Category Archives: Debt

Sergey Glazyev: ‘The road to financial multipolarity will be long and rocky’, by Pepe Escobar

It’s not easy putting together monetary arrangements that will be accepted by nations comprising over half the world’s population. (SLL maintains that it will be impossible.) From Pepe Escobar at thecradle.co:

In an exclusive interview with The Cradle, Russia’s top macroeconomics strategist criticizes Moscow’s slow pace of financial reform and warns there will be no new global currency without Beijing.

The headquarters of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) in Moscow, linked to the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) is arguably one of the most crucial nodes of the emerging multipolar world.

That’s where I was received by Minister of Integration and Macroeconomics Sergey Glazyev – who was previously interviewed in detail by The Cradle –  for an exclusive, expanded discussion on the geoeconomics of multipolarity.

Glazyev was joined by his top economic advisor Dmitry Mityaev, who is also the secretary of the Eurasian Economic Commission’s (EEC) science and technology council. The EAEU and EEC are formed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The group is currently engaged in establishing a series of free trade agreements with nations from West Asia to Southeast Asia.

Our conversation was unscripted, free flowing and straight to the point. I had initially proposed some talking points revolving around discussions between the EAEU and China on designing a new gold/commodities-based currency bypassing the US dollar, and how it would be realistically possible to have the EAEU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS+ to adopt the same currency design.

Glazyev and Mityaev were completely frank and also asked questions on the Global South. As much as extremely sensitive political issues should remain off the record, what they said about the road towards multipolarity was quite sobering – in fact realpolitik-based.

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Heaven and Hell, by Bill Bonner

Bill Bonner’s grandson got the right grandpa. From Bill Bonner at bonnerprivateresearch.com:

From banking crises to our chapel on the ranch, a look at solid foundations

(Source: Getty Images)

Bill Bonner, reckoning today from San Martin, Argentina…

As predicted…when the fight gets tough, the Fed takes a dive.  

That is what we are watching now…in slow motion.

After the crisis of ’08, the feds insisted that the banks hold more reserves. They were told to buy safe, government debt – T-bonds. The Treasuries were supposed to be financial ballast, designed to keep them safe in a market squall.  

Oh, if only Mother Nature, in all her guises and disguises, would cooperate!  

A storm blew up last week. Now loaded up with Treasury debt, banks are much more solid – on paper – than they were in 2008. But what happened? The ballast sank. And two banks sank with it.

Foxes in the Henhouse

The California bank, Silicon Valley Bank, has a CEO, Greg Becker, who was also a director of the San Francisco Fed. The New York bank, Signature, has none other than Barney Frank, who, along with Elizabeth Warren, actually wrote key parts of the 2010 bank regulations.

But neither regulators nor regulations saved them. As interest rates rose, fixed-return assets, notably bonds, were not as valuable as they had been before. Two years ago, you could get only a 1.5% yield from your 10-year Treasury. Today, the yield is 3.7%. The income stream from the old bond is now worth only half as much as it was. Which means, the value of the banks’ reserves – their balance sheets – fell. As this continues, more banks can be expected to get into trouble. And the Fed will have to bail them out. Or give up its interest rate hikes altogether.

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A Mile-High House of Cards… 3 Ways to Protect Yourself Before Your Bank Collapses, by Nick Giambruno

Cash, gold and silver, and Bitcoin are going to be salvation for a lot of people during the next financial crises. From Nick Giambruno at internationalman.com:

The Truth About Your Bank Deposits

It’s hard to think of a topic where following conventional wisdom is more dangerous than banking.

The general public and most financial experts accept as absolute truth that putting your money in a bank is safe and responsible. After all, the government insures your deposits, so if anything were to go wrong…

As a result, most people put more thought into the shoes they purchase than the bank they entrust with their life savings.

However, the banking system is a mile-high house of cards that could collapse anytime.

Here are three reasons why.

Reason #1: Government Deposit Insurance Is a False Sense of Security

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures bank deposits in the US.

When a bank fails, the FDIC pays depositors up to $250,000. The FDIC has a reserve of around $126 billion for this purpose.

Now, $126 billion is a lot of money. But, considering there are around $9.8 trillion in insured deposits in the US, $126 billion is just a drop in the bucket, around 1.3%, to be exact.

In other words, the FDIC’s reserve has around one penny for every dollar of deposits it insures.

It wouldn’t take much to wipe out the FDIC’s reserves. One large bank failure and the FDIC itself could go bust.

For example, the recently failed Silicon Valley Bank—the largest bank failure since the 2008 crisis—had around $210 billion in customer deposits. That’s $84 billion more than the FDIC’s entire reserve.

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Why the Banking System Is Breaking Up, by Michael Hudson

Inject enough liquidity into the financial system and you get inflation, which means rising interest rates, which means lower financial asset values. Eventually something’s got to give. From Michael Hudson at unz.com:

The collapses of Silvergate and Silicon Valley Bank are like icebergs calving off from the Antarctic glacier. The financial analogy to the global warming causing this collapse of supporting shelving is the rising temperature of interest rates, which spiked last Thursday and Friday to close at 4.60 percent for the U.S. Treasury’s two-year bonds. Bank depositors meanwhile were still being paid only 0.2 percent on their deposits. That has led to a steady withdrawal of funds from banks – and a corresponding decline in commercial bank balances with the Federal Reserve.

