Tag Archives: Central banks

Statism, Rinse, Repeat…Collapse, by Robert Gore

Pick a perceived problem to which a government has intervened. There’s a stupidity cycle: the intervention makes the problem worse, which leads to more intervention, which makes the problem even worse, and so on. Statism, rinse, repeat. You may wonder: how long can a stupidity cycle persist before the problem that government has exacerbated gets so bad that there is a reckoning, or just plain collapse? Pull up a chair and make yourself comfortable—2015 is offering the opportunity to view cyclical stupidity exhaustion on multiple screens. There’s also a feature you won’t see in conventional AV rooms: the screens are interrelated; what happens on one screen affects what’s happening on the others.

Start with the Middle East. The US government went to war in Afghanistan to capture Osama bin Laden, purported mastermind of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. As with most government programs, that mission soon expanded, to regime change for despots the Bush administration found odious. The U.S military was instrumental in deposing Afghanistan’s Taliban, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and later, Libya’s Murammar Gaddafi. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Iran’s fundamentalist Shiite government were, and still are, on the neoconservative hit list. However, a not-so-funny thing happened on the way to reordering the Middle East. It grew more chaotic and deadly than when we started, each intervention amplifying the chaos and violence.

As part of this phenomenon, blowback has been amplified. Nobody would argue that the global war on terrorism has reduced terrorism. Al-Qaeda has been a growth stock. From humble origins in Afghanistan, it has gone multinational across the Middle East and Northern Africa, with various subsidiaries and spin-offs. One of the spin-offs, the Islamic State, governs large swaths of Syria and Iraq, and may be making inroads in Libya. Like any large enterprise, Al-Qaeda also has its competitors, who wreak their own havoc. More blowback: expanding terror, destruction, and death have created a flood of refugees who are rapidly overwhelming Europe’s capacity and willingness to aid them.

That flood shows no signs of ebbing because there are no signs the conflict that is causing it will abate any time soon. In the time-honored fashion of government stupidity cycles, conflict is escalating. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt, Russia, Iran, and the US all claim to be fighting the Islamic State in Syria. However, the first five all want to depose Assad, Russia and Iran are trying to protect him, and who knows what the hell the US is trying to do. The important point here is that the next escalation may be world war, which will collapse the escalation cycle, but not before countries are destroyed and millions die.

Regular readers of SLL are well aware of debt dynamics. In a fiat money world, debt expands ceaselessly until the dead weight of debt service outweighs the gains from production, consumption, and speculative activities. Private and public debt around the world have expanded at growth rates greater than underlying economic growth rates for decades.

With global gluts of natural resources and manufactured goods, debt for productive investment now produces negative returns, even though interest rates on most classes of debt are still at generational lows. The greatest percentage of debt has funded consumption, which generates no economic return to repay it. And as the margin-call month of August demonstrated, debt fueled speculation can only go so far. Sooner or later financial markets recognize the increasingly bleak economic realities generated by an increasingly debt-encumbered economy.

That’s even if central banks promise free money forever. In 1987, Alan Greenspan quelled a stock market crash by pouring Federal Reserve liquidity into the financial system, thus lowering short term rates. Since then, every significant financial disturbance has been met with liquidity injections—debt and financial asset monetization—and lower interest rates, not just in the US but across the developed world. Each cycle has required escalation: the injections have grown progressively larger, their real world effects progressively smaller, and interest rates have hit the zero rate floor.

The latest escalation was from the 2007-2009 financial crisis, but the recovery has been anemic, and many economic magnitudes have not regained levels attained before the financial crisis. The world is either on the cusp of or actually in economic contraction. The return from additional debt is negative and interest rates cannot go lower. In other words, governments and central banks no longer have even the smoke-and-mirrors tricks of expanding debt, debt monetization, and interest rate suppression to prop up economies and financial markets. Which means this next downturn will not be a downturn at all; it will be a vertiginous plunge orders of magnitude more severe than anything that has preceded it. Making up for lost time, so to speak.

Debt, rising taxes, and ever-expanding government have fueled an explosion in entitlement spending. Such spending, by reducing both the urgency of recipients to better their situations and the incentive of producers to produce and thus provide funding, actually increases the poverty and “unmet social needs” it was ostensibly meant to address. Debt, taxes, and expanding government retard economies. Properly measured, economic growth in Europe, the cradle of he welfare state, is almost nonexistent, even during so-called expansions, and the US is not far behind. Demands for public services and the sense of entitlement escalate even as public balance sheets and economies deteriorate.

Obamacare will almost certainly mark the apex of the entitlements stupidity cycle in the US, preceding fiscal collapse. When it comes, large swaths of the US population will be unable to provide for themselves and will clamor in vain for assistance from insolvent local, state, and federal governments. What will these unfortunates do? Quiet resignation and acceptance of their fate are not the odds on favorite, rather, we’re looking at unprecedented civil disorder, lawlessness, and widespread chaos.

