Tag Archives: deflation

America’s #1 Import: Deflation, by Matt Matias Tavares

From Matt Matias Tavares of Sinclair & Co. at linkedin.com:

It seems that everyone these days is exporting deflation to the US.

The drop in commodity prices and the US dollar rally versus a broad basket of currencies in recent years had a big impact of course, but the magnitude of the decline of US import prices has been very significant indeed. And this matters for many reasons.

Competition for the all-important US consumer remains fierce, as exporting countries devalue their currency and/or further reduce their costs to maintain market share. While imports represent a relatively small percentage of US GDP (typically <17%), the technocrats at the Federal Reserve will now have to work harder to fan the flames of inflation across the economy (hint: not by continuing to raise interest rates…). Moreover, these price patterns suggest that all is certainly not well in the global economy.

The graph above shows the evolution of selected US import price indices by country of origin since January 2009 (=100), when the world was in the throes of the great recession, as provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The dotted line shows total import prices excluding oil, to isolate the direct impact of the recent collapse in crude oil prices. After staging a post-crisis rally, prices of overall imports pretty much remained in a range between mid-2011 and mid-2014. But then something happened: the US dollar started to rally hard and that price index quickly went the other way.

To continue reading: America’s #1 Import: Deflation

2016 Is An Easy Year To Predict, by Raúl Ilargi Meijer

From Raúl Ilargi Meijer at theautomaticearth.com:

No year is ever easy to predict, if only because if it were, that would take all the fun out of life. But still, predictions for 2016 look quite a bit easier than other years. This is because a whole bunch of irreversible things happened in 2015 that were not recognized for what they are, either intentionally or by ‘accident’. Things that will therefore now be forced to play out in 2016, when denial will no longer be an available option.

A year ago, I wrote 2014: The Year Propaganda Came Of Age, and though that was more about geopolitics, it might as well have dealt with the financial press. And that goes for 2015 at least as much. Mainstream western media are no more likely to tell you what’s real than Chinese state media are.

2015 should have been the year of China, and it was in a way, but the extent to which was clouded by Beijing’s insistence on made-up numbers (GDP growth of 7% against the backdrop of plummeting imports and exports, 45 months of falling producer prices and bad loans reaching 20%), by the western media’s insistence on copying these numbers, and by everyone’s fear of the economic and financial consequences of the ‘Great Fall of China‘.

2015 was also the year when deflation, closely linked -but by no means limited- to China, got a firm hold on the global economy. Denial and fear have restricted our understanding of this development just as much.

And while it should be obvious that 2015 was the year of refugees as well, that topic too has been twisted and turned until full public comprehension has become impossible. Both in the US and in Europe politicians pose for their voters loudly proclaiming that borders must be closed and refugees and migrants sent back to the places they’re fleeing due to our very own military interventions.

And that said politicians have the power to make that happen, the power to close borders to hundreds of thousands of fellow human beings arriving on their countries’ doorsteps. As if thousands of years of human mass migrations never occurred, and have no lessons to teach the present or the future.

The price of oil was a big story, and China plays the lead role in that story, even if again poorly understood. All the reports and opinions about OPEC plans and ‘tactics’ to squeeze US frackers are hollow, since neither OPEC as a whole nor its separate members have the luxury anymore to engage in tactical games; they’re all too squeezed by the demise of Chinese demand growth, if not demand, period.

Ever since 2008, the entire world economy has been kept afloat by the $25 trillion or so that China printed to build overleveraged overcapacity. And now that is gone, never to return. There is nowhere else left for our economies to turn for growth. Everyone counted on China to take them down the yellow brick road to la-la-land, forever. And then it didn’t happen.

To continue reading: 2016 Is An Easy Year To Predict

10 Investor Warning Signs For 2016, by Michael Pento

From Michael Pento at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

Wall Street’s proclivity to create serial equity bubbles off the back of cheap credit has once again set up the middle class for disaster. The warning signs of this next correction have now clearly manifested, but are being skillfully obfuscated and trivialized by financial institutions. Nevertheless, here are ten salient warning signs that astute investors should heed as we roll into 2016.

1. The Baltic Dry Index, a measure of shipping rates and a barometer for worldwide commodity demand, recently fell to its lowest level since 1985. This index clearly portrays the dramatic decrease in global trade and forebodes a worldwide recession.

