Tag Archives: Chinese property market

Where is China Going? By Bill Blain

Is China killing its own golden goose? The country is becoming increasingly opaque, so it’s hard to tell. From Bill Blain at morningporridge.com:

Evergrande will default, but the Chinese economy will probably avoid a property contagion crisis as the government becomes increasingly interventionist. Longer term, how will China evolve to cope with Covid, Growth and Demographics

“When the winds of change blow, some build walls while others build windmills..”

This morning – Evergrande will default, but the Chinese economy will probably avoid a property contagion crisis as the government becomes increasingly interventionist. Longer term, how will China evolve to cope with Covid, Growth and Demographics?

I’m going to go off on something of a tangent on China this morning.. It can hardly come as much of a surprise to markets that S&P says Evergrande’s default is “inevitable”. (One of my highly coveted No Sh*t Sherlock awards is on its way to the US debt rating firm for stating the downright bleeding obvious).

Evergrande’s quietus will be a step towards China’s managed deflation of its property bubble, and it’s got massive implications for current and future investors in the economy. Let me stress I don’t believe China’s economy is about to vanish in a cloud of evaporating property dreams, or that a social revolution is around the corner on deflating consumer expectations. But, change will occur.

I expect China will successfully avoid Evergrande contagion destabilising the economy, and manage a soft-landing, but there is fundamental shift underway – a slowing economy, lethargic growth, and a shift away from capitalism towards a more interventionist state-controlled economy is underway.

Growth expectations are now around 5% – far below numbers we assumed were deemed necessary by the party just a few years ago. Even that number could be under pressure as the scale of the property effect on the economy comes into play, while China’s isolationist response to Covid means the fast spreading Omicron variant could play havoc with reopening the economy.

The Thoughts of Chairman Xi now absolutely dominate and set the internal debate – begging the question: just how will China emerge from the immediate uncertainties of a Property Wobble, Covid and Geopolitical Tension, and the long-term question of how China fits into an evolving global economy?

And, all the time, hiding in the background is the demographic reality: can China get rich before its aging demographic leaves it struggling?

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Will China Pop the Global Everything Bubble? Yes, by Charles Hugh Smith

China will pop the global everything bubble because to China’s leaders, the only worse alternative would be to allow it to persist and grow ever-larger. From Charles Hugh Smith at oftwominds.com:

The line of dominoes that is already toppling extends around the entire global economy and financial system. Plan accordingly.

That China faces structural problems is well-recognized. The list of articles in the August issue of Foreign Affairs dedicated to China reflects this:

Xi’s Gamble: the Race to Consolidate Power and Stave Off Disaster

China’s Economic Reckoning: The Price of Failed Reforms

The Robber Barons of Beijing: Can China Survive its Gilded Age?

Life of the Party: How Secure Is the CCP? (Chinese Communist Party)

These are thorny, difficult issues: a demographic cliff resulting from the one-child policy, soaring wealth-income inequality, pervasive corruption, public health issues (diabesity, etc.), environmental damage and a slowing economy.

What the conventional analysts do not fully grasp, in my view, are 1) the existential threat to the CCP and China’s economy posed by its unprecedented, metastasizing credit-asset bubble and 2) its incipient energy crisis.

As I explained in a recent blog post, What’s Really Going On in China?, the CCP and the government informally institutionalized moral hazard (the disconnection of risk and consequence) as a core economic policy.

Every financial loss, no matter how risky or debt-ridden, was covered by the state (via bail-out, refinancing debt, new loans, etc.) as a “cost of rapid development,” a reflection of the view that some inefficiency and waste was inevitable in the rapid development of industry, housing, infrastructure and a consumer economy.

What China’s leaders did not fully understand was this implicit guarantee of bail-outs–the equivalent of “The Fed has our backs”–incentivized debt-funded speculation as the lowest-risk, highest-return “investment,” especially when compared to low-profit, risky investments in low-margin export industries. (Recall the average profit margins of Chinese exporting enterprises is 1% to 3%.)

This is the hidden driver of China’s sagging productivity and economy: debt in all sectors is skyrocketing to fund speculation, not productivity.

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“Catastrophic” Property Sales Mean China’s Worst Case Scenario Is Now In Play, by Tyler Durden

The financial situation of a number of Chinese property developers is dire, but the most serious issue is the state of the Chinese property market. Property is a huge part of Chinese people’s assets, and weakness there will translate directly into economic weakness and perhaps a recession. From Tyler Durden at zerohedge.com:

o matter how the Evergrande drama plays out – whether it culminates with an uncontrolled, chaotic default and/or distressed asset sale liquidation, a controlled restructuring where bondholders get some compensation, or with Beijing blinking and bailing out the core pillar of China’s housing market – remember that Evergrande is just a symptom of the trends that have whipsawed China’s property market in the past year, which has seen significant contraction as a result of Beijing policies seeking to tighten financial conditions as part of Xi’s new “common prosperity” drive which among other things, seeks to make housing much more affordable to everyone, not just the richest.

As such, any contagion from the ongoing turmoil sweeping China’s heavily indebted property sector will impact not the banks, which are all state-owned entities and whose exposure to insolvent developers can easily be patched up by the state, but the property sector itself, which as Goldman recently calculated is worth $62 trillion making it the world’s largest asset class, contributes a mind-boggling 29% of Chinese GDP (compared to 6.2% in the US) and represents 62% of household wealth.

It’s also why we said that for Beijing the focus is not so much about Evegrande, but about preserving confidence in the property sector.

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