Nothing happens in isolation; everything is interrelated. Imagine, if you have the intestinal fortitude, the interrelationships in a world embroiled in global war, economic depression, and the death of the welfare state. Those who invoke such visions are called apocalyptic. Is it apocalyptic, or does a straight line, logical analysis of ever escalating stupidity cycles yield the conclusion that we’re at the brink of collapse? Is this a mere pothole, or are we at the edge of an abyss the bottom of which we cannot see? Hope for the former, if you wish to delude yourself. Prepare for the latter if you don’t.

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Say Goodbye to Normal, by James Howard Kunstler

Today’s prize for an apocalyptic vision goes to James Howard Kunstler at kunstler.com:

The tremors rattling markets are not exactly what they seem to be. A meme prevails that these movements represent a kind of financial peristalsis — regular wavelike workings of eternal progress toward an epic more of everything, especially profits! You can forget the supposedly “normal” cycles of the techno-industrial arrangement, which means, in particular, the business cycle of the standard economics textbooks. Those cycle [SIC} are dying.

They’re dying because there really are Limits to Growth and we are now solidly in grips of those limits. Only we can’t recognize the way it is expressing itself, especially in political terms. What’s afoot is a not “recession” but a permanent contraction of what has been normal for a little over two hundred years. There is not going to be more of everything, especially profits, and the stock buyback orgy that has animated the corporate executive suites will be recognized shortly for what it is: an assest-stripping operation.

What’s happening now is a permanent contraction. Well, of course, nothing lasts forever, and the contraction is one phase of a greater transition. The cornucopians and techno-narcissists would like to think that we are transitioning into an even more lavish era of techno-wonderama — life in a padded recliner tapping on a tablet for everything! I don’t think so. Rather, we’re going medieval, and we’re doing it the hard way because there’s just not enough to go around and the swollen populations of the world are going to be fighting over what’s left.

To continue reading: Say Goodbye to Normal

US Debt In The Age Of Unrestrained Central Banking, by Eugen Bohm-Bawerk

Eugen Bohm-Bawerk gets both his history and economics right. From Bohm-Bawerk, at bawerk.net via zerohedge.com:

We have shown in the previous three episodes (episode 1, 2 and 3) how the US economy structurally changed after Nixon took the US off gold, letting the Federal Reserve do what it does best. Obviously, with the “hard” anchor of the US dollar cut loose, the rest followed suit. It is telling that the so-called post-Bretton Wood “gold standard” of all currencies, the Deutsche mark lost 65 per cent of its purchasing power from 1971 to 1990.

Also note that the French, with its inferior Franc lost 84 per cent of its purchasing power over the same, time hated the Germans for it. As a “victorious” nation of the Second World War, the French had a right to veto German unification, and would only agree to re-merge east and west if the Germans would give up their coveted mark and join the euro.

But we digress, in the this episode we will focus on debt levels within the context of unrestrained central banking.

Throughout history the US economy used to be leveraged, on average, 1.5 times GDP; total credit market debt fluctuated more or less within a tight range of maximum one standard deviation from its long term mean. Prior to 1971 the only time debt levels really got out of hand was during the Great Depression on back of a 45 per cent decline in nominal GDP. Total outstanding debt, in dollar terms actually fell by 12 per cent over the same time span.

So, the US economy was leveraged 1.5 times its annual output from 1840 to 1971 before fundamentally changing its trajectory. Needless to say, this low debt period was also when the US economy became the world’s largest and most sophisticated (see here) and ultimately a global hegemon.

To continue reading: US Debt In The Age Of Unrestrained Central Banking

Get It Right, by Robert Gore

The deflationary depression upon which the world has embarked has two central themes: debt, and the inability of government and central banks to control multiple variables and consequently, outcomes. Viewed through these prisms, everything that has happened and will happen is readily comprehensible.

The received wisdom before last week’s US stock market plunge was that China’s economic and financial problems would remain local. After the plunge, the revised received wisdom is that it’s all China’s fault. Neither analysis is correct. China has entered a debt contraction after one of the greatest, if not the greatest, debt expansions in history. Its problems are exacerbated by its lack of freedom and its command and control government (they’re communists, after all), which stands revealed as unable to dictate economic outcomes. It has its fingers crossed that its inability does not cross over into the political realm, probably a vain hope.

The US has entered the same debt contraction phase as China—just a few months later—after a debt expansion that dates back to the 1960’s, when Presidents Johnson and Nixon opted for guns and butter on the installment plan. Nixon cut the last fiscal tether to reality in 1971 when he closed the gold window. The US’s problems will not be solved by the command and control ministrations and manipulations of its government and central bank, any more than China’s have been.