2. Further validating this significant slowdown in global growth is the CRB index, which measures nineteen commodities. After a modest recovery in 2011, it has now dropped below the 2009 level—which was the nadir of the Great Recession.

3. Nominal GDP growth for the third quarter of 2015 was just 2.7%. The problem is Ms. Yellen wants to begin raising rates at a time when nominal GDP is signaling deflation and recession. The last time the Fed began a rate hike cycle was in the second quarter of 2004. Back then nominal GDP was a robust 6.6%. Furthermore, the last several times the Fed began to raise interest rates nominal GDP ranged between 5%-7%.

To continue reading: 10 Investor Warning Signs for 2016

 

 

 

What Deflation Quacks Like, by Raúl Ilargi Meijer

Deflation, like winter, is no longer coming; it’s here. From  Raúl Ilargi Meijer at theautomaticearth.com:

As yet another day of headlines shows, see the links and details in today’s Debt Rattle at the Automatic Earth, deflation is visible everywhere, from a 98% drop in EM debt issuance to junk bonds reporting the first loss since 2008 to corporate bonds downgrades to plummeting cattle prices in Kansas to China’s falling demand for iron ore and a whole list of other commodities.

The list is endless. It is absolutely everywhere. And it’s there every single day. But how would we know? After all, we’re being told incessantly that deflation equals falling consumer prices. And since these don’t fall -yet-, other than at the pump (something people seem to think is some freak accident), every Tom and Dick and Harry concludes there is no deflation.

But if you wait for consumer prices to fall to recognize deflationary forces, you’ll be way behind the curve. Always. Consumer prices won’t drop until we’re -very- well into deflation, and they will do so only at the moment when nary a soul can afford them anymore even at their new low levels.

The money supply, however it’s measured, may be soaring (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard makes the point every other day), but that makes no difference when spending falls as much as it does. And it does. The whole shebang is maxed out. And the whole caboodle is maxed out too. All of it except for central banks and other money printers.

Everyone has so much debt that spending can only come from borrowing more. Until it can’t. We read comments that tell us the global markets are reaching the end of the ‘credit cycle’, but can the insanity that has ‘saved’ the economy over the past 7 years truly be seen as a ‘cycle’, or is it perhaps instead just pure insanity? There’s never been so much debt on the planet, so unless we’re starting a whole new kind of cycle, not much about it looks cyclical.

Also, though we hear this all the time, the collapse in spending does not happen because people are ‘saving’, but we wouldn’t know that from the ‘official’ numbers, because when people pay down their debts, that is counted as ‘saving’.

To continue reading: What Deflation Quacks Like

Telling Details, by Robert Gore

Writers are advised to avoid descriptions that read like catalogs, and instead use a few telling details that convey to the reader the essence of what’s being described. In the same vein, a few details may be all that’s necessary to understand the global economy and where it’s headed.

Detail one: the government of Portugal recently issued 12-month debt at a negative interest rate (“The Mad Euro Project Just Got A Lot Madder,” by Don Quijones). Detail two: the Chinese producer price index (PPI) has fallen for 44 straight months (“The Great Fall Of China Started At Least 4 Years Ago,” by Raúl Ilargi Meijer). Detail three: the so-called FANG stocks—Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google—have accounted for the S&P 500’s entire 1 percent gain this year (as of November 20). Their market capitalizations have gone up 60 percent versus a combined increase in earnings of 13 percent. Without those four, the S&P is down 2.5 percent (“When Wall Street Gets DeFANGed———Look Out Below!” by David Stockman).

It is a truism of human psychology that a dollar today is worth more to us than a dollar in the future. To be induced to give up a dollar today, we need to be paid more than a dollar in the future. That premium is interest, and the psychological truism implies that it will always be at a positive rate. How then is Portugal able to borrow money and repay less than the amount it’s borrowing twelve months hence? It’s like seeing water run uphill.

There is an economic cult that infests central banks and believes, against all evidence, that debt powers economies and that by manipulating interest rates, economies can be manipulated. Press interest rates low enough and the economy will flourish. Businesses will borrow and invest in new productive capacity and jobs. Consumers will head to the malls. Speculators will bid up the price of financial assets and higher balances on brokerage statements will prompt more spending and investment.