Most media reports reflect a prayer that the bank runs will be localized, as if there is no context or environmental cause. There is general embarrassment to explain how the breakup of banks that is now gaining momentum is the result of the way that the Obama Administration bailed out the banks in 2008 with fifteen years of Quantitative Easing to re-inflate prices for packaged bank mortgages – and with them, housing prices, along with stock and bond prices.

The Fed’s $9 trillion of QE (not counted as part of the budget deficit) fueled an asset-price inflation that made trillions of dollars for holders of financial assets – the One Percent with a generous spillover effect for the remaining members of the top Ten Percent. The cost of home ownership soared by capitalizing mortgages at falling interest rates into more highly debt-leveraged property. The U.S. economy experienced the largest bond-market boom in history as interest rates fell below 1 percent. The economy polarized between the creditor positive-net-worth class and the rest of the economy – whose analogy to environmental pollution and global warming was debt pollution.

But in serving the banks and the financial ownership class, the Fed painted itself into a corner: What would happen if and when interest rates finally rose?

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If SVB is insolvent, so is everyone else, by Simon Black

Financial crises stem from too much debt and too much financial interconnection. From Simon Black at sovereignman.com:

On Sunday afternoon, September 14, 2008, hundreds of employees of the financial giant Lehman Brothers walked into the bank’s headquarters at 745 Seventh Avenue in New York City to clear out their offices and desks.

Lehman was hours away from declaring bankruptcy. And its collapse the next day triggered the worst economic and financial devastation since the Great Depression.

The S&P 500 fell by roughly 50%. Unemployment soared. And more than 100 other banks failed over the subsequent 12 months. It was a total disaster.

These bank, it turned out, had been using their depositors’ money to buy up special mortgage bonds. But these bonds were so risky that they eventually became known as “toxic securities” or “toxic assets”.

These toxic assets were bundles of risky, no-money-down mortgages given to sub-prime “NINJAs”, i.e. borrowers with No Income, No Job, no Assets who had a history of NOT paying their bills.

When the economy was doing well in 2006 and 2007, banks earned record profits from their toxic assets.

But when economic conditions started to worsen in 2008, those toxic assets plunged in value… and dozens of banks got wiped out.

Now here we go again.

Fifteen years later… after countless investigations, hearings, “stress test” rules, and new banking regulations to prevent another financial meltdown, we have just witnessed two large banks collapse in the United States of America– Signature Bank, and Silicon Valley Bank (SVB).

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Silicon Valley Bank Crisis: The Liquidity Crunch We Predicted Has Now Begun, by Brandon Smith

Liquidity crises have a way of soon turning into solvency crises. From Brandon Smith at alt-market.com:

By Brandon Smith

There has been an avalanche of information and numerous theories circulating the past few days about the fate of a bank in California know as SVB (Silicon Valley Bank). SVB was the 16th largest bank in the US until it abruptly failed and went into insolvency on March 10th. The impetus for the collapse of the bank is tied to a $2 billion liquidity loss on bond sales which caused the institution’s stock value to plummet over 60%, triggering a bank run by customers fearful of losing some or most of their deposits.

There are many fine articles out there covering the details of the SVB situation, but what I want to talk about more is the root of it all. The bank’s shortfalls are not really the cause of the crisis, they are a symptom of a wider liquidity drought that I predicted here at Alt-Market months ago, including the timing of the event.

First, though, let’s discuss the core issue, which is fiscal tightening and the Federal Reserve. In my article ‘The Fed’s Catch-22 Taper Is A Weapon, Not A Policy Error’, published in December of 2021, I noted that the Fed was on a clear path towards tightening into economic weakness, very similar to what they did in the early 1980s during the stagflation era and also somewhat similar to what they did at the onset of the Great Depression. Former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke even openly admitted that the Fed caused the depression to spiral out of control due to their tightening policies.

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Bank Runs. The First Sign The Fed “Broke Something.” By Lance Roberts

Bank runs are an ever lurking possibility in a fractional reserve banking system. From Lance Roberts at realinvestmentadvice.com:

With the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, questions of potential “bank runs” spread among regional banks.

“Bank runs” are problematic in today’s financial system due to fractional reserve banking. Under this system, only a fraction of a bank’s deposits must be available for withdrawal. In this system, banks only keep a specific amount of cash on hand and create loans from deposits it receives.

Reserve banking is not problematic as long as everyone remains calm. As I noted in the “Stability Instability Paradox:”

The “stability/instability paradox” assumes that all players are rational and such rationality implies an avoidance of complete destruction. In other words, all players will act rationally, and no one will push “the big red button.

In this case, the “big red button” is a “bank run.”

Banks have a continual inflow of deposits which it then creates loans against. The bank monitors its assets, deposits, and liabilities closely to maintain solvency and meet Federal capital and reserve requirements. Banks have minimal risk of insolvency in a normal environment as there are always enough deposit flows to cover withdrawal requests.