Governments and central banks are the problem, not the solution. The market-based solutions of debt contraction, asset repricing, insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, economic contraction, reduced consumption, and unemployment are not planks of a platform designed to win next year’s US election or quell Chinese unrest. They will, however, happen regardless of who’s running things in either nation. The one certainty is that the powers that be in both nations will make matters worse.

The incompetence of governments and central banks renders absurd the debate about whether the Federal Reserve will abandoned its hinted-at plan to raise the federal funds rate target next month. For SLL’s money, it will not raise the rate in the face of crashing economies and financial markets; we’ll probably see the next iteration of quantitative easing before year’s end. And for SLL’s money, it won’t make a bit of difference what the Fed does. At the first hint that the rate won’t be raised we’ll see one of those one- or two-day wonder rallies that crucify the shorts. In the long run, it will be an almost imperceptible upward squiggle on a stock chart that bears a striking resemblance to that of the last crisis (except this one will have a steeper negative slope and a more precipitous drop).

Governments around the world are racing to make things worse as debt unravels. Financial markets, no longer faithful lap poodles, are registering the carnage. Currencies are being competitively devalued in a less-than-zero-sum race to the bottom that will have no winners, but which will impoverish citizens of any nation that imports anything. Repayment by governments and corporations of foreign currency debt becomes increasingly problematic as economies shrink and domestic currencies depreciate.

Economic contraction is killing exports for raw materials and finished goods, outweighing the transitory benefits from currency depreciation. Local stock markets have tended to follow local currencies, so it’s turning into a rough year for emerging market investors. Widening credit default swap spreads and rising interest rates indicate that it’s also going to be a rough year for emerging market creditors (see “This Is Not A ‘Correction’……..It’s The Beginning Of The Global Bubble Unwind,” by Doug Noland, SLL, 8/22/15). Emerging market travails should occasion no smugness among more developed nations. The former’s problems are the leading edge to which the latter will catch up.

SLL readily confesses to two systemic errors. SLL has always underestimated the desperate lengths governments and central banks will go to sustain the unsustainable. During the last financial crisis, SLL would have taken the other side of bets that: the Fed’s balance sheet would expand by four times; the ECB would do “what ever it takes” to keep the European afloat, including allowing as collateral all sorts of garbage debt; central banks would promote negative interest rates; China would go on its massive debt binge, and Japan’s central bank would monetize everything, including equity ETFs.

Nevertheless, all these things happened, which brings up SLL’s second systemic mistake: underestimating the willingness of financial markets, speculators, and investors to play along with incompetent, counterproductive market manipulation and economic policy. Perhaps no chart is more telling in this regard than one tracking the closely correlated size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet and the S&P stock index, even as the economy experience its weakest “recovery” since WWII. SLL predicts that correlation will soon be broken, but there is no denying that it has persisted for over six years, or about three years longer than SLL thought it would.

The looming financial and economic debacle will put those mistakes in the rear-view mirror, although new SLL mistakes will undoubtedly be made further down the road. For the time being, there is no need to make things complicated. We are in a debt contraction and economic depression that will be marked by widespread deflation in assets prices of all stripes. Virtually everything governments and central banks do to forestall or prevent these inevitable outcomes will only make things worse.

For those who are prepared and who get it right intellectually, there will be comic, even hilarious, moments. For example: as markets and economies crash, a long overdue comeuppance is at hand for maladroit, corrupt, rapacious elites. Hard as it is to believe, those who maintain that the bad guys and gals never get what’s coming to them may be too cynical. Picture politicians, central bankers, lobbyists, crony capitalists, and other scum in the dock or the hoosegow. To borrow from Oscar Wilde, you would have to have a heart of stone to witness such “tragedies” without laughing. If nothing else, satire flourishes during hard times, so the coming years should be a Golden Age. In addition to commentary and analysis, SLL will try to supply some of the laughs.

THE BEST FAMILY SAGA, HISTORICAL NOVEL OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION PUBLISHED THIS CENTURY

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Crisis Progress Report (10): Bust, by Robert Gore

Ideas and actions have consequences, fortunately. Debt booms bust. SLL is back in action after a week-long trip. Nothing that happened over that week, culminating in yesterday’s worst equity market drops in months, followed by today’s so-far hefty drop (never dismiss the possibility of an end-of-day “save” to make people feel a little better over the weekend) is surprising. SLL has been warning of exactly this outcome since last fall. Even the rally in oversold precious metals has been predictable (see “Buy Gold and Silver,” SLL, 7/20/15). The surprise has been how long the equity collapse was in coming. SLL was a little early, but a little early informed by competent analysis is better than a little late informed by complete cluelessness.

SLL has not been the only one making this call, but the competent camp has been far outnumbered by the clueless. Such was the case during the 2007-2009 crisis, too. That the lessons from that crisis went unlearned is inexcusable. It was a busting debt bubble, of which housing, mortgages, and mortgage securities and derivatives were at the leading edge.