It doesn’t work. While a lower interest rate may prompt an immediate increase in business borrowing, over time markets adjust to the new rate and the prevailing rate of return equilibrates to that rate. The last six years have demonstrated that taking central bank-administered rates to zero does not promote economic expansion, especially for developed world economies already overly indebted and plagued by governments addicted to economic intervention and welfare-state spending. But central bankers are like the medieval “doctors” who bled their patients to death. Having taken rates to zero they’re prescribing more leaches: negative rates. Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank, pledges to buy debt at negative yields. Speculators front run his pledge, buying an idiot’s ticket to ruin knowing a bigger idiot will pay a higher price. And Portugal, whose dire financials would merit double-digit interest rates in rational credit markets, gets paid to borrow.

Detail two: China joined a global debt binge after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Debt funded booms in domestic consumption and investment in infrastructure, factories, houses, apartments, malls, and entire cities. Debt in the US and Europe funded their consumption of Chinese exports. China recycled the proceeds from its trade surpluses back into the debt of its customers—vendor financing.

China’s PPI deflation started in March 2012: producer demand shifted downward relative to supply, taking prices with it. Debt was producing diminishing returns and debt service was exacting an increasing toll on its economy. China’s “solution” has been more leaches: more debt. Chinese government statisticians dutifully count each new factory, apartment complex, and addition to infrastructure in their GDP tally. However, new facilities operate at a loss, apartments join hundreds of thousands across the country standing vacant, few cars are seen on many of the brand new roads and bridges, and some of the new cities are virtually uninhabited. China’s string of negative PPI readings offers a preview for the global economy: deflation and debt contraction.

Speculation and the rise of financial asset prices are not indicators of economic vitality. Rather, speculation is the last economic activity in which debt has produced a positive return. Negative interest rates imply that the prevailing rate of return could go negative: borrowing money to fund investments that lose money! That prospect may seem fanciful, but speculation is close to it, bearing a hugely disproportionate probability of loss.

Corporate managers are spending more on share repurchases—speculating on their corporation’s stock price—than their corporations’ free cash flow. There is a self-serving element to this. A significant share of executive compensation is stock options, but another consideration has been overlooked. Managers face a dearth of productive investments. Years of cheap debt have already funded most plausible capital projects. Commodities, intermediate, and finished goods markets are glutted and prices are falling. Debt, welfare state spending, and regulation have slowed many economies to a crawl, and put some of them in reverse. In what are managers supposed to invest? Might as well take a flier on the stock market; the potential gain of a gamble is better than a certain loss.

Detail three: capital is being destroyed or is fleeing glutted industries with burdensome debt and negative rates of return. Those characterizations apply to an ever-expanding swath of the overall economy, and are moving up the production chain from raw materials to transportation services, intermediate and finished goods, and retail. It is only a matter of time before they spread to services. The progression has been reflected in the stock market, where gains are confined to an ever shrinking number of stocks.

Investors have crowded into Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google because they are among the few companies that continue to show increased profits; exemplars in a sector—high technology—that many investors hope is immune from the forces of economics. However, on a trailing twelve months basis, their price to earnings ratio is an unweighted average of 356.88, dragged down by Google’s “meager” 31.89 (all figures from Yahoo Finance). The FANG companies are wonders to behold, but their S&P-supporting valuations say nothing about the economy. They are instead an indication that, in David Stockman’s words, “[T]he gamblers are piling on the last train out of the station.” No company, not even the FANGs, are immune from the forces of economics; they are much better shorts than longs here.

Negative interest rates, glutted product markets, falling prices, shrinking global trade, plunging shipping rates, fading retail activity, and the desperate, manic piling into the FANG stocks say volumes about the economy. Winter is coming, and like the Game of Thrones version, it will be years before spring follows.

WHAT IS GREATNESS? WHY DO SO MANY

SETTLE FOR SO MUCH LESS?

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The Long, Cold Economic Winter Ahead, M.N. Gordon

From M.N. Gordon at davidstockmanscontracorner.com:

Cold winds of deflation gust across the autumn economic landscape. Global trade languishes and commodities rust away like abandoned scrap metal with a visible dusting of frost. The economic optimism that embellished markets heading into 2015 have cooled as the year moves through its final stretch.

