Tag Archives: commodities

Blood, Oil, Debt, and Government, by Robert Gore

Last December, in “Oil Ushers in the Depression,” SLL said that oil was on the leading edge of global economic and financial contraction.

The future is now. The carnage in the oil sector, where a glut has knocked over a third off its price in less than five months, is not an aberration, but a harbinger—the shape of things to come across sectors and around the world. It kicks off the depression, or more accurately, the resumption of the depression that started in either 2000 or 2007 (let the statisticians quibble about that determination).

That forecast may have seemed extreme at the time. The global economy was still growing, albeit slowly. Mainstream economists were predicting that 2015 would be the year it reached liftoff velocity, thanks to central banks’ quantitative easing and interest rate suppression. Those predictions betrayed appalling ignorance of the central force in the global economy—debt—and its dynamics during expansions and contractions, what SLL has termed “debtonomics.” (See the Debtonomics Archive for more.)

Now, after a rout in commodities, dwindling or negative growth worldwide, and widespread financial turmoil, including a rough third quarter for most equity markets and steadily widening credit spreads, the forecast looks less extreme. Even mainstream economists, in their ever cautious, toe-in-the-water way, are acknowledging that there might, just might, be a possibility (usually expressed in terms of a percentage in the neighborhood of 10 to 25 percent) that the economy heads into a recession. When the depression resumes, they’ll go back and cite that kind of well-hedged piffle as proof positive that they knew it all along.

Cutting through the weaselly verbiage, the global economy is at a precipice the likes of which it has never been at before, and it’s look-out-below time. Oil continues to offer the perfect economic, financial, and geopolitical analytical template, at the nexus of debt, blood, and governments’ incompetence and corruption.

One of the more vacuous concepts out there is what’s called “the resource curse.” The idea is that countries with abundant natural resources coast on those resources and economic development in other areas is stunted. One can certainly find examples; Venezuela may be the poster child. However, the world’s most advanced and technologically developed economy resides in a country that has been “cursed” with abundant natural resources—the United States—an example not usually cited in the “resource curse” literature.

Venezuela is the poster child for the real curse: statism. Once upon a time, the US had its opposite: “the freedom blessing.” The contretemps in the oil patch are a clash of statist titans: Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the Federal Reserve. The Fed and other central banks have monetized financial assets, mostly government debt, and suppressed interest rates. Cheap debt funded America’s oil patch fracking “revolution” as yield-starved investors ignored negative cash flows at many companies, and the risks that the price of oil could go down as the new US production added to supply.

Both Saudi Arabia and Russia find themselves on the wrong end of the debt and commodity bust. Saudi Arabia’s economy is almost entirely dependent on oil. Russia’s is more diversified, but unfortunately for it that diversification is mostly other commodities subject to the same debt dynamics as oil. Massive government and central bank debt formation globally have produced decades-long distortions that have left the world awash in mines, raw materials, factories, transportation facilities, structures, stores, and everything else that can be funded by debt. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Russia have ever known the freedom blessing, the font of economic progress that would have led to healthy diversification. Now they have little choice but to keep pumping oil; it’s their major source of revenue.

Doing so, they illustrate an important aspect of debt deflation: just as governments and central banks artificially inflated the bubble on the way up, they are going to make the bust far more prolonged and painful on the way down. In the US, frackers have run into low oil prices and the limits of low-cost money and have responded accordingly. They are keeping their most efficient rigs running, idling the rest, and reducing production and expenses. Debt has been restructured and companies have gone bankrupt. Prices of oil production assets have dropped to what, a year ago, would have been regarded as fire sale levels. This is how capitalism cleans up its errors. Governments make bad situations worse.

Fiat debt at below market rates creates superfluity. What the world economy desperately needs is more of what’s going on in the US oil patch: creative destruction and Darwinian winnowing. Unfortunately, policy makers and central banks, having blown their gargantuan debt bubble, are going to try to keep it inflated, and, once it busts, they’ll prolong the bust in counterproductive attempts to staunch the pain. These efforts will only delay or prevent necessary adjustments. China’s and Europe’s central banks served notice last week: more cheap fiat debt. Saudi Arabia and Russia, hemmed in by the realities of state-directed, resource-based economies and welfare-state spending, and further encumbered by Middle Eastern military commitments, are pumping oil at glut-perpetuating full tilt.