The beliefs both within and outside the economics profession in the magic beans of expanding government spending and debt, transferring private debt to public balance sheets, debt monetization, and interest rate suppression betrays stupidity, cupidity, and statist proclivities. A bursting debt bubble cannot be stopped by encouraging and incurring more debt; Jack had a better chance with his beans.

How then have so many missed what was so obviously coming? In both government and on Wall Street, analysts and economists are paid not to look, to explain why common sense is fallacious and the plainly evident is not what is really happening. There is no constituency for the truth, which is why unvarnished utterances by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are propelling their candidacies. Outside the 1 percent, there is a constituency for reality, logic, and consequences. (If there is not, SLL will have to close up shop.) Inside the 1 percent, such considerations are ignored until they cannot be.

The two most subscribed-to economic fantasies—Keynesianism and monetarism—give the government primacy of place in economic affairs. According to Keynes, markets and the price mechanism are insufficient, only the government can bring aggregate supply and demand into alignment, by going into debt or raising taxes as necessary. According to the monetarists, the economy dances to a tune called by the central bank’s manipulations of bank reserves and interest rates.

Pick your poison: both schools believe in magic beans because they fit their statist predilections. You would think that the global economy sliding into depression after six years of unprecedented application of Keynesian and monetarist nostrums would give their adherents pause, but it won’t. The mainstream branches of economics are religions, and at core their faith is a reflection of faith in government.

As SLL has said repeatedly, governments cannot control multiple variables, and the multiple variables they cannot control have been multiplying daily. China—where the government is trying to control the economy, margin debt, corporate debt, bad debt reserves, shadow banks, state-controlled banks, interest rates, equity prices, pollution, the price of pork, and whatever else it believes needs controlling—has become the poster child for the futility of such efforts. The futility, as predicted, is rippling out across the globe, where other governments are now frantically engaging in their own futile efforts to control multiple variables.

Now that debt expansion has become debt contraction, coming to intellectual grips with the future is straightforward. Regular readers of SLL should be intellectually prepared, hopefully they are prepared appropriately in other aspects of their lives as well. Debt contractions are inherently deflationary, especially in a global economy based on debt. Contraction and deflation are accompanied by depression, which will not be acknowledged for several years and from which innumerable “recoveries” will be hailed. Everything that governments and central banks do will make the situation worse, as they attempt to prevent or forestall the market (reality)-based consequences—repriced assets, reduced production and consumption, unemployment, insolvency, and bankruptcy—that will be the only road to recovery.

The next decade, and perhaps longer, will be incredibly stressful, even for the well-prepared. At this point, the best advice is relax: stay calm, focused, and rational. Remember, there will be some silver linings. Brutal and at times as indiscriminate as the crisis will be, there will be a measure of justice. Many fantasies, especially those of government as manna from heaven and central banks as guarantors of ever-rising markets, will be demolished. Rendezvous with reality are never bad things.

Sovereign debt and unfunded promises will be the locus of this crisis. Although governments will undoubtedly increase their repression and control as financial stress deepens, after multiple crashes they will be dead broke, unable to obtain credit at anything but ruinous interest rates. This means that they will be unable to do even a fraction of what they try to do now. Anarchy, chaos, civil disobedience, and revolution are far more likely than police state totalitarianism (which is quite expensive). You’ll have a better chance of being killed by criminals than police (although in many instances the two will be indistinguishable). However, from the disorder may emerge enclaves devoted to strictly limited government, the protection of individual rights and freedoms, and capitalism. Such enclaves will probably not correspond to existing political boundaries.

When markets make their final lows, there are going to be once-in-a-lifetime bargains in all sorts of financial and real assets. The daunting problem, of course, will be preserving liquidity in the interim, especially with rapacious governments on the prowl. Preparation will be a journey, not a destination; you’ll never be “done” and perfect solutions will be in short supply. However, just knowing what’s coming will put you ahead of most, and may very well be the difference between surviving for a better day or succumbing to the general panic and chaos.

A CLASSIC YOU’LL ACTUALLY ENJOY!

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If Price Insensitive Buyers Become Sellers, Will The Entire Market Collapse? by Tyler Durden

“Price insensitive buyer,” especially in the context of financial markets, looks anomalous. Such buyers would appear to be destined for ruin. However, the PIBs listed in this article are primarily government or government-regulated entities, which explains the irrationality. The wholly private entities listed in this article, corporations, risk parity funds, and some mutual funds, are subject to market discipline and it remains to be seen how many are in business after a full market cycle. The interesting question posed by this article: What happens when PIBs become PISs (price insensitive sellers)? From Tyler Durden, at zerohedge.com:

One narrative we’ve been building on for quite some time is the idea that both stocks and bonds have been propped up by a perpetual bid from price insensitive buyers. Put simply, it really doesn’t matter how overvalued something is if your primary concern is something other than maximizing your return on investment.