If you recall, the popular storyline since late last year has been that the U.S. economy is moderately improving while the world’s other major economies – Japan, China, and Europe – are rolling over. The U.S. economy would power through. Moreover, stock prices had achieved a permanently high plateau.

But somewhere between collapsing oil prices, dollar strength, and consumer lethargy the economy’s narrative has drifted off plot. The theme has transitioned from one of renewed growth and recovery to one of recurring sickness and stagnation. Mass malinvestments in U.S. shale oil, Brazilian mines, and Chinese factories and real estate must be reckoned.

Price adjustments, bankruptcies, and debt restructuring must be painfully worked through like a strawberry picker hunkered over a seemingly endless furrow row of over ripening fruits. Sore backs, burnt necks, and tender fingers are what the over-all economy has in front of it. The U.S. economy is not immune to the global disorder after all.

More evidence is revealed each week that the unexpected is happening. Instead of economic strength and robust growth, economic fundamentals are breaking down. Manufacturing is slowing. Consumer spending is soft. For additional edification, let’s turn to Dr. Copper…

To continue reading: The Long, Cold Economic Winter Ahead

Crisis Progress Report (13): Time for the Crash, by Robert Gore

From the last Crisis Progress Report, dated October 1: “Assume a rally like the one in 2008 is in the offing. If the 2008 rally’s timing is any guide, this one will start between now and New Year’s, but there are no assurances; it may begin next year.” SLL did not know then that the rally was already underway, the market having made its recent closing low on September 28. Now that the market has rallied, in the perverse way that markets work, Friday’s employment report, the best in some time, may well kick off the next down leg. October has had its share of market crashes, so with fear high at the beginning of the month, the market rallied and October was its best month in years. November and December are often strong, marked by end-of-the-year “Santa Claus” rallies. Again, in their perverse way, markets this year may leave a lump of high-sulfur-content, CO2-releasing, soon-to-be-outlawed coal in investors’ stockings.

This latest employment report will be revised multiple times; it is subject to a variety of abstruse statistical criticisms; it is seasonally and birth-death-model adjusted; it shows that almost all the jobs in October were taken by older workers, and finally, employment is, as any economist will tell you, a lagging indicator. Whatever the ambiguities in the employment report, there is no gainsaying that debt contraction is rolling through, and roiling, the global economy in textbook fashion. Global debt, central bank and government-force fed, approaches $225 trillion and has grown faster than global GDP for decades. It is the most massive in history, measured in either absolute terms or in relative terms against global GDP.

Debt is close to or at a high point that may not be exceeded for decades, but the underlying forces of contraction are in full flower. They first appeared in the most leveraged sector relative to its ability to repay: natural resources. China blew a debt-fueled bubble, and its economic “miracle” stoked investment in natural resources around the world. That investment binge was aided mightily by artificially low, central-bank suppressed interest rates. Once China’s bubble started to deflate, as all such bubbles must, investment that looked “opportunistic” on the way up has became malinvestment, with gluts in oil, iron ore, coal, aluminum, nickel, fertilizer, and a host of other raw materials.

Earlier this year, it was possible, if one was completely ignorant of debt dynamics, or “debtonomics” as SLL has christened them (see Debtonomics Archive), to argue that the raw materials situation would be contained. The same assurances were given in 2007 about the pending collapse of the housing and mortgage finance markets, and the present assurances will prove as spot off as those were. Natural resources are a far larger part of the global economy than the what proved to be earth-shaking US housing and mortgage finance market was in 2007. There are too many debt contraction ripples rippling out; the only way the contained argument can be made now is through willful ignorance. (SLL has been glutting its blog postings with stories on those ripples. Rather than clutter up this article with a multitude of links, readers who have missed those stories and are interested should scan through the blog over the last month.)

The glut of raw materials has led to a glut in raw materials transport. Tankers, bulk shipping vessels, and container ships are in oversupply and shipping rates have collapsed, in some cases to all time lows. China’s exports and imports are shrinking, as is overall global trade. The ripples are reaching US shores, where railroads are reporting shrinking volumes of not just natural resources, but chemicals, containers, and industrial products. The trucking industry is following suit; the US load-to-truck ratio just hit a 33-month low. Neither US railroads nor trucks are directly tied into China, but they are nevertheless being affected by reduced demand from China that is anything but “contained.”