Iraq, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, and Kuwait are all significant oil producers in which the state’s hand weighs heavily on the industry. Along with Saudi Arabia and Russia, they may well continue to produce beyond the point of economic rationality, perhaps covering cash costs but not recovering capital expenditures for exploration and development. Or, if the local oil company or companies are state-owned or heavily state-influenced and are large employers, and especially if the work force is unionized and a major bloc of votes, production may continue although it does not cover cash costs, as politically expedient make-work. There will be occasional bounces, like this summer’s, but such noneconomic considerations will keep the price of oil low for a much longer time than most experts currently foresee (see “The Shape of Things to Come,” SLL, 8/28/15).

The old saw in commodities markets is that the best cure for low prices is low prices, but that assumes economic rationality among market participants. As debt deflation deepens, prices stay low, and markets stay glutted, expect governments dependent on their countries’ natural resources for jobs and revenues to disregard those economic factors. In so doing, they will increase their economic distress and forestall adjustment, prolonging the agony. Boxed in, governments may seek to divert attention from their economic mismanagement and rally their populaces by making war, which will only increase their fiscal stress. So look for continued pain in natural resources, and perhaps an upside breakout for warfare, which would be one of the few upside breakouts. It wouldn’t be unprecedented. World War II followed the Great Depression.

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Iron Ore Is Buckling Again as Supply Jumps, China Demand Sags, by Jasmine Ng

Stock markets don’t want to notice articles like this. Ignorance is bliss, we suppose. Notice that although prices are dropping, the big 3 iron ore producers are increasing production. That’s ominous, and its going on with other natural resources, notably oil. From Jasmine Ng at bloomberg.com:

BHP, Rio and Vale all post increases in quarterly production

Demand from China `remains tepid,’ MineLife’s Wendt says

Iron ore is showing signs of buckling again. Prices slumped to the lowest level in three months as the top producers announced increases in low-cost supply while data and comments from China pointed to further weakness in demand.

“All of this extra production out of ‘the big three’ will keep a lid on prices,” said Gavin Wendt, founding director and senior resource analyst at MineLife Pty Ltd. in Sydney. “China demand remains tepid and its steel industry is hurting under margin pressures.”

Iron ore is headed for a third year of losses, and the recent decline risks tugging prices below the trading range of $50 to $60 a metric ton that’s held since July, according to Westpac Banking Corp. Rio Tinto Group, BHP Billiton Ltd. and Vale SA, the three largest suppliers, all announced increases in quarterly output this month. China’s central bank on Friday cut benchmark rates and banks’ reserve requirements to boost a faltering economy after data this week showed crude-steel output contracted. The chairman of the second-largest producer flagged the potential for the country’s production to eventually slump 20 percent.

Weak Steel

“The downtrend in seaborne iron ore prices is accelerating,” according to a report from Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. on Friday. “Chinese steel mills are tightening their spending on the back of weak steel prices.”

Ore with 62 percent content delivered to Qingdao slid 1.1 percent to $51.62 a dry ton on Friday, dropping for a fifth day to the lowest since July 24, according to Metal Bulletin Ltd. Prices are 4 percent lower this week, having dropped for five of the past six weeks. The raw material bottomed at $44.59 on July 8, a record in daily price data dating back to May 2009.

BHP, the world’s biggest miner, said on Wednesday iron ore output jumped 7 percent to 61.3 million tons in the three months to Sept. 30, two days after Brazil’s Vale said it produced a record 88.2 million tons in the period. In mid-October, Rio reported third-quarter output rose 12 percent.

Vale reported a 15 percent drop in adjusted quarterly earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization on Thursday as slumping prices overshadowed efforts to focus on higher-quality deposits and cut costs. Prices for iron ore fell in line with lower global steel output, with China’s steel usage subdued by real-estate weakness, Vale said.