Take corporate buybacks for instance. Both equity-linked compensation and the market’s tendency to focus on quarterly results at the expense of the bigger picture have compelled corporate management teams to develop a dangerously myopic strategy that revolves around tapping corporate credit markets for cheap cash and plowing the proceeds into EPS-inflating buybacks. Whether or not this is the best use of cash is certainly debatable but when the goal is to manage earnings and appease stockholders, that doesn’t matter, and indeed, companies have an abysmal record when it comes to buying back shares at levels that later prove to be quite expensive.

In America, the price insensitive corporate management bid simply replaced the monthly flow the market lost when the Fed – the most price insensitive of all buyers – began to taper its asset purchases. Of course QE in all its various iterations playing out across the globe, is price insensitive buying taken to its logical extreme. With the ECB’s PSPP for instance, limits on the percentage of an individual issue that NCBs are allowed to own apply to nominal amounts meaning that, to the extent NCBs can buy bonds at a premium to par, they can effectively buy fewer bonds than they otherwise would have and still hit their purchase targets. In other words, if you overpay, it’s easier to stay under the issue cap when supply is scarce in eligible paper. So in some respects, the more EMU central banks pay for the bonds they purchase, the better.

In Japan, the BoJ has amassed an elephantine balance sheet full of ETFs and because one cannot classify stocks as “held to maturity”, Haruhiko Kuroda’s equity plunge protection is effectively a self-feeding loop – that is, the more stocks the central bank owns, the more it must buy in order to protect its balance sheet from the damage it would suffer were equities to sell off.

And then there are banks, mutual funds, and pension plans which for various reasons (regulatory and otherwise) are forced to accumulate assets at otherwise unattractive prices.

The question in all of this – and this may indeed become one of the most important considerations for market participants once every DM central bank bumps up against the Sweden problem – is this: what happens when the price insensitive buyers behind the inexorable rise in financial asset prices become price insensitive sellers?

To continue reading: If Price Insensitive Buyers Become Sellers

Slay the Creature From Jekyll Island! by Robert Gore

In business, what doesn’t work is changed. Every day companies announce they are reorganizing, divesting, and eliminating unprofitable or insufficiently profitable operations. People are fired, factories closed, towns abandoned—painful but necessary economic root canals. If a company doesn’t do so, investors mark down its securities, profitability declines, executive bonuses shrink, worker pay erodes, market share declines, and the company falls behind its competitors, until it’s bankrupt. That is the ceaseless, pitiless logic of markets and capitalism; it’s built into the system.

Governments do not operate in the same way, not a dazzling insight. They have their own internal incentives and logic, which defy logic. SLL has said that for government, nothing succeeds like failure. That’s not facetious; it’s true and there are reasons for it. In response to some sort of public demand, a government program is created. The day the legislation is signed marks the height of the public’s concern with whatever problem the program was meant to address. It also marks the beginning of the Washington scrum among affected individuals and businesses, their lobbyists, bureaucrats, and politicians. While the public moves on the next issue, the scrum know that outcomes will be dictated by the government and big bucks ride on influencing those outcomes. Before long new shoots of Washington’s indigenous flora and fauna sprout: lobbying, campaign contributions, bribes, revolving doors, cronyism, and regulatory and bureaucratic capture, in short, corruption that dares not speak its name.

It’s tempting to say that the question of failure or success of the programs original mission becomes irrelevant, but that’s seeing it through rose-colored glasses. Failure is preferred by all concerned. Failure can always be attributed to lack of adequate funding and inadequate powers for the government agency responsible for the program. This leads to bigger budgets, more power, and more of the attendant influence peddling and corruption. And that’s why government continuously gets bigger, more powerful, more failure-prone, and more corrupt. To outside observers, Washington is an out of control cancer. For those on the inside, the malignancy is a huge success, precisely because it is malignant: destroying healthy tissues, proliferating unchecked, but ensuring its own survival at the expense of its host.

The history of the Federal Reserve presents no anomalies; it has gone from failure to failure. Its loose money during the 1920s led to the stock market crash of 1929 and a recession that FDR turned into a Great Depression. Fed printing press financing of Johnson and Nixon’s guns and butter paved the way for inflation in the 1970s, the worst since the Civil War. Greenspan’s serial lowering of the monetary floodgates in response to the 1987 stock market crash, the savings and loan fiasco, the Asian market meltdown, Y2K (a crisis that never happened!), and the tech wreck gave rise to his infamous equity market “put.” The Fed sponsored a cheap-money housing bubble and bust; the bust met by Bernanke’s “put.” Bernanke and Yellen’s zero interest rate policy and massive debt monetization have not produced economic recovery, but have destroyed price discovery in financial markets, promoted the political propensity to run up debt, and underwritten trillions of dollars of malinvestment. Because the Fed’s program has served as a template for other central banks’, there are trillions of new yen, euro, and renminbi debt and malinvestment as well.

