Tag Archives: Target 2 balances

Eurozone finances have deteriorated , by Alasdair Macleod

The Eurozone is on the verge of a financial crisis. From Alasdair Macleod at goldmoney.com:

Despite negative interest rates and money printing by the European Central Bank, which conveniently allowed all Eurozone member governments to fund themselves, having gone nowhere Eurozone nominal GDP is even lower than it was before the Lehman crisis.

Then there is the question of bad debts, which have been mostly shovelled into the TARGET2 settlement system: otherwise, we would have seen some substantial bank failures by now.

The Eurozone’s largest banks are over-leveraged, and their share prices question their survival. Furthermore, these banks will have to contract their balance sheets to comply with the new Basel 4 regulations covering risk weighted assets, due to be introduced in January 2023.

And lastly, we should consider the political and economic consequences of a collapse of the Eurosystem. It is likely to be triggered by US dollar interest rates rising, causing a global bear market in financial assets. The financial position of highly indebted Eurozone members will become rapidly untenable and the very existence of the euro, the glue that holds it all together, will be threatened.

Introduction

Understandably perhaps, mainstream international economic comment has focused on prospects for the American economy, and those looking for guidance on European economic affairs have had to dig deeper. But since the Lehman crisis, the EU has stagnated relative to the US as the chart of annual GDP in Figure 1 shows.

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Who Benefitted from the Euro and Who Pays the Piper Now? by Mike “Mish” Shedlock

The European monetary system has essentially been in exercise in vendor financing, with the productive countries lending money to the less productive countries to buy their goods. What happens when the borrowers can’t pay? We’ll soon find out. From Mike “Mish” Shedlock at mishtalk.com:

Let’s take a look at the latest currency imbalances in the EU with a series of questions and answers. This discussion started from reader comments.
Euroscepticism Grows In Germany 

A noteworthy reader-led discussion just took place in response to my previous article Euroscepticism Grows In Germany as 63% Say the EU is Excessively Bureaucratic

One of my readers, PecuniaNonOlet, commented “I thought Germany was the biggest beneficiary of the EU.”

That is (or was) an accurate assessment. The response from TexasTime65 was perfect.

“They were the biggest beneficiaries. But now they are potentially the biggest losers because all the other countries owe them a lot of money and have no real way to pay any of it back unless Germany becomes a net importer of goods and services (which is politically a no-go in Germany),” replied TT.

Trade Statements by German Finance Minister “Utter Lunacy”

I have commented on trade aspects many times before.

For example please consider my September 13, 2016 article Michael Pettis Calls Surplus Trade Statements by German Finance Minister “Utter Lunacy”

At that time the six largest deficit countries owe a collective 797.3 billion euros to the four creditor countries, primarily Germany.

Target 2 Imbalances

It’s been a while since I reported on Target2 (what countries owe each other).

Spain, Italy, Greece, and the ECB now owe Germany (alone) over a trillion euros!

Tiny Luxembourg is a creditor to the tune of 267 billion euros.

The creditor total is over 1.5 trillion euros!

How can that be paid back?

It can’t. Target2 is one of the fundamental flaws of the Eurozone.

The ECB denies this and so does the pro-EU clan in general, but Target2 imbalances are a measure of capital flight.

Those imbalances can only be paid back in one of these ways: Default, forgiveness, monetary printing and handouts against Maastricht Treaty rules, or a very prolonged period in which Germany becomes a net importer of goods and services from Spain, Italy, and Greece.

Place your bets, but I rule out the last choice.

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The Eurozone’s financial disintegration, by Alastair Macleod

Northern European central banks have been monetizing southern European debts, and the balances are adding up. from Alastair Macleod at goldmoney.com:

xau pic

Introduction

The Euro Crisis Monitor (above) shows the increasing imbalances in the TARGET2 settlement system between all its members: the ECB (itself with a €145bn deficit) and the national central banks in the Eurozone. Other than minor differences reflecting net cross-border trade not matched by investment flows going the other way, these imbalances should not exist. But following the Lehman crisis and as the Eurozone developed its own series of crises, imbalances arose. Commentators have grown used to them, so have more or less given up pointing them out. But in the last few months, the apparent flight into the Bundesbank (€995,083m surplus) has gathered pace, as have the deficits for Italy (€536,722m) and Spain (€451,798m). It is time to take these rising imbalances seriously again.

Target2 — the ECB’s flexible friend

Target2 is the settlement system for transfers between the national central banks. The way it works, in theory, is as follows. A German manufacturer sells goods to an Italian business. The Italian business pays by bank transfer drawn on its Italian bank via the Italian central bank through the Target2 system, crediting the German manufacturer’s German bank through Germany’s central bank.

But since the Lehman crisis, and more noticeably the last eurozone crisis, capital flows appear to have gravitated from Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (the PIGS — remember them?) to principally Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland in that order. Before 2008, the balance was maintained by trade deficits in Greece, for example, being offset by capital inflows as residents elsewhere in the eurozone bought Greek bonds, other investments in Greece and the tourist trade collected net cash revenues.

In this sense, it would be wrong to suggest that trade imbalances have led to Target2 imbalances. But part of the problem must be put down to the failure of private sector investment flows to recycle.

Then there is the question of “capital flight”, which is not capital flight as such.

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