To continue reading: Iron Ore Is Buckling Again as Supply Jumps

China’s Glencore: State-Owner Miner And Steel Trader Avoids Default With Last Minute Bailout, by Tyler Durden

Debt, debt, and more debt; here, there, and everywhere. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

While the macro watchers were keenly awaiting China’s macroeconomic data dump on Sunday night, which was far worse than reported (as we will show shortly), a just as notable development was taking place in China’s microeconomic world, where as the FT reported on Sunday, China’s state-owned SinoSteel, the country’s second largest importer of iron-ore, and a major miner and steel trader (yes, another commodity trader) was “poised to default on its bonds this week, the latest test of whether Beijing is willing to impose market discipline on national champion companies.”

As the FT adds, “Sinosteel, one of an elite club of 112 state groups directly owned by the central government, sent a letter to investors last week warning that its subsidiary lacked the funds to repay principal and interest on Rmb2bn ($315m) in bonds sold in 2010 due on Tuesday.”

“The company’s business has stagnated and cash flow has dried up at headquarters and a portion of subsidiary enterprises,” said the letter, a copy of which circulated on social media on Friday.

Transparency is not Chinese insolvent corporations’ strong suit: “Sinosteel was not available for comment. A person who answered the phone at Sinosteel refused to transfer calls to the company’s media relations department.”

None of this is a surprise: we reported nearly a month ago that more than half of China’s commodity producers are technically insolvent at current commodity prices (a finding which CLSA later used to back into a whopping 8% NPL for the Chinese banking sector), and don’t generate the cash flow to pay even the interest on their debt, let alone fund maturities!

And yet, Sinosteel’s troubles, which mirror those of peer companies Glencore and Noble Group, did surprise some despite clear warnings by other: “The company has lost debt repayment ability. It can only rely on external support,” Jiang Chao, Haitong Securities bond analyst, wrote last week.

However, while China’s leadership has huffed and puffed about freeing its markets and imposing the “business cycle”, even if it means a surge in default, it remains reluctant to “tolerate public defaults due to fears about financial instability. Sinosteel investors are hoping that the government or another state entity will step in with a last-minute bailout. Last month state-owned heavy machinery producer China National Erzhong Group narrowly averted default when its parent company said it would buy outstanding bonds from investors.”

To continue reading: China’s Glencore

The Biggest Threat To Glencore’s Survival: The Unwind Of China’s Copper “Carry Trade”, by Tyler Durden

This is one of those obscure stories that may become a very big mainstream story, just like collateralized loan obligations, collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps became big stories during the last financial crisis. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com, with a story that should be read in full, including the highlighted link. This is a time bomb.

Since we first exposed the topic of China’s Commodity-Financing Deals (CCFDs) in May 2013, deals which some have since called China’s commodity “carry trades”, and warning of the looming “bronze swan” once said deals are unwound, copper (among most collateralized commodities) has been slumping.

The double-whammy of central-bank-inspired overcapacity, with a crackdown on the CCFD shadow credit markets has now flowed into the miners/producers – no more so than Glencore and Trafigura (as we have detailed).

A subsequent analysis by Goldman attempted to quantify just how big CFD “carry trade” is as follows:

Fast forward to the recent shocking developments involving Glencore, which recently crashed to a record low price as the market finally realized what we had been saying all along: Glencore is a levered bet on not only China’s economy, but the fate of copper pricing.

And while talking heads proclaim the worst is over, Bloomberg looks back at the carry trade first discussed here, and finds that as much as 70% of finished copper backs the “carry trade” whose upcoming unwind will lead to even more price pain.

As we introduced in 2013, the critical issue of how China uses commodities as financial assets was, and remains, largely ignored and vastly misunderstood: i.e., the fact that copper’s ubiquitous arbitrage and rehypothecation role in China’s economy through the use of Chinese Copper Financing Deals (CCFD) is coming to an end.

Copper, as China pundits may know, is the key shadow interest rate arbitrage tool, through the use of financing deals that use commodities with high value-to-density ratios such as gold, copper, nickel, which in turn are used as collateral against which USD-denominated China-domestic Letters of Credit are pleged, in what can often result in a seemingly infinite rehypothecation loop (see explanation below) between related onshore and offshore entities, allowing loop participants to pick up virtually risk-free arbitrage (i.e., profits), which however boosts China’s FX lending and leads to upward pressure on the CNY.