Not despite but because of these failures the Fed’s budgets, powers, and influence over the economy has grown since its 1913 inception. So too has the attendant corruption. The central bank has been captured by the banking industry and is emblematic of the what’s-a-back-scratching-among-friends culture of Washington. Beneficiaries of cheap money recycle some of their loot into six-figure speaking fees for the men responsible for that largess, dutifully sitting through Greenspan’s and Bernanke’s unmemorable speeches. The door between the Fed and Wall Street never stops revolving. A stint at the central bank is a worthwhile apprenticeship before a lucrative career in hedge funding or investment banking or an influential semi-retirement and cushy sinecure afterwards.

If the Fed were a business it would have been shuttered decades ago. As a de facto arm of the federal government it has thrived. If SLL were a conventional, mainstream financial website this article would conclude dutifully with a call for reform, joining hundreds of other long-forgotten articles on the Fed. Reform is a badge of honor for government entities. Every agency, bureau, and department worth it’s salt has been reformed; most more than once. Experienced bureaucrats roll with the punches: publicly accepting the need for reform; working with lawmakers on its specifics; implementing it; then distorting it beyond all recognition to further serve the needs of the bureaucracy and constituents. Like regulation for private businesses, reform is not embraced but is tolerated, an inevitable part of governance.

The only “reform” that would have a lasting effect on the Fed (or any other government entity or program) is abolition. Nobody has ever presented a coherent case why governments and their central banks must be involved with money, and there are plenty of reasons why they shouldn’t. Invariably debtors, usually their country’s largest, governments have a clear incentive to devalue their debt through monetary depreciation. They accrue issuers’ advantages of seigniorage, the difference between the cost of production and the value of their currencies. Central banks purchase their debt with money they conjure from thin air, providing a market and suppressing interest rates, thus facilitating governments’ indebtedness and expansion. The economic value governments realize from currency depreciation comes from their citizens, who hold their depreciating currencies. It’s another tax, much preferred by governments because it’s hidden.

What would private money look like? Undoubtedly any transition from government money to market-determined money would be complicated. Multiple forms of money would probably evolve in a private-money world. Specie-backed bank notes are almost certain, which might not be the end of fractional reserve banking but would certainly curtail it. Some of the newer cyber-monies might meet the market test. Money, whatever its forms, serves economically useful functions. Taking money away from central banks and governments and leaving it for market determination takes it away from the two institutions most responsible for impairing or destroying its economic value. Markets will determine the most efficient and trustworthy forms of money, some of which are unforeseeable at the present time (almost by definition, innovation is unforeseeable until it happens).

What can be foreseen is that private money, whatever its form, will embody some sort of identifiable value. Specie-backed money will be convertible into a precious metal, obviously tangible value. Cyber-money will promise anonymity, transactional ease, and an untouchable promise of a controlled quantity in existence. In a private money system, both those who originate the money and those who use it will have an interest in maintaining its value. Beyond that, we would have to see how people and markets use private money and how it evolves.

That statement shouldn’t doom it. All sorts of government programs are birthed with extravagant promises, when it can confidently be asserted beforehand that the program will fail, expand, grow in power, become increasingly corrupt, and never die. Markets and private, for-profit entities continuously change and improve…or die. Private money would be a process of trial and error. So is manufacturing, medicine, transportation, entertainment, communications, and every other private market activity. That’s how change and improvement happen.

However, there is no way that the transition to private money can happen in the present system. The government and its beneficiaries would lose power, prominence, the ability to manipulate economic variables—including asset markets’ prices—for political advantage, and hidden tax revenues. It is no coincidence that bloated welfare-warfare-regulatory states blossomed in conjunction with central banks.

Central banking’s greatest failures lie ahead of it. As the Fed’s powers have grown, the variables it is charged with controlling have grown as well. Inevitably it will run into the Command and Control Futility Principle: Governments and central banks can control one, but not all variables in a multi-variable system (see “Crisis Progress Report,”). When control is lost and the economy and financial markets crash into a deflationary depression, it is to be hoped, perhaps in vain, that the Fed will be unable to escape its rightful share of the blame. Consequently, there may be an intellectual shift, a willingness to question and reject the fundamental premises of central banking. The ultimate conclusion: for freedom and economic sanity to be restored, money must be privatized and the creature from Jekyll Island slain.

CHAPTER 28, FOOLS’ GOLD: WHY THE FED WAS A BAD IDEA

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A NOVEL OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

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Heads In a Basket, by Robert Gore

Spend enough time contemplating the lunacy that pervades society and you find that physical reality offers blessed relief. Release a ball and it drops because of the earth’s mass and consequently, its gravity. It works every time, not subject to anyone’s whim. Gravity, time, space, light, energy, and other phenomena can be defined and explained. As science progresses, definitions and explanations change as scientists search for the logic that most closely correspond to reality. Many of humanity’s affairs, on the other hand, defy logic and deny reality.