However, in a “bank run,” many customers of a bank or other financial institution withdraw their deposits simultaneously over concerns about the bank’s solvency. As more people withdraw their funds, the probability of default increases, prompting a further withdrawal of deposits. Eventually, the bank’s reserves are insufficient to cover the withdrawals leading to failure.

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Money Troubles, by James Howard Kunster

Two from James Howard Kunstler tonight. From Kunstler at kunstler.com:

“As for the evil: It lurks in the interstices of our bureaucratic institutions, which, as they have grown in size and complexity since the nineteenth century, behave in ways that are increasingly impossible to understand and contrary to human flourishing.” — Eugyppius on Substack

       Money is all theoretical… until it’s not. Paper money is bad enough, as France learned under the tutelage of the rascal John Law in the early 1700s. The nation was broke, exhausted by foolish wars, and heaped under unbearable debt. Monsieur Law, a Scottish genius-wizard (the Jerry Lewis of political economy), landed in Paris, cast a spell on the regent Duc d’Orléans, set up a magic credit engine fueled by dreams of untold riches-to-come burgeoning out of the vast, new-found lands called Louisiana up the Mississippi River, and modern finance was born!

       The stock-and-money schemes known as the Mississippi Bubble soon ruined France and put finance in such a bad odor that the word “banque” could not be used in polite society there for a century to come. Monetary inflation became a thing for the first time since Roman days — a much easier trick with printed paper banknotes than with silver coins — but the effect was the same: the evaporation of “wealth” (which is what money supposedly represents). At the height of the crisis, trading in gold was criminalized, though that was so easily worked-around due to sheer custom and habit that the Crown had to re-legalize it. The frenzy from start to finish lasted only a few years, but the nation was set on the path that would eventually lead to revolution. Law ended his days dolefully running card games in Venice.

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Silicon Valley Bank Followed Exactly What Regulation Recommended, by Daniel Lacalle

That’ll teach them to believe the regulators. From Daniel Lacalle at dlacalle.com:

The second largest collapse of a bank in recent history could have been prevented. Now, the impact is too large, and the contagion risk is difficult to measure.

The demise of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is a classic bank run driven by a liquidity event, but the important lesson for everyone is that the enormity of the unrealized losses and financial hole in the bank’s accounts would have not existed if it were not for ultra-loose monetary policy.

Let us explain why.

As of December 31, 2022, Silicon Valley Bank had approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits, according to their public accounts. Their top shareholders are Vanguard Group (11.3%), BlackRock (8.1%), StateStreet (5.2%) and the Swedish pension fund Alecta (4.5%).

The incredible growth and success of SVB could not have happened without negative rates, ultra-loose monetary policy, and the tech bubble that burst in 2022. Furthermore, the bank’s liquidity event could not have happened without the regulatory and monetary policy incentives to accumulate sovereign debt and mortgage-backed securities.

The asset base of Silicon SVB read like the clearest example of the old mantra: “Don’t fight the Fed”.

SVB made one big mistake: Follow exactly the incentives created by loose monetary policy and regulation.

What happened in 2021? Massive success that, unfortunately, was also the first step to its demise. The bank’s deposits nearly doubled with the tech boom. Everyone wanted a piece of the unstoppable new tech paradigm. SVB’s assets also rose and almost doubled.

The bank’s assets rose in value. More than 40% were long-dated Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The rest were seemingly world-conquering new tech and venture capital investments.

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The Collapse of SVB Portends Real Dangers, by Jeffrey A. Tucker

The real danger is a world that has between debt, unfunded liabilities, and derivatives at least 12 times its GDP. The world has never been more indebted, and the blame lies with fiat currencies and fiat debt. It’s immaterial whether SVB or something else sets off the chain reaction; the chain reaction and resultant debt explosion are inevitable. From Jeffrey A. Tucker at The Epoch Times via zerohedge.com:

Thus far in this 3-year fiasco of mismanagement and corruption, we’ve avoided a financial crisis. That’s for specific reasons. We just had not traveled there in the trajectory of the inevitable. Are we there yet? Maybe. In any case, the speed of change is accelerating. All that awaits is to observe the extent of the contagion.

The failure of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), $212 billion in assets until only recently, is a huge mess and a possible foreshadowing. Its fixed-rate bond holdings declined rapidly in market valuation due to changed market conditions. Its portfolio crashed further due to a depositor run. And it all happened in less than a few days.

It’s all an extension of Fed policy to curb inflation, reversing a 13-year zero-rate policy. This of course pushed up rates in the middle and right side of the yield curve, devaluing existing bond holdings locked into older rate patterns. Investors noticed and then depositors too. The high-flying institution that specialized in providing liquidity in industries that have lost their luster suddenly found itself very vulnerable.

In addition, the bank was exposed with a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations and mortgage-backed securities. But with rates rising, those are coming under stress too as high leverage in housing and real estate become untenable amidst falling valuations. Borrowers are finding themselves under water and that in turn adds to stress on lenders.

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