Since the end result of this arbitrage hits China’s current account directly, and is the reason for the recent aberrations in Chinese export data that have made a mockery of China’s economic data reporting, China’s State Administration on Foreign Exchange (SAFE) on May 5 finally passed new regulations which will effectively end such financing deals.

The impact of this development can not be overstated: according to independent observers, as well as firms like Goldman, this will not only impact the copper market (very adversely) as copper will suddenly go from a positive return/carry asset to a negative carry asset leading to wholesale dumping from bonded warehouses, but will likely take out a substantial chunk of synthetic shadow leverage out of the Chinese market and economy.

Naturally, for an economy in which credit creation is of utmost importance, the loss of one such key financing channel will have very unintended consequences at best, and could potentially lead to a significant “credit event” in the world’s fastest growing large economy at worst.

To continue reading: The Unwind Of China’s Copper “Carry Trade”

Commodity contagion sparks second credit crisis as investors panic, John Ficenec

From John Ficenec at telegraph.co.uk:

The collapse in commodity prices has sparked a second credit crisis as investors dump high-yield bonds, shattering the fragile confidence necessary to support global markets. Those calling it a Lehman moment forget their history. Current events have chilling similarities to the Bear Stearns collapse and mark the start of a new crisis, not the end.

Canary in the mine

The world of commodity trading has been thrown into chaos as the cost of borrowing to fund operations soars. Glencore has become the poster child for the sector’s woes as its shares have more than halved in value during the past six months. More worrying has been the impact on the group’s credit profile.


Glencore’s US bonds due for repayment in 2022 have collapsed to around 82 cents in the dollar. Only four months earlier, they had been stable at around 100 cents, implying that those who lent money would get it back plus interest. Now for every dollar lent to Glencore, banks face losses, and as the price of bonds falls the yield has risen to 7.4pc.

Without the oxygen of cheap debt, commodity trading houses are finished. Each trade in oil or iron ore might generate only 1pc to 2pc in margin – but this greatly increases when magnified by debt. The only limit on profits is then how much you can borrow. Greed drives returns.

Glencore is a profitable business when it can borrow at around 4pc, but if it has to refinance at 7pc to 10pc those slim profit margins evaporate.

The fear of those holding Glencore debt can be seen in the soaring price for the insurance against a default, or credit default swaps (CDS). Glencore five-year CDS has soared to 625, from about 280 just a month ago.

A rule of thumb is that a CDS above 400 means a serious risk of a default, or about a 25pc chance in the next five years.

To continue reading: Commodity contagion sparks second credit crisis

Commodity Trading Giants Unleash Liquidity Scramble, Issue Record Amounts Of Secured Debt, by Tyler Durden

One lesson the world will have to relearn from the last financial crisis: liquidity is money or some other easily monetizable and unencumbered asset. Revolving lines of credit, letters of credit, and other bank committments become debt when drawn upon. They have an unfortunate tendency to dry up when the debtor most needs them. Even when they are available to be drawn upon, they have to be paid back. When a company starts talking about all its bank commitments and its confidence in its own liquidity, it’s usually a sign of trouble dead ahead. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

Earlier today, in its latest attempt to restore confidence in its brand and business model after suffering a historic stock price collapse, Glencore – whose CDS recently blew out to a level implying a 50% probability of default – released a 4 page funding worksheet which was meant to serve as a simplied summary of its balance sheet funding obligations and lending arrangements to equity research analysts who have never opened a bond indenture, and which among other things provided a simplied and watered-down estimate of what could happen if and when the company is downgraded to junk.

Meanwhile, in a furious race to shore up as much liquidity as possible, Glencore – which a month ago announced a dramatic deleveraging plan – and its peers have been quietly scrambling to raise billions in secured funding. Case in point none other than Glencore’s biggest competitor and the largest independent oil trader in the world, Swiss-based, Dutch-owned Vitol Group, whose Swiss unit Vitol SA earlier today raised a record $8 billion in loans.

It is not alone.