One innovation combines the unfortunate propensities to defy and deny with the mathematical certainty of Boyle’s law and the mechanical precision of a dropping guillotine blade: debt. In exchange for a promise of future repayment, borrowers acquire the wherewithal to invest or consume beyond their current means. Creditors forego present consumption and assume the risk of nonpayment. Defiance and denial arrive when debtors cannot repay their debts. Mathematical certainty stems from compound interest: unpaid debt increases exponentially. Mechanical precision arrives with default, the only question being who bears the loss. Will it be the debtor’s, creditor’s, or both heads in the basket?

Much of a century’s worth of financial “innovation” represents a desire to defy logic and deny reality. At the heart of banking lies an uncomfortable reality: depositors have a right to their money on demand (hence the term demand deposit), but the bank cannot satisfy that demand if all of its depositors want their money at the same time. The money is lent out or invested as bankers seek a return. Only a fraction of it is kept on reserve to satisfy withdrawals (hence the term fractional-reserve banking). Depositors are unsecured creditors of the bank, which they may not realize until they are unable to withdraw their money. The financial system is inherently interconnected; a run at one bank can quickly become systemic.

Bank runs were a vicissitude of 19th century American finance, the primary impetus behind the establishment of the Federal Reserve. The central bank would supply what was termed an “elastic” currency (fiat money created by the central bank) to its member banks in exchange for sound collateral, mostly short-term commercial paper, to prevent bank runs and generalized panics from seizing the financial system. It was the first step by the government to ameliorate the central risk of fractional-reserve banking. The second came during the Great Depression with the establishment of deposit insurance, which put the government on the hook for deposits—the banks’ unsecured debts to its depositors—up to a limit that has been periodically raised. The Too Big To Fail (TBTF) doctrine puts the government on the hook for all of the liabilities of a select group of banks, deemed so large that their failure poses a systemic risk to the global financial system.

Fractional-reserve banking guarantees the banking system a front row seat for any significant financial perturbation. It is leveraged, a repository for large pools of depositor money, and at the heart of the payments mechanism. Getting a handle on how much banks are leveraged is virtually impossible. The large ones are in the thick of the derivatives trade, especially interest rate derivatives. The notational value of such derivatives is in the hundreds of trillions of dollars, many times world GDP, but much of that exposure is supposedly netted out. However, when counterparties fail, as they did in 2008, net exposures become gross exposures. While governments claim to backstop banks, the fundamental instability posed by fractional-reserve banking has not gone away. Nobody knows how much risk there is within the system, especially what’s lurking in the  TBTF banks. The regulators are as clueless now as they were in 2008, but confident that their vastly augmented regulations will prevent disaster. (SLL will take the other side of that bet.)

Much has been made, at least in the blogosphere, of recent proposals to abolish cash. The civil liberties aspect of such proposals merit attention and discussion, but there has been little notice of a more disturbing aspect. If cash is outlawed, then everyone must keep their money in banks and use the banking system for payments (Martin Armstrong mentioned it in a recent post, “This Time It Is Different,” armstrongeconomics.com). That makes everybody an unsecured creditor of banks, whether they want to be or not. Cash may be outlawed not just as one more step to the Orwellian state or to facilitate the central banks’ dopey effort to drive interest rates deeper into negative territory, but to keep money from fleeing the banking system when logic can no longer be defied, nor realty denied, and banks and financial systems crash as debt crushes the global economy.

Banning cash will make the unsecured liabilities (customer deposits) of a banking system that was insolvent seven years ago—and will be so again—the medium of exchange. While coins and paper money are backed only by promises from politicians not to create too much of them, they will represent Rock of Gibraltar solidity compared to those unsecured deposits trapped within the banks. Look at banking system risks now and imagine the new risks bankers will take when they know money cannot leave the system. It is the ultimate involuntary bail-in, preceding rather than following bank insolvency.

When the economy collapses under the weight of debt, there will be no way for depositors herded into the banking system holding pen to avoid the guillotine. Governments that won’t allow there own coins and paper to be used as mediums of exchange will certainly not allow gold or silver to function as such. However, in the black market that will be the only functioning economy, gold and silver will be accepted—albeit not legal—tender. Which suggests that if you want to keep your head out of the basket, put away some of those time-tested mediums of exchange now. Keeping your stash hidden from the government will be child’s play compared to getting anything of value out of failed banks.

WHEN THE DOLLAR WAS GOOD AS GOLD

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AMAZON

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Why Bonds Are No Longer a “Safe Haven,” by Bill Bonner

Bond math is such that with interest rates as low as they are (in some instances negative) when they move up at all, the losses are quite painful. Keep in mind that the biggest losers are central banks, including the Fed, who own a lot of bonds. From Bill Bonner, of Bonner & Partners, via wolfstreet.com:

Bonds: A Crowded Trade

Bonds are extremely vulnerable right now. In the financial markets, for example, we have been waiting for a crash of U.S. stock prices. And waiting. And waiting. It still hasn’t come. Last week the spectacular bull market in U.S. stocks that began in March 2009 continued with even more gains. And the S&P 500 hit another all-time high.

