yourself.

http://www.theburningplatform.com/2015/10/23/its-absurd-do-not-fool-yourself/

He Said That? 9/30/15

From Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), Italian historian, politician, diplomat, philosopher, humanist, and writer, The Prince, (1513):

All courses of action are risky, so prudence is not in avoiding danger (it’s impossible), but calculating risk and acting decisively. Make mistakes of ambition and not mistakes of sloth. Develop the strength to do bold things, not the strength to suffer.

You Think You’re An Investor? I Think Not, by Raúl Ilargi Meijer

From Raúl Ilargi Meijer at automaticearth.com:

Let’s start with defining what an ‘investor’ really is. A reasonable definition of an investor seems to be ‘someone who puts money into risk bearing assets that promise to produce financial gains through – increased – productivity’.

If we can agree on that, then furthermore I think we can all agree that investors need markets. And not only that, but they need functioning markets. What defines ‘functioning’ here is that ‘investors’ need to be able to discern what the value is of the assets they have already purchased and/or are thinking of purchasing in the future.

But we haven’t had any functioning markets since at least 2008. There is no price discovery left, nobody knows the actual value of anything anymore, and ‘traders’ pour money into all sorts of ‘assets’ without having one single clue as to what they are really worth. They don’t even care about the real value of the ‘assets’ they purchase. They don’t have to, because the game’s so obviously rigged and distorted.

There is no risk left in the assets, productivity – i.e. the added value – has long since ceased to be an issue, and that leaves financial gains as the only point of our definition above. But that must of necessity also mean that whoever trades in these non-functioning markets – preferably with ‘money’ borrowed on the cheap -, is not an investor.

So what are the people who do trade, while still calling themselves investors? Are they then mere ‘traders’? That doesn’t quite seem to fit.

What are they then? It may sound a bit harsh to claim they are all just plain grifters, but maybe that’s not too far off the truth after all.

http://www.theautomaticearth.com/2015/03/you-think-youre-an-investor-i-think-not/

To continue reading: You Think You’re An Investor?