As Bloomberg reports, another name profiled previously here, privately-held (but with publicly-traded debt) Trafigura “won improved terms on a $2.2 billion loan refinancing deal on Oct. 1 via a group of 28 banks. Swiss commodity traders Gunvor Group Ltd. and Mercuria Energy Group Ltd. are also marketing credit facilities totaling $2 billion.”

Louis Dreyfus Commodities, the world’s largest raw-cotton and rice trader, said in its interim report last month that it had six revolving credit facilities with staggered maturity dates totaling $3.3 billion. In June, it amended and extended its North American facilities totaling $1.6 billion and in July it refinanced a $400 million Asian lending facility with the company securing an option to request an increase of $100 million.

Noble Agri, the agricultural commodity trader majority owned by China’s Cofco Corp., attracted four new lenders to its $1.58 billion one-year revolving credit facility, people familiar with the matter said this month.

In short – a race against time to pledge as much unencumbered collateral as possible for future funding needs, because as every CEO knows you raise capital when you can, not when you have to. Yet this is odd, because even as the companies hold investor meetings and publicly comfort investors that they are adequatly funded and see no need for a liquidity-raising scramble, that’s precisely what the world’s commodity traders are doing.

Glencore Implodes: Stock Plunges Most Ever, CDS Blow Out To Record Up On Equity Wipeout Fears, by Tyler Durden

Who will be the first to propose a bailout for Glencore? From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

Update: And there it is: GLENCORE DEBT INSURANCE COSTS SURGE TO RECORD HIGH; 5-YR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS RISE 207BASIS POINTS FROM FRIDAY’S CLOSE TO 757 BASIS POINTS

Just last Thursday we asked whether Goldman was “preparing to sacrifice the next Lehman”, by which of course we meant the world’s largest commodity trading counterparty, Baar, Switzerland-based Glencore which just two weeks ago unveiled an unprecedented “doomsday” capital raising and deleveraging plan which, in retrospect, was not enough.

The punchline of Goldman’s report was that if commodity prices drop 5%, or even stay where they are, then Glencore’s investment grade rating – the most critical foundation of its entire trading operation where a downgrade to junk would launch a collateral and margin-call waterfall cascade a la AIG – would be lost. From Goldman:

Glencore’s trading business relies heavily on short-term credit to finance commodity deals and its financing costs would increase if it were to lose its Investment Grade credit rating. In addition, it could even lose some counterparties due to increased counterparty risk.

As we added on Thursday, “what a junking of Glencore would do, is start a collateral demand waterfall cascade that the cash-strapped company simply would not be able to sustain.” So having laid out the strawman, Goldman next, very conveniently, explains just what would take for the Investment Grade trap to slam shut: “it would only take a c.5% fall in spot commodities prices for concerns about its credit rating to resurface.”

Of course, Glencore’s leverage to commodity prices was first explained in our March 2014 post, in which we said buying Glencore CDS is the best and easiest way to bet on a Chinese credit and commodity crunch.

To continue reading: Glencore Implodes

The Shape of Things to Come, by Robert Gore

Historical Natural Gas Prices - Natural Gas Price History Chart

Historical Natural Gas Prices - Natural Gas Price History Chart
Take a look at this natural gas price chart. Natural gas made its all-time high in 2008 at just above $13 per million British Thermal Units (BTUs). With the advent of natural gas fracking, money had poured in as the price rose, leading to an excess of supply. By September 2009, exacerbated by the financial crisis, the price had collapsed to below $3 per million BTUs. Since then, it has had two bounces to $6, but its nearby future closed Friday at $2.72 on the Nymex, and spot natural gas can be had for less than $1 at the most productive US natural gas field, the Marcellus Shale. At those prices nobody is making money in natural gas. Producer Quicksilver Resources filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March, and much larger Samson Resources has scheduled a bankruptcy filing for September 15.

 

This is not an analysis of the natural gas market, but rather an explanation of why it’s price graph will be the shape of things to come, not just for natural resources, but for manufacturing and equities. At first, natural gas’s price rose even as a flood of capital was expanding production, precursor to what occurred in oil and other natural resources several years later. In a free market, speculative capital would have been attracted to the possibilities opened up by natural gas fracking. In a world in which central banks have for decades supplied more debt at cheaper interest rates than what would have prevailed in a free market, that flow of capital was amplified. Consequently, so too was the number of natural gas rigs put in operation, the amount of natural gas produced, and the subsequent crash in price. The same can be said for the progressions that came later in oil, iron ore, aluminum, coal, copper, and other extractive industries.