But the real action was in the bond market. Over the last three weeks, about half a trillion dollars has been wiped off the value of global bonds… despite lower than normal trading volumes.

According to Citigroup strategist Mark Schofield, the sell-off is a “stark reminder of just how congested a lot of market positioning has become.” This makes it “increasingly difficult for investors to exit those positions when the time comes to do so.

As Bloomberg reports:

That means that it will be increasingly difficult for central banks to start backing away from their unprecedented stimulus efforts as growth takes hold – no matter how much they may want to – without causing a massive traffic jam of investors all trying to sell at once.

Uh… yes.

A Modern-Day John Law

Nobody knows whether the recent correction in bond prices (and the accompanying rise in yields) will continue or not.

It is almost too classic to believe. Serious economists – and anyone with any common sense – have realized for centuries that you can’t increase the quantity of debt without also decreasing its quality. The more you owe, the less likely you are to pay.

But central banks have been encouraging businesses, households, and governments all over the planet to take on more debt. They claim this will “stimulate” the economy… and that the resulting “growth” will make it easy to repay the debt.

Mario Draghi, the John Law of modern central banking, told us that the European Central Bank would persist in its delusions.

(Law was a Scottish economist and gambler. In 1716, he set up the world’s first central bank in France and was responsible for the Mississippi Company bubble – a precursor to other paper-money-induced bubbles.)

Draghi has made it clear he’s determined to implement the ECB’s €1.1 trillion ($1.2 trillion) QE plan “in full.”

As he put it in a recent speech in Washington, his policy moves “have proven so far to be potent, more so than many observers anticipated.” And although Draghi admitted that low interest rates would “inevitably result in some local misallocation of resources,” he rejected claims that they threaten “overall financial stability.”

http://wolfstreet.com/2015/05/18/why-bonds-are-no-longer-a-safe-haven/

To continue reading: Why Bonds Are No Longer a “Safe Haven”

The Central Problem with Central Banks: They Become the Greater Fools/Bag-Holders, by Charles Hugh Smith

In the current financial fantasyland, central banks are all seeing, all knowing seers who, even if they can’t get the economy going, can keep asset prices elevated. In real life, based on historical experience, central banks and the governments they are part of are usually the last to get the joke, and end up being the “greater fools/bag-holders” in the title. From Charles Hugh Smith at oftwominds.com:

Those who are confident the central banks can print unlimited money may find there are political and financial consequences to such extremes that cannot be foreseen.

The central problem with central banks is their mandate now includes propping up all asset markets globally. Back in the good old days before the Global Financial Meltdown of 2008-09, central bankers reckoned they could control the “animal spirits” released when the risk-on herd destabilized into a chaotic risk-off stampede.

As former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan noted in his 2014 Foreign Affairsarticle Why I Didn’t See the Crisis Coming, the models used by central banks and private economists alike presumed the demand for risk-on assets would remain robust even in a downturn:

Almost all market participants were aware of the growing risks, but they also knew that a bubble could keep expanding for years. Financial firms thus feared that should they retrench too soon, they would almost surely lose market share, perhaps irretrievably. In July 2007, the chair and CEO of Citigroup, Charles Prince, expressed that fear in a now-famous remark: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”

Financial firms accepted the risk that they would be unable to anticipate the onset of a crisis in time to retrench. However, they thought the risk was limited, believing that even if a crisis developed, the seemingly insatiable demand for exotic financial products would dissipate only slowly, allowing them to sell almost all their portfolios without loss.

They were mistaken. They failed to recognize that market liquidity is largely a function of the degree of investors’ risk aversion, the most dominant animal spirit that drives financial markets. Leading up to the onset of the crisis, the decreased risk aversion among investors had produced increasingly narrow credit yield spreads and heavy trading volumes, creating the appearance of liquidity and the illusion that firms could sell almost anything.

But when fear-induced market retrenchment set in, that liquidity disappeared overnight, as buyers pulled back. In fact, in many markets, at the height of the crisis of 2008, bids virtually disappeared.

Translated into plain English, what Greenspan and other conventional economists expected was a deep pool of greater fools would gladly lose money by buying assets that were plunging in value. Greenspan et al. reckoned the seemingly insatiable demand for exotic financial products implied that greater fools would continue to “buy the dips,” enabling Wall Street financiers to unload the near-worthless exotic financial products to those willing to absorb rapidly increasing losses.

http://charleshughsmith.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-central-problem-with-central-banks.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+google%2FRzFQ+%28oftwominds%29

To continue reading: The Central Problem with Central Banks