Notice that the contraction has moved beyond raw materials. Cheap money and China’s supposedly perpetually expanding demand prompted fervid increases in Chinese and global industrial capacity, now overcapacity. Exhibit A is the steel industry, burdened with massive oversupply. Its raw material, iron ore, has gone from $154 per dry metric ton in February of 2013 to its current price below $50 per dry metric ton. It’s the same story with cement, finished aluminum and copper products, industrial machinery, tractors, and engines, to name a few. The segment of the global economy that makes things, especially the segment that makes things for other industrial users, is looking at gluts as devastating as those faced by producers of raw materials. Last month, Daniel Florness, the CEO of Fastenal, a US company that makes nuts, bolts, and other fasteners said, “The industrial environment is in a recession—I don’t care what anybody says, because nobody knows that market better than we do. You know, we touch 250,000 active customers a month.” (“‘Our Data Is Not Good’ – US Companies Warn That A Recession Is Coming,” by Tyler Durden, SLL, 10/26/15).

The fashionable refrain is that none of this will put the US in a recession because the US economy is based on services, not mining, manufacturing, and exports. The stock market has recovered most of its August and September losses, the housing market is holding up, and service sector statistics still show growth. This optimism is misplaced. The things-you-can-touch economy buys legal and financial services, communications, technology, insurance, consulting, office space, real estate, and advertising. The idea that significant cutbacks by America’s mining, manufacturing, transport, and distribution companies will have minimal impact on its service companies ignores the extensive commercial relationships between the two groups.

Layoffs have begun in mining, oil, and gas and will spread. The newly unemployed cut back on store trips, restaurants, entertainment, and other discretionary spending in the service economy. They may, heaven forbid, even cut back on their smart phone usage. Then we’ll know that things are really, really bad. About the only sector that may appear immune, at least for a while, is the government, but the relative health of this nonproductive—or more accurately, counterproductive—sector, will come, as it always does, at the expense of the rest of the economy.

One of the US’s world-beating service industries—the production, packaging, and distribution of debt—is already showing the strain. Fracking and mining companies are seeing their credit lines curtailed or eliminated, and bond financing unavailable or prohibitively priced. What started in the oil and gas corner of the bond market—widening credit spreads—has spread out to a general increase. The ultra-cheap interest rates that allowed companies to finance shareholder friendly dividends and buybacks are ratcheting up. Banks are cutting their commitments to both the investment grade and high-yield corporate bond markets. Constriction in credit markets often precedes significant stock market declines, but hey, things are different this time. Flinty creditors spend all their time looking at boring old balance sheets, revenues, expenses, and cash flows. Equity markets have hope and faith and central bank pixie dust!

They can ignore the writing on the wall, but not the wall. That would be the one into which the global economy is smashing. Pixie dust has probably taken US equity markets about as far as they’re going to go. A crash that begins before Christmas will surprise only those who still believe in Santa Claus.

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The Global Test Most Will Fail: Surviving the Bust That Inevitably Follows a Boom, by Charles Hugh Smith

From Charles Hugh Smith at oftwominds.com:

Now that virtually every nation is entering the bust phase, all are being tested.

Booms powered by credit, new markets and speculation are followed by busts as night follows day. This creates a very difficult test for every nation-state facing the inevitable bust: how does the leadership deal with the end of the boom?

As the world is about to learn once again, the “fix” may make the next bust even more destructive.

Let’s start by reviewing what conditions generate booms.

1. An undeveloped nation gains access to new credit, markets and resources and go through a “boost phase” much like a rocket lifting off when suddenly abundant finance capital ignites the country’s latent growth potential. When a country with little to no public or private debt suddenly gains access to essentially unlimited capital, growth explodes.

One variant of this is the discovery of vast new resources that quickly attract capital (for example, oil) or that generate new wealth (for example, gold).

The modern example of a developing nation gaining access to new credit, markets and resources is of course China, but this model also describes America in the 1790s and early 1800s, and many other nations in various phases of their development.

2. A new sector opens up in a developed nation’s economy. A recent example is the Internet, which exploded in a boost phase from 1995 to 2000. In these cases, the new sector simply didn’t exist, and the boost phase is as spectacular as the ones in newly developing economies.

Example from American history include the railroad-fueled boom of the 1870s and 1880s and the advent of electric light and later, radio.