Abnormally cheap, abundant debt does not just distort supply, it distorts demand. The number one distortion is China. It has been on a multi-decade debt binge that has fueled capital spending, manufacturing, production, and an infrastructure build-out. China sucked in raw materials from all over the world, notably Latin America and Australia.

In the US and Europe, government and private debt primarily funded consumption, financial debt went into speculation, and corporations borrowed money to fund share buy backs and dividends. China and oil exporting nations engaged in vendor financing, recycling their trade surpluses into the debt of nations buying their exports. It was a virtuous circle of sorts: production of all manner of natural resources and manufactured goods, amped up by cheap debt, found end markets in countries where consumption had been amped up by cheap debt.

Total world debt increased far faster than the underlying growth rate of the global economy, which meant that assets and income streams became increasingly encumbered by debt claims. It also meant that despite low interest rates, the burden of debt service increased, exerting an ever-heavier drag on the real economy. A broad-based transition from debt expansion to debt contraction first manifested itself in commodities in 2014. The graphs for many natural resources took on the grim aspect of the above natural gas chart after 2008; their prices crashed.

Just as with natural gas, crashing prices impaired and in some cases impaled the ability of indebted producers to service their debts. Credit spreads in the natural resource sector have blown out. Several coal producers and oil fracking companies have gone bankrupt and more will follow. Contraction and financial stress are moving up the production chain. There are already gluts in steel and autos, and the bulk of growth registered in US GDP in the first and second quarters has been due to inventories building. Production cutbacks and layoffs are coming, followed by reductions in consumption by the newly unemployed and further cutbacks and layoffs.

Take another look at the natural gas chart. It’s been over seven years since the price topped out, and it is still only about 20 percent of what it was then. In the bad old days of something closer to dog-eat-dog free market capitalism, downturns were vicious, but they were comparatively short. Gluts in raw materials and crops, intermediate and finished goods, and employment were fixed by falling prices and wages, liquidation and bankruptcy, and newly cheap assets moving from the weak and indebted to the strong and solvent. The depression of 1920-1921 is the most recent example. It was brutal, but it was also over in less than two years (see The Forgotten Depression: 1921: The Crash That Cured Itself, James Grant, Simon and Schuster, 2014) as the government and the Federal Reserve sat on their hands. (The Fed actually raised rates!)

In today’s no-pain-allowed environment, it took seven years before two natural gas producers even went bankrupt. The chart illustrates the harm from the Fed’s ultra-low interest rates, now in their 80th month. They have been perpetual life support for terminally-ill companies for whom the machines should have been turned off long ago.

If you’re looking for when natural gas and other commodities might “recover” and regain their former highs, consider the Japanese stock market. Way back on December 29,1989, the Nikkei 225 made its all-time intra-day high at 38,957.44 and dropped for almost 20 years, 81.9 percent to 7054.98 on March 10, 2009. After rallying strongly the last two years, the Nikkei closed Friday at 19,136.32, which means that it still has to rally over 100 percent to regain its 26-year-old high. Nobody has gone in for government indebtedness, central bank monetization of assets (the Bank of Japan now buys equity ETFs as well as most of the government’s debt), and keeping zombie companies alive as long and with as much fervor as the Japanese, but nobody would argue that these nostrums have done anything but prolong the pain.

With governments’ and central banks’ “help,” the prices of natural gas, other natural resources, goods, and labor may remain depressed for years to come. As the greatest debt bubble in history unwinds, attempts will continue to forestall or prevent markets from making their painful, but necessary adjustments, However, gravity can only be fought for so long. With contraction and falling prices becoming the order of the day in the real economy, it takes a triumph of hope over experience to think financial assets will be immune. Bid farewell to the S&P’s all-time intraday high of 2134.72 on May 20, 2015. It may be a long, long time before the index sees that level again.