3. A previously “safe” sector is financialized as the assets are collateralized into vast mountains of debt and leverage, both of which fuel runaway speculation.

The mortgage-backed-securities and subprime-fueled housing boom of 2002-2008 is a recent example of this: a safe, conservative sector (mortgages and housing) was rapidly financialized into a speculative frenzy.

Eventually this boost phase burns thru all the productive investments and moves into mal-investment, rampant speculation and outright fraud as insiders take advantage of new entrants. In the U.S., this occurred in the early 1890s once the construction of railroads had moved to the over-indebted, speculative mal-investment phase.

To continue reading: The Global Test Most Will Fail

The Ghost Cities Finally Died: For China’s Steel Industry “The Outlook Is The Worst Ever Amid Unprecedented Losses,” by Tyler Durden

From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

It’s almost difficult to believe, but just 8 years ago, in 2007 and right before the world was swept in the worst financial crisis in history, China had only $7.4 trillion in debt, or 158% in consolidated debt/GDP. Since then this debt has risen to over $30 trillion (specifically $28.2 trillion as of Q2, 2014) representing a staggering 300% debt/GDP.

Here is the summary breakdown from McKinsey.

This means that China was responsible for more than a third of all the $57 trillion debt created since 2007, making a mockery of the QE unleashed by all the DM central banks – something we first noted about two years before the famous McKinsey report went to print.

To continue reading: The Ghost Cities Finally Died

The Wrong War for Central Banking, by Stephen S. Roach

From Stephen S. Roach, former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and the firm’s chief economist, senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs, and a senior lecturer at Yale’s School of Management. Notwithstanding the mainstream credentials, Roach has often swum against the tide on his economic calls, and he’s been right more often than wrong. His only mistake here is not mentioning debt as the overriding factor in deflation, but the rest of the article is pretty good. From Roach, at project-syndicate.org:

BEIJING – Fixated on inflation targeting in a world without inflation, central banks have lost their way. With benchmark interest rates stuck at the dreaded zero bound, monetary policy has been transformed from an agent of price stability into an engine of financial instability. A new approach is desperately needed.

The US Federal Reserve exemplifies this policy dilemma. After the Federal Open Market Committee decided in September to defer yet again the start of its long-awaited normalization of monetary policy, its inflation doves are openly campaigning for another delay.
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For the inflation-targeting purists, the argument seems impeccable. The headline consumer-price index (CPI) is near zero, and “core” or underlying inflation – the Fed’s favorite indicator – remains significantly below the seemingly sacrosanct 2% target. With a long-anemic recovery looking shaky again, the doves contend that there is no reason to rush ahead with interest-rate hikes.

Of course, there is more to it than that. Because monetary policy operates with lags, central banks must avoid fixating on the here and now, and instead use imperfect forecasts to anticipate the future effects of their decisions. In the Fed’s case, the presumption that the US will soon approach full employment has caused the so-called dual mandate to collapse into one target: getting inflation back to 2%.

Here, the Fed is making a fatal mistake, as it relies heavily on a timeworn inflation-forecasting methodology that filters out the “special factors” driving the often volatile prices of goods like food and energy. The logic is that the price fluctuations will eventually subside, and headline price indicators will converge on the core rate of inflation.

This approach failed spectacularly when it was adopted in the 1970s, causing the Fed to underestimate virulent inflation. And it is failing today, leading the Fed consistently to overestimate underlying inflation. Indeed, with oil prices having plunged by 50% over the past year, the Fed stubbornly maintains that faster price growth – and the precious inflation rate of 2% – is just around the corner.

Missing from this logic is an appreciation of the new and powerful global forces that are bearing down on inflation. According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest outlook, the price deflator for all advanced economies should increase by just 1.5% annually, on average, from now to 2020 – not much higher than the crisis-depressed 1.1% pace of the last six years. Moreover, most wholesale prices around the world remain in outright deflation.

But, rather than recognize the likely drivers of these developments – namely, a seemingly chronic shortfall of global aggregate demand amid a supply glut and a deflationary profusion of technological innovations and new supply chains – the Fed continues to minimize the deflationary impact of global forces. It would rather attribute low inflation to successful inflation targeting, and the Great Moderation that it presumably spawned.

To continue reading: The Wrong War for Central Banking