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He Said That? 8/9/15

From Stephen Schork, of The Schork Report, an energy industry newsletter, in an interview with Bloomberg’s Pimm Fox:

And this is the big concern because we keep on thinking that lower energy prices are somehow good for the economy. That can’t be, because energy prices or commodity prices in general don’t drive economic growth. Economic growth drives commodity prices.

So we have the rout in oil prices. We have the rout in copper prices, in aluminum prices. If we look at the industrial metals complex, that’s now trading at lows not seen since the recession. We’re looking at bellwethers such as Caterpillar, a bellwether of industrial production. That stock is trading again at a post-great recession low.

So there are a lot of telltales out there that this drop in oil prices, this drop industrial metal prices, this is not good. It’s a canary in the coal mine that something is not right in the global economy, Pimm. And that is a concern for us all.

“Why Commodities Defaults Could Spread”, UBS Explains, by Tyler Durden

Anybody who was around for the last financial crisis knows how this one will go: defaults spreading out to “unrelated” areas as debt unravels, a process misnamed “contagion.” UBS has gotten the message. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

UBS has been keen to warn investors about just how perilous the situation in high yield has become – which works out nicely, because we’ve been saying precisely the same thing ever since it became readily apparent that between investors’ hunt for yield and energy producers’ desire to take advantage of low rates and forgiving capital markets in order to stay solvent, the market was setting up for a spectacular implosion.

Lots of supply (hooray for record issuance!), a gullible retail crowd (bring on the secondaries and find me a junk bond ETF!), and a lack of liquidity in the secondary market (down with the prop traders!) have conspired to create a veritable nightmare scenario and with commodity prices (especially crude) set to remain in the doldrums for the foreseeable future, the question is not whether there will be defaults in HY energy, but rather what the fallout will be for the broader market.

Or, as we put it in “The Junk Bond Heat Map Has Not Been This Red In A Long Time,” at some point, investors (using other people’s money) will tire of throwing good money after bad hoping to time the bottom tick in oil just right (and if oil tumbles in the $30, that may be just that moment) at which point the commodity capitulation which we noted previously, will spread away from just commodities and junk bonds, and spread to all sectors and products, including stocks.

Here with more on the contagion risk from commodities defaults is UBS.

* * *

From UBS

Credit contagion: why commodity defaults could spread

In the wake of the commodity price swoon one of the recurring questions is will the stress in commodity markets spillover to other sectors?

First, regular readers will recall our HY energy default forecast of 10-15% through mid- 2016. Simply framed, the commodity related industries total 22.8% of the overall HY market index on a par-weighted basis. In our view, sectors most at-risk for defaults (defined as failure to pay, bankruptcy and distressed restructurings) total 18.2% of the index and include the oil/gas producer (10.6%), metals/mining (4.7%), and oil service/equipment (2.9%) industries.

How large are contagion risks to the broader HY market? And what are the transmission channels? Historically, investors in the limited contagion camp would probably point to the early 1980s. In this cycle commodity price defaults spiked with the drop in oil prices yet average default rates (IG & HY) increased only moderately amidst a favorable economic environment. In our view, however, the parallels in terms of the credit and asset price cycles are a stretch versus the current context. In the last three cycles, commodity price defaults have either led or coincided with a broader rise in corporate default rates.

But why should there be contagion from commodity sectors to other segments?

There is a clear pattern of default correlation dependent on fluctuations in national or international economic trends. Commodity price weakness is symptomatic of weak economic growth in China and emerging markets – with possible spillover risks for commodity related sovereigns (oil exporters) and corporates.

In addition, distress in one sector affects the perceived creditworthiness as well as profits and investment of related firms in the production process. For example, exploration and production firm defaults could negatively affect suppliers and customers which would include oil equipment and service, metals, pipeline, infrastructure, and engineering firms. Furthermore, related literature points to the significance of the supply/demand balance for distressed debt; our theory is that there is a relatively finite pool of capital for distressed assets, implying greater supply of distressed paper pushes down valuations of like assets. Unfortunately, a rise in the supply of stressed bonds typically coincides with a decline in demand for such assets. This self-reinforcing dynamic historically leads to a re-pricing in lower quality segments.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-30/why-commodities-defaults-could-spread-